Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when the EPA sent two letters to Anderson notifying Anderson of its potential liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., for environmental contamination of the Portland Harbor Superfund Site. Anderson's general liability insurer, St. Paul, declined to provide Anderson with a legal defense. St. Paul argued that the letters sent to Anderson were not "suits" because they were not filed in a court of law. The court held that the letters were "suits" within the meaning of the policies; the letters alleged facts sufficient to alert Anderson to its potential liability for environmental contamination under CERCLA; and, therefore, St. Paul breached its duty to defend Anderson. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of Anderson and also affirmed the attorney's fee award in Anderson's favor in light of the court's holding on the merits. View "Anderson Bros. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their sentences after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess an unregistered firearm. Defendants had purchased a grenade launder from an undercover ATF agent. In consolidated appeals, at issue was the definition of a missile under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(f). Adopting the common meaning of the word missile, the court held that the definition of a missile, under the sentencing guidelines, was a self-propelled device designed to deliver an explosive. The court concluded that the 40-mm cartridges in this case did not qualify as missiles, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise and enhancing defendants' base offense level by fifteen levels. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former prison guard in India, challenged the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal because he had assisted in the persecution of others on account of political opinion. The court granted the petition for review, concluding that the decisions of the IJ and BIA reflected a misunderstanding and misapplication of relevant precedent. The court remanded under INS v. Ventura to consider whether petitioner purposefully assisted in the alleged persecution. In doing so, the BIA should consider in particular whether the work of a sentry on the perimeter of an intelligence facility was integral not only to the functioning of the facility but also to the persecution that occurred inside of it, and the differences between the role of a Nazi guard at a Nazi concentration camp and petitioner, an individual working for a legitimate arm of a recognized government at a legitimate prison facility. View "Kumar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally storing hazardous wastes without a permit in violation of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(2). The hazardous wastes at issue were used toluene and excess methanol. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court properly instructed the jury that, for purposes of the RCRA, "disposal" of hazardous waste begins not with an individual's subjective decision to dispose but with an act of disposal. View "United States v. Humphries" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of using a thermal lance to cut open the back of an ATM in order to steal the money it contained. Under 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), a mandatory ten-year consecutive sentence was imposed on anyone who "uses fire... to commit any felony." The enhancement was increased to twenty mandatory consecutive years for a second offense. Rejecting the government's definition of "fire," the court concluded that the use of a thermal lance tool - designed to cut through metal using extreme heat - did not fall within the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of "uses fire." Further, the purpose, context, and history of the statute make clear that it was not intended to apply to the use of a tool such as the thermal lance that was not designed to cause fire. Finally, application of the rule of lenity was required in these circumstances where defendants did not have "fair warning" that their conduct was subject to the enhancement penalty of section 844(h)(1). Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions under section 844(h)(1) and reversed as to the conspiracy counts as well. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Landon Wynar, a sophomore high school student, was suspended from school after he made a string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages sent from home to his friends. Landon and his father sued the school district and others (collectively, "Douglas County") for violations of Landon's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court held that, when faced with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools could take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech that met the requirements of Tinker v. DesMoines. In this instance, the court concluded that it was reasonable for Douglas County to interpret the messages as a real risk and to forecast a substantial disruption. Further, Landon's messages threatening the student body as a whole, and targeted specific students by name, impinged on the rights of the students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, the court held that Douglas County's actions did not violate the First Amendment. The court also held that Landon received adequate due process before both his 10-day suspension and his 90-day expulsion. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district. View "Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of felony murder after he and his girlfriend robbed the house of her stepmother. After they left the stepmother hogtied and face-down with a sheet taped around her head, the stepmother was not breathing and had no pulse when police arrived. Petitioner argued that the "logical nexus" requirement between the robbery and the death was unconstitutionally vague, that its application in his case was unconstitutionally retroactive, and that the trial court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions violated his constitutional rights. The court rejected petitioner's void-for-vagueness argument, concluding that there was a clear connection between the felony petitioner set out to commit and the stepmother's subsequent death. The court also concluded that petitioner was unable to identify any California case actually absolving a criminal defendant of felony murder for a killing done by his accomplice during a felony but not in furtherance of a felony. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Because there was a clear logical nexus between petitioner's crime and the stepmother's death, failure to instruct the jury on the required connection could not have prejudiced petitioner. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. View "Cavitt v. Cullen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of Senate Bill 1172, which banned state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" ("SOCE") with patients under 18 years of age, because it violated the First Amendment and infringed on several other constitutional rights. Undertaking plenary review, the court held that SB 1172 was a regulation of professional conduct and, therefore, did not violate the free speech rights of SOCE practitioners or minor patients under rational basis review. The court also held that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad and did not violate parents' fundamental rights. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting preliminary relief in Case No. 13-15023 and affirmed the denial of preliminary relief in Case No. 12-17681. View "Pickup, et al. v. Brown, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Applicants sought a four-month exemption from the per page Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system fee. At issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to review the district court's administrative order denying the exemption. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1291 necessarily refers to final decisions of a judicial character, not to administrative actions outside the scope of the litigative function. Because the order denying applicants a PACER fee exemption came before the court strictly in an administrative context, the court could not review under section 1291. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "In re: Application for Exemption from Electronic Public Access Fees" on Justia Law

This case concerned Hawaii's "Act 163," Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-1134(c), which barred students from attending public school after the last day of the school year in which they turned 20. At issue was whether state-funded high school diploma programs for adults who never graduated from high school were a form of "public education" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(B)(I). The Community Schools for Adults offers "free public education" to students who did not require IDEA services. The Department offers, at taxpayer expense, the opportunity for nondisabled 20- and 21-year-olds to complete their secondary educations and earn high school diplomas. Providing IDEA services to disabled children of those ages would therefore be consistent with "State law or practice... respecting the provision of public education," so the state must do so. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment for the State on the IDEA claim, holding that Act 163 violated federal law. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "E.R.K. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law