Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Planned Parenthood and others filed suit challenging Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) as a violation of the federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 35-196.05(B) barred patients eligible for the state's Medicaid program from obtaining covered family planning services through health care providers who performed abortions in cases other than medical necessity, rape, or incest. The court concluded that the district court's entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction mooted Arizona's appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court dismissed that appeal (Case No. 12-17558), and considered only Arizona's appeal of the summary judgment order and permanent injunction (Case No. 13-15506). The court held that the Medicaid Act's free-choice-of-provider requirement conferred a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court also held that the Arizona statute contravenes the Medicaid Act's requirement that states give Medicaid recipients a free choice of qualified provider. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment and permanent injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Betlach" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.110(3)(g), which prohibited driving with over 2ng/ml of marijuana in the blood, assimilated into federal law under the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction because an applicable federal regulation punished his conduct, thereby precluding assimilation of Nevada law. The court agreed with the district court that there was a gap in federal law which could be properly filled by Nevada's per se drugged driving law where there was no indication of an overriding federal policy with which Nevada's per se drugged driving law interfered and where there was a gap in federal law with respect to punishing operators of vehicles who exceeded a per se drug limit regardless of impairment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of brandishing a firearm in the presence of the occupant of a motor vehicle, in violation of California Penal Code section 417.3. An IJ subsequently determined that petitioner's conviction was for a "crime of violence" and thereby an "aggravated felony," making petitioner statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and for asylum. The IJ denied withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief on the merits. After petitioner appealed, the BIA affirmed the IJ's conclusion but issued its own reasoned decision. Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision. The court dismissed the petition for review, concluding that California Penal Code section 417.3 qualified categorically as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and, therefore, petitioner was an aggravated felon who was ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). View "Bolanos v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, Ernst & Young filed a motion to compel arbitration of state wage and hour claims asserted by its former employee. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Ernst & Young had waived its right to arbitration by failing to assert that right as a defense in an action brought by two other former employees. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff had not established any prejudice as a result of Ernst & Young's alleged delay in asserting its arbitral rights. View "Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the district alleging claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the district. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reconsidering its prior order denying summary judgment where the district court found that it had committed clear error by not considering whether plaintiff gave a sufficient explanation for the conflict between her ADA claim and her Nevada Public Employees' Retirement Systems (PERS) application under the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp. Under the standard set forth in Cleveland, the court concluded that plaintiff gave sufficient explanations for the inconsistencies between her ADA claim and her PERS and Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, applications to survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Smith v. Clark County School District" on Justia Law

Debtor was required to make contributions to the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund pursuant to a multiemployer bargaining agreement (the Agreement). When the Agreement expired, debtor no longer was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement and stopped making payments. The Fund subsequently filed suit because debtor was still doing work covered by the Agreement and was subject to withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.C. 1381. Debtor then filed for bankruptcy and sought a discharge of his debt to the Fund. The Fund filed a complaint under 11 U.S.C. 523(c) to prevent discharge, seeking to establish that the debt qualified as one created via defalcation by a fiduciary under section 523(a)(4). The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dischargeability of the Fund's claim against debtor; debtor was not a fiduciary of the Fund because the unpaid withdrawal liability was not an asset of the Fund; and debtor's failure to challenge the withdrawal liability amount in arbitration did not act as a waiver of his right to discharge the debt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Moxley" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, was found removable because he had committed a theft offense that qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). At issue was whether the government proved that petitioner was convicted of a qualifying felony theft offense. Applying the modified categorical approach, the court concluded that petitioner was clearly and unambiguously charged as a principal who personally drove or took the vehicle of another, without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of it under California Vehicle Code section 10851(a). Further, the BIA has held that section 10851(a) was a categorical theft offense even though, in some circumstances, it criminalizes taking a vehicle temporarily. The court has also defined a "theft offense" to include taking property without consent and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property, even if the deprivation is less than total or permanent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to add a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k, against former outside directors of Peregrine. The district court denied leave to amend the complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile because the "negative causation" defense barred plaintiff's proposed claim. The court concluded that Section 11 imposed broad liability without regard to reliance or fraudulent intent for any material misstatements or omissions contained in a registration statement for the first year that the registration statement was available. In this instance, plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the material misstatements at issue caused his losses, and thus amending the complaint would not be futile. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hildes v. Arthur Andersen LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a former Maricopa County Board of Supervisors member and his spouse, filed suit against defendants, former prosecutors and their spouses, alleging that defendants initiated a frivolous federal civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., suit against plaintiffs. The suit was part of an ongoing "political war" in Maricopa County. The prosecutors claimed that they were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from any claims arising out of their filing of the civil RICO action. The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were not sufficiently "analogous to those of a prosecutor." Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendants' motions to dismiss based on these claims. View "Stapley v. Pestalozzi" on Justia Law

The district court granted petitioner's petition for a 28 U.S.C. 2254 writ of habeas corpus, concluding that petitioner had ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that California's Court of Appeal's application of the Strickland v. Washington standard was unreasonable. The district court also concluded that the Court of Appeal's factual findings in support of its decision were unreasonable. Counsel failed to timely object to an unsworn witness's testimony, knowing at the time that the witness had decided to change his story, and, therefore, counsel waived any objections he might of had to the testimony. The court affirmed, concluding that the Court of Appeal's conclusion that counsel's decision not to object in a timely fashion was acceptably tactical and not error was objectively unreasonable; the Court of Appeal's factual determinations were unsupported by the record and thus demonstrably and clearly erroneous; and petitioner was prejudiced by these errors. View "Griffin v. Harrington" on Justia Law