Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that petitioner did not present evidence of imputed political opinion that would compel any reasonable factfinder to conclude that petitioner was subject to persecution because of imputed political beliefs; the reports submitted by petitioner did not compel the conclusion that the Guatemalan government had acquiesced in torture against women, whether as a result of corruption or through cooperation with criminals; and, therefore, substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that petitioner was not persecuted "on account of" a protected ground and that petitioner failed to establish the state action necessary for CAT relief. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Garcia-Milian v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with production, distribution, receipt, and possession of child pornography. Law enforcement officers found 3,400 electronic images and 632 electronic videos of commercial child pornography pursuant to a warrant authorizing an electronic search of all of defendant's computer equipment and digital storage devices. The district court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the government appealed. The court concluded that, because there was a fair probability that evidence of child pornography would be found on defendant's computer system, the underlying facts supported a finding of probable cause; the warrant was not overbroad and did not raise the risks inherent in over-seizing that the court considered in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT III); the absence of precautionary search protocols, suggested as guidance in the plurality's concurring opinion in CDT III, was not fatal here; and, therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Schesso" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Armenia, sought review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's decision declaring her asylum application frivolous. The BIA affirmed the IJ's determination that petitioner knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and that she was statutorily barred from adjustment of status and a 8 U.S.C. 1182(i) waiver on that basis. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record that supported the IJ's and BIA's findings that petitioner received the required warnings and petitioners' arguments to the contrary were without merit. In Matter of X-M-C-, 25I. & N., the BIA held that the only action required to trigger a frivolousness inquiry was the filing of an asylum application and that the IJ and BIA were not prevented from finding that an application was frivolous simply because the applicant withdrew the application or recanted false statements. Even if 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6) were ambiguous, the court nonetheless owed Chevron deference to the BIA's published interpretation of the statute, which was reasonable and well-grounded in the policy behind the statute. Accordingly, the court held that section 2258(d)(6) permitted a frivolousness finding based on a withdrawn application and denied the petition for review. View "Kulakchyan v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

On interlocutory appeal, the government challenged the district court's grant of reconsideration and suppression of evidence found at an apartment defendant had entered several times in recent days before the search. At issue was whether the warrantless search of the apartment was valid under the Fourth Amendment because defendant was subject to a parole search condition. The court concluded that under its "relatively stringent" standard, the officers lacked probable cause to conclude that defendant lived at the apartment that they searched. In this instance, it was abundantly clear that the searched property was a residence, a parole condition permitting searches of "your residence and any property under your control" was triggered only when the officers have probable cause that the parolee lives at the residence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

Petitioner, along with one of his accomplices, was found guilty of murder. After petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, the court granted a certificate of appealability to the issue of whether the exclusion of the accomplice's statement violated petitioner's right to present a complete defense. The court concluded that the holding of the California Court of Appeal that the accomplice's confession was properly excluded was entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The accomplice gave three conflicting and contradictory versions of the murder and it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that these statements rendered the accomplice's own inculpatory statement unreliable. View "Phillips v. Herndon" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography. On appeal, defendant challenged his 240-month concurrent sentences. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in considering defendant's compelled statements obtained during sex offender treatment in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court left the issue of the admissibility of a witness's testimony for the district court on remand and declined to reassign the case. View "United States v. Bahr, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former prison gang member and police informant. Defendants are producers of the documentary television series, "Gangland." Plaintiff filed suit for various claims alleging that defendants' failure to conceal his identity in an episode of "Gangland" endangered his life and cost him his job as an informant. On interlocutory appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) motion to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. The court concluded that defendants have met their initial burden under the anti-SLAPP statute where defendants' acts in furtherance of their right of free speech were in connection with issues of public interest. The court also concluded that, at this juncture, plaintiff's claims were not barred by the release he signed. It follows that plaintiff's statements were not barred by the parole evidence rule. The court further concluded that plaintiff met his burden of showing a probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) public disclosure of private fact; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) false promise; and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable probability of prevailing on his claims for (1) appropriation of likeness and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to death on each of two counts of first-degree murder, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. On appeal, petitioner raised claims regarding the trial court's use of dual juries at trial; the trial court's use of a leg brace as a security measure during trial; and whether the sentencing judge properly considered all mitigating evidence under Lockett v. Ohio and Eddings v. Oklahoma. The court concluded that the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's "courtroom layout" and Lockett/Eddings claims, because the Arizona Supreme Court's decision denying relief was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court agreed with the State that the Lockett/Eddings line of cases held only that a sentencer must fully consider proffered mitigation evidence and did not affect a sentencer's determination of its weight. In this instance, the record made clear that the trial court adequately considered and weighed the mitigation evidence. The court also concluded that the district court properly denied relief on petitioner's remaining dual juries and "shackling" claims, because the claims were procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McKinney v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this instance, petitioner filed his federal petition well over one year after his conviction became final. However, the Supreme Court has long recognized, under Schlup v. Delo, that in a "narrow class of cases... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice," federal courts could hear the merits of a habeas petition despite an otherwise applicable procedural bar. Petitioner contended, and the district court concluded, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be considered on the merits despite its untimeliness because he is innocent. The court concluded that it was simply implausible that McQuiggin v. Perkins would alter the district court's conclusions about the credibility of petitioner's evidence, because the district court already undertook the precise analysis that Perkins prescribes. Because the court concluded that petitioner met the demanding Schlup standard, the court must exercise the "equitable discretion" of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors did not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that petitioner had made the requisite showing that he is actually innocent. View "Larsen v. Soto" on Justia Law

Barry Bonds's conviction of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1503, arose from Bonds's testimony before a grand jury investigation regarding whether the proceeds of the sales of performance enhancing drugs were being laundered. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 1503 applied to factually true statements that were evasive or misleading. Bonds could not escape criminal liability under section 1503 by contending that his response that he was a "celebrity child" was true. The court also concluded that Bonds's contention that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that section 1503 did not apply to a witness's statements before the grand jury was foreclosed by established precedent; the court rejected Bonds's argument that the use of the word "corruptly" in section 1503 was unconstitutionally vague and failed to put him on notice that his conduct was criminal; the indictment was sufficient; and the indictment and the jury instructions made clear that Bonds could be convicted on the basis of individual statements that were evasive or misleading. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law