Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to four drug offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by associating with known felons. Under United States v. Miller, the court held that a defendant's term of supervise release did not begin when the Bureau of Prisons places him in home confinement as part of his federal sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the court affirmed the trial court's order revoking defendant's term of supervised release and imposing additional terms where the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's term of supervised release. View "United States v. Earl" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioners, convicted of first degree murder. The district court concluded that petitioners' Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court removed the only juror advocating for acquittal. The district court removed the juror for willful misconduct under California Penal Code 1089 because she offered her expert opinion on petitioners' mental health and violated the court's instructions by consulting a dictionary in order to obtain a medical definition that she presented to her fellow jurors during deliberations. The court concluded that, without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent guidance in this area, the district court erred in applying a de novo review of petitioners' claims instead of applying the appropriate standard of review under section 2254(d). The court also concluded, inter alia, that the state court's determination that the trial court properly discharged the juror for cause was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Further, Petitioner DeMola failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in regards to her sentence. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanded for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree robbery, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, alleging prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor knowingly elicited and then failed to correct false testimony. The district court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct violated Napue v. Illinois but upheld the conviction because the district court found that it was not reasonably likely that, absent the misconduct, petitioner would have obtained a more favorable verdict. The court concluded that, in rejecting petitioner's claim, the state court applied a harmlessness standard that was "contrary to" the harmlessness standard required by Napue. The Napue standard was different from the ordinary harmlessness standard, and was referred to in Napue and its progeny as a "materiality" standard. Even assuming that the state court applied the Napue materiality standard, its application of that standard would have constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dow v. Virga" on Justia Law

The Secretary appealed the district court's order certifying a nationwide class of Medicare beneficiaries and granting summary judgment in the beneficiaries' favor. The beneficiaries raised two claims: (1) the Secretary's practice of demand "up front" reimbursement for secondary payments from beneficiaries who have appealed a reimbursement determination or sought waiver of the reimbursement obligation was inconsistent with the secondary payer provisions of the Medicare statutory scheme; and (2) the Secretary's practice violated their due process rights. The court concluded that Patricia Haro had Article III standing on behalf of the class; John Balentine, as counsel for Haro, had Article III standing on his individual claim; and the beneficiaries' claims for injunctive relief were not moot and Article III's justiciability requirements were satisfied. The court concluded, however, that the beneficiaries' claim was not adequately presented to the agency at the administrative level and therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). On the merits of Balentine's claim, the court concluded that the Secretary's interpretation of the secondary payer provisions was reasonable. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's injunctions, reversed the district court's summary judgment order, and remanded for consideration of the beneficiaries' due process claim. View "Haro v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

The district court found that the Secretary violated the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection when the Secretary declined to enter into a self-determination contract with the Tribe to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation. The court concluded that no reading of the ISDA authorized federal courts to grant relief when the Secretary properly denied a contract; the Tribe's argument that the BIA's failure to fund law enforcement on the Los Coyotes Reservation was a violation of the APA was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent; there was a meaningful distinction between Public Law 280 states and non-Public Law 280 states and such a distinction provided a rational basis for prioritizing law enforcement funding in non-Public Law 280 states; and the BIA's funding policy did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a professor, filed suit alleging that university administrators retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment for distributing a short pamphlet and drafts from an in-progress book. The court held that there was an exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos for teaching and academic writing. Pickering v. Board of Education governed such teaching and writing by publicly employed teachers. The court affirmed the district court's determination that plaintiff prepared and circulated his pamphlet pursuant to official duties; reversed its determination that the pamphlet did not address matters of public concern; concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that the in-progress book triggered retaliation; and held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity given the uncertain state of the law in the wake of Garcetti. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Demers v. Austin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Apple alleging federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiff alleged that Apple encoded iTS music files with its proprietary Digital Rights Management (DRM), called FairPlay, which rendered iTS music and the iPod compatible only with each other. Plaintiff also alleged claims that through certain software updates, Apple excluded competitors and obtained a monopoly in the portable digital media player (PDMP) and music download markets, which inflated Apple's music prices and deflated the value of the iPod. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's July 2009 order denying her motion to certify a class of indirect purchasers of the iPod under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that, because plaintiff abandoned the individual claim for which she sought class certification, the issue of whether the district court erred in denying her motion to certify that claim for class treatment was waived. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's monopolization claim for damages based on the theory of diminution in iPod value on the ground that it was barred by Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois; properly dismissed plaintiff's claim for damages based on supracompetitive music prices; and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief where plaintiff's alleged inability to play her music freely was not an "antitrust injury" that affected competition and could, therefore, not serve as the basis for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of class certification and dismissal of plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Somers v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Drakes Bay challenged the Secretary's discretionary decision to let Drakes Bay's permit for commercial oyster farming expire according to its terms. Drakes Bay subsequently sought a preliminary injunction under Section 124 of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and various federal regulations. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider whether the Secretary violated constitutional, regulatory, or other legal mandates or restrictions. On the merits, the court concluded that a preliminary injunction was not warranted where the likelihood of success on the merits of these claims was too remote to justify the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction. Congress left the decision to grant or deny an extension to the Secretary's discretion; the Secretary neither violated any statutory mandate nor did he misapprehend his authority under the various statutes raised by Drakes Bay; even if NEPA compliance was required in this instance, the Secretary conducted an adequate NEPA review process; and Drakes Bay lacked standing to challenge the publication of the notice in the Federal Registrar. Further, Drakes Bay has failed to show that the balance of the equities weighs in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Dandino petitioned under 49 U.S.C. 521(b)(9) for review of an order of the FMCSA affirming a civil penalty to Dandino for transporting goods after the agency had revoked its operating authority and before that authority was reinstated. The court held that, for purposes of section 521(b)(9), when a final agency order was mailed to a party, and there was no proof of actual receipt, there was a rebuttable presumption that the order was received within three days of mailing. Applying this holding to these circumstances, the court concluded that Dandino's petition was timely. However, on the merits, the court concluded that Dandino's concession that it operated "without the required operating authority" was dispositive of its petition on the merits. The court rejected Dandino's remaining claim and dismissed the petition for review. View "Dandino, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foie gras producers and sellers, appealed the district court's denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of California from enforcing California Health & Safety Code 25982. Section 25982 banned the sale of products that were the result of force feeding birds to enlarge their livers beyond normal size. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to the Attorney General. The court dismissed the State of California and Governor Brown from the lawsuit because they were immune from suit. The court concluded that the only product covered by section 25982 at issue in this appeal was foie gras; plaintiffs' Due Process Clause challenge failed because section 25982's definition for force feeding was not vague and the statute gave fair notice of prohibited conduct; and section 25982 did not violate the Commerce Clause because it was not discriminatory, did not directly regulate interstate commerce, and did not substantially burden interstate commerce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because plaintiffs failed to raise a serious question that they were likely to succeed on the merits. View "Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards v. Harris" on Justia Law