Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers for violations of his Fourth Amendment right in their searches and seizures and plaintiff's arrest pursuant to warrants. Defendant was arrested for disseminating indecent materials to minors. The court concluded that the officers demonstrated their entitlement to the Messerschmidt v. Millender "shield of immunity" from suit and that the claims against them should be dismissed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the officer's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and remanded. View "Armstrong v. Asselin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted murder, appealed from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The court concluded that a section 2254 petition was not statutorily tolled during the 100-day gap between the denial of his State Court of Appeals Petition and the filing of his State Supreme Court Petition. Therefore, petitioner's section 2254 petition was not timely filed. Further, petitioner failed to make a showing of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo. The district court properly reached its decision without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Stewart v. Cate" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a single count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant's appeal concerned the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, and the related amended Sentencing Guidelines ranges for offenses involving crack cocaine. The court concluded that defendant did not waive her right to appeal the reduced sentence; under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), the district court was required to apply U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 and the district court concluded correctly that under the revised version of section 1B1.10, it could not adjust defendant's sentence below 70 months; the two-step analysis in Dillon v. United States did not hinge to any degree on the substantive content of section 1B1.10 and an amendment of that policy did not affect the two-step process; the district court properly followed the two-step process by first determining that a reduction below 70 months would be inconsistent with section 1B1.10 as revised and declined to grant defendant's full motion; and the court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v.Tercero" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting a senseless murder in a public bus. The prosecutor neglected, however, to discharge his obligation to disclose material information that would have enabled defense counsel to impeach the credibility of a critical witness against defendant. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that the prosecutor violated defendant's right to due process under Brady v. Maryland and defendant was entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus and release defendant from custody unless the district attorney timely initiated proceedings for a new trial. View "Amado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced to 450 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued that his guilty plea and sentence must be set aside because the district court impermissibly and prejudicially participated in his plea negotiations. The court followed United States v. Davila and reviewed the district court's alleged violation of Rule 11(c)(1) in light of the prejudice inquiry required. The court found that the district court participated in the parties' plea discussions by prematurely committing itself to a sentence of a specific severity and the district court's participation prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, the court held that the plea must be vacated and the appeal remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Kyle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who has a history of bipolar disorder, delusions, Parkinson's disease, and hypertension, filed suit pro se against defendants, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed his claim and plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Bannister because plaintiff failed to submit evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dr. Bannister was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Warden Neven and nurses Grisham, Diliddo, and Balao-Cledera because plaintiff expressly waived his appeal against them in his reply brief; vacated the clerk's entry of judgment in favor of Defendant Dr. Sussman because the district court abused its discretion in failing to comply with Rule 4(m); vacated the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request for leave to amend his second amended complaint to name additional defendants; and remanded with instructions to comply with Rule 4(m) with respect to Dr. Sussman and to allow plaintiff leave to amend his second amended complaint. View "Crowley v. Bannister" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The California Court of Appeal had found that the custodial confession at issue was obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, but that it was harmless error. The district court conditionally granted the petition, finding that the California Court of Appeal's harmless error determination conflicted with the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Harrison v. United States. Harrison held that when a defendant's trial testimony was induced by the erroneous admission of a confession into evidence, the trial testimony could not be introduced in a subsequent prosecution, nor could it be used to support the initial conviction on harmless error review. Harrison outlined a clear exclusionary rule that applied to the States; Harrison did not conflict with Motes v. United States; and Harrison remained clearly established law subsequent to Oregon v. Elstad. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that federal habeas corpus relief under section 2254(d)(1) was warranted. The court affirmed the district court's and state appellate court's conclusion that law enforcement's communications with petitioner did not comply with the clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny. The court vacated portions of the district court's order and judgment that concluded second-degree murder convictions were an appropriate remedy, remanding to the district court to issue a conditional writ. View "Lujan v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ralphs alleging violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. On appeal, Ralphs challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration was procedurally unconscionable where, among other things, agreeing to Ralphs' policy was a condition of applying for employment and the terms were not disclosed to plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it. In regards to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded, among other things, that Ralphs' terms required that the arbitrator impose significant costs on the employee up front, regardless of the merits of the employee's claims, and severely limited the authority of the arbitrator to allocate arbitration costs in the award. Further, the state law supporting such a conclusion was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavarria v. Ralphs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit on behalf of current and former students, alleging that Corinthian engaged in a deceptive scheme to entice the enrollment of prospective students in violation of California law. Corinthian moved to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in plaintiffs' enrollment agreements. The court concluded that the Broughton-Cruz rule, which exempted claims for "public injunctive relief" from arbitration, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. In the alternative, the court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were within the scope of their arbitration agreements and plaintiffs were required to arbitrate their public injunction claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying Corinthian's motion to compel arbitration and remanded. View "Ferguson, et al. v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plant, a California corporation that sold Fiberboard-manufactured asbestos-based insulation, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. At issue on appeal was whether Plant's bankruptcy plan, which allegedly left a group of insurers paying more than their fair share on a large number of asbestos personal injury claims, complied with the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in confirming the plan where the Trust, in connection with which the plan's injunctions were to be implemented, failed to satisfy the requirements of section 524(g). Accordingly, the court vacated the order of the bankruptcy court affirming Plant's Restated Second Amended Plan of Reorganization and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Plant Insulation Co." on Justia Law