Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

APAC petitioned for review of a settlement agreement between the BPA and a large number of its customers. The settlement set terms for refunding customers who were previously over-charged, as well as setting terms for the next seventeen years. APAC alleged that the settlement violated several provisions of the Pacific Northwest Power Planning and Conservation Act (NWPA), 16 U.S.C. 839c(c), 839e(b); the Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. 832d(a); regulations of the Federal Energy Commission, 18 C.F.R. 300.1(b)(6), 300.21(e)(1); and the court's decision in Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. BPA and Golden NW. Aluminum, Inc. v. BPA. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that APAC had standing to challenge the settlement because of the "pass-through" contracts under which its members pay rates that directly reflect the rates BPA charged its direct customers. On the merits, the court concluded that the settlement complied with the relevant statutory requirements and with the court's prior decisions. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "APAC v. BPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Russia, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioner was denied due process when the government was allowed to introduce its forensic report on a medical document without prior notice and by refusing a continuance to allow petitioner to investigate the report; the court concluded that petitioner had suffered past persecution; but the court rejected petitioner's contention that the government improperly disclosed information contained in his asylum application. The court granted the petition, remanding to allow petitioner a reasonable opportunity to investigate the forensic report on the medical report and to present additional evidence. View "Bondarenko v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Arizona filed suit against ASARCO on behalf of Angela Aguilar and the state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. These proceedings were consolidated and removed to federal court. The jury found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims only and the jury did not find any compensatory damages for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also awarded Aguilar $868,750 in punitive damages. The district court subsequently ordered that the punitive damages be reduced to $300,000, which was the statutory maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO's size. The court concluded that the punitive damages award was outside of constitutional limits and must be vacated. The court concluded that the requirement of a reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages suggested that these damages should be reduced. However, given ASARCO's highly reprehensible conduct and the presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title VII damages cap, the court concluded that the Constitution did not bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award. Therefore, on remand, the district court could reorder a new trial unless plaintiff accepted a remittitur of $125,000. View "State of Arizona v. ASARCO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that officers in the Army caused his infant son's death by ordering his pregnant wife, a servicewoman on active duty, to perform physical training in contravention of her doctors' instructions, which ultimately induced premature labor. The district court held that the suit was barred by the Feres doctrine and dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Feres doctrine immunizes the United States from liability for tort claims arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that, under its own precedent, Feres barred plaintiff's wrongful death claim. The court employed the "genesis test," by asking whether the family member's Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., claim had its genesis in injuries to members of the armed forces. In this case, the infant's injury derived from his mother's military service. The court rejected plaintiff's claim that genetic injuries differed from claims based upon injuries incurred in utero. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Ritchie v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder-for-hire and victim tampering. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred by denying his pre-judgment motion for new trial without reaching the merits of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court concluded that the district court did not err in this case by deferring consideration of defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to collateral review, when a complete record would be available. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying the motion for a new trial. View "United States v. Steele" on Justia Law

137 named plaintiffs filed suit against 25 financial institutions alleging, among other things, that the institutions' deceptive mortgage lending and securitization practices decreased the value of their homes, impaired their credit scores, and compromised their privacy. The court concluded that the action was properly removed from state court to federal court because more than 100 named plaintiffs proposed a joint trial and because the other prerequisites of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, were satisfied. However, the court reversed and remanded to the district court to dismiss without prejudice the claims of all plaintiffs but the first named plaintiff because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a), the First Amended Complaint did not present common questions of law. View "Visendi v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. As part of a reverse sting operation, an ATF undercover agent, working with a confidential informant, recruited defendants to carry out an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash. Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the fake robbery was the product of outrageous government conduct. The court affirmed the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that defendants have not met the extremely high standard of demonstrating that the facts underlying their arrest and prosecution were so extreme as to violate fundamental fairness or were so grossly shocking as to violate the universal sense of justice. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting their sentencing entrapment arguments were any error was harmless. View "United States v. Black" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner was charged with seventeen counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon children in violation of various provisions of the California Penal Code. The court denied the petition, holding that petitioner was an alien convicted of an aggravated felony within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) because petitioner's state crime of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), was a categorical crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) where it posed a substantial risk of the use of physical force. View "Rodriguez-Castellon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona death row prisoner, appealed from the district court's order dismissing his motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Petitioner alleged three ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that were neither presented in state post-conviction proceedings nor included in his initial federal habeas corpus petition. The court concluded that none of petitioner's arguments amounted to an allegation of a "defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings" that constituted grounds for a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, petitioner was arguing in essence that he deserved "a second chance to have the merits determined favorably" in the context of a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The court held that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's successive section 2254 habeas petition. Even if petitioner's motion was permissible under Rule 60(b), petitioner failed to satisfy the standards for relief from judgment under that rule. Likewise, petitioner failed to meet the stringent standards of a section 2254 habeas petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion in No. 13-16928 and denied petitioner's motion to seek relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The court denied petitioner's as construed application in No. 13-16928 and his separate application in No. 13-73647 to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition. View "Jones, Jr. v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, seeking to compel the Agencies to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the state's five oil refineries under the CAA. On appeal, Intervenor WSPA argued that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the parties' dispositive motions on the merits because plaintiffs have not met their burden in satisfying the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements for Article III standing under either the causality or redressability prong discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order on the parties' dispositive motions and remanded with instructions that the action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon" on Justia Law