Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's final order of removal. The court concluded that neither the IJ nor the BIA abused their discretion in holding that petitioner had waived her application for relief and protection where she did not file her application for relief by the extended due date for her applications set by the IJ. Further, petitioner abandoned her application for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H) and she was ineligible for such a waiver where she was being deported because she was convicted of falsifying documents, not because she was inadmissible at entry. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Taggar v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and subsequent to the entry of the discharge order of appellant's debts, the trustee learned that appellant had misrepresented the value or existence of a number of assets in the schedules he had filed and in the testimony he gave during the creditors meeting. Finding that the misrepresentations amounted to a violation of 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A), the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to revoke appellant's discharge under section 727(d)(1). Appellant appealed. The court adopted the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and its sister circuits in holding that a material fraud, which would have resulted in the denial of a Chapter 7 discharge had it been known at the time of such discharge, could justify revocation of that discharge under section 727(d)(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's decision. View "Jones v. US Trustee" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Washington statutes that require a certificate of "public convenience and necessity" (PCN) in order to operate a ferry on Lake Chelan in central Washington sate. The court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass a right to operate a public ferry on intrastate navigable waterways and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The court also held that the district court properly abstained from deciding on plaintiffs' challenges to the PCN requirement as applied to the provision of boat transportation services on the lake. The district court properly abstained under the Pullman doctrine, but the district court should have retained jurisdiction instead of dismissing the claim. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded this claim with instructions to the district court to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge. View "Courtney, et al. v. Goltz, et al." on Justia Law

Marshak appealed the district court's preliminary injunction for HRE enjoining Marshak from using the "The Platters" mark in connection with any vocal group with narrow exceptions. At issue was whether the likelihood of irreparable harm must be established - rather than presumed, as under prior Ninth Circuit precedent - by a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in the trademark context. Following eBay v. MarcExchange and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case must establish irreparable harm. The court concluded that HRE was not foreclosed from bringing the underlying suit where prior New York actions (Marshak I and Marshak II) did not have res judicata effect; HRE's trademark infringement claim and request for preliminary injunction was not precluded by the doctrine of laches; the record supported the district court's determination that HRE did not abandon "The Platters" mark; but the fact that the district curt made no factual findings that would support a likelihood of establishing irreparable harm, led the court to reverse the preliminary injunction and to remand to the district court. View "HRE v. Florida Entertainment Mgmt." on Justia Law

Capital One appealed the district court's order remanding a putative class action lawsuit to California state court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. The court concluded that there must ordinarily be facts in evidence to support a finding that two-thirds of putative class members were local state citizens, which was one of the local controversy exception's requirements, if that question was disputed before the district court. A pure inference regarding the citizenship of prospective class members may be sufficient if the class is defined as limited to citizens of the state in question, but otherwise such a finding should not be based on guesswork. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Russian citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court granted the petition, concluding that petitioner met his burden of presenting evidence that the Russian government was unable or unwilling to control the nongovernmental actors who persecuted him because he was a homosexual; in order to obtain relief petitioner requested, he was not required to demonstrate that the Russian government sponsored or condoned the persecution of homosexuals or was unwilling for that reason to control persecution; and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of robbery and assault. At issue was whether petitioner procedurally defaulted a federal habeas claim. In Harris v. Reed, the Supreme Court instructed that a procedural default did not bar consideration of a federal claim unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar. Applying Harris and its Ninth Circuit progeny, the court held that petitioner did not default his claim and vacated the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition. Under Chambers v. McDaniel, the cursory rejection of petitioner's appeal made it quite plausible that the Oregon Court of Appeals reached the merits of petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. View "Smith v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to charges under 21 U.S.C. 841. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of is motion to suppress the fruits of a home search. The court concluded that it was not objectively reasonable for agents to conclude that a houseguest had authority to consent to a search of the master bedroom and bathroom; it was not objectively reasonable for the agents to conclude that the houseguest had authority to consent to a search of the area beyond the door inside the master bedroom; the government's protective sweep fallback argument was waived; and the plain view doctrine did not apply. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court. View "United States v. Arreguin" on Justia Law

HFI filed suit against the Bank alleging trademark infringement and related claims, contending that the Bank's use of its "Hana Bank" mark infringed HFI's "Hana Financial" mark because its use of the word "Hana" in connection with financial services would likely cause confusion. A party claiming trademark ownership must establish priority and one of the ways that a party could establish priority was through the constructive use doctrine known as "tacking." Tacking required a highly fact-sensitive inquiry, and the jury decided the issue after receiving an instruction that correctly conveyed the narrowness of the doctrine. In this instance, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on trademark priority where, viewing the marks in context and in their entirety, the ordinary purchasers could perceive them as conveying the same idea or meaning or evoking the same mental reaction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of HFI's motion for judgment as a matter of law on trademark priority and upheld the jury's verdict. View "Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for removal because his conviction for racketeering under Arizona law constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(J). The language in the indictment, plea agreement, and sentencing order was clear and convincing evidence that petitioner was convicted of an offense coming within the definition of "aggravated felony." Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition, concluding that the BIA did not err in determining that the Arizona conviction constituted an aggravated felony and that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b. View "Murillo-Prado v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law