Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon and was sentenced to 46-months in prison. The principal issue on appeal concerned U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), which assigned criminal history points for crimes that were committed when the defendant was a juvenile. The court concluded that consideration of juvenile criminal history in determining the sentence for an adult convicted of a crime did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court also concluded that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to determine that defendant's prior attempted burglary conviction was for a "crime of violence" did not survive the Supreme Court's recent decision in Descamps v. United States. Further, the government has never contended in this litigation that the burglary statute was categorically a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing without the "crime of violence" enhancement. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly filing false federal income tax returns. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's revocation of her probation. The court concluded that the record demonstrated defendant's fugitive status. Because defendant's fugitive status tolled her Probation Term from July 2010 until she was found and arrested by federal authorities in April 2012, the time added to her Probation Term extended it well beyond its original expiration date. Consequently, the Revocation hearing occurred during defendant's Probation Term and the district court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Grant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the CDCR and others after she was terminated from her independent contractor position as a nurse and was unable to find other work within the CDCR. The court held that a state agency did not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors could ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more was required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of property claim where her orientation documents did not contain any such assurances. The court also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal deprivation of liberty claim where her liberty interest was in her profession as a nurse, not her placement with a particular employer. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Defendant Hill where plaintiff's allegations concerning him were conclusory and implausible on their face. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Blantz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a severely disabled student, filed suit arguing that he was entitled to remain at a private school he had been attending since the age of seven. The Department issued a formal notice that plaintiff's special education placement at the school would end when he turned 20 years old. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled to remain at the school until he was 22 years old. At issue on appeal was whether the "stay put" provision in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1415j, applied to a student who has exceeded a state-imposed age limit on eligibility for public education. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court correctly granted plaintiff's motion for stay put. Plaintiff was entitled to remain at the school as his stay-put placement from the date he filed his administrative complaint and he was entitled to remain there until his case was finally resolved. View "A.D. v. State of Hawaii Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the government's reinstatement of a removal order issued in 1997. Petitioner contended that ICE could not deport him on the basis of his prior removal order because a federal district court found that due process violations in his 1997 immigration hearing rendered the removal order invalid as a predicate for criminal prosecution under 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that petitioner was prejudiced by ICE agents' misinformation or lack of information regarding his criminal prosecution, as well as by the absence of an opportunity to contest the reinstatement determination at a meaningful time. Accordingly, the court remanded to ICE to provide that opportunity and to reconsider its reinstatement determination in light of the district court's findings regarding petitioner's 1997 removal proceedings. The court expressed no view as to that determination on remand. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Villa-Anguiano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegal reentry after deportation and subsequently appealed his sentence of 30 months' imprisonment. The district court concluded that his 2005 Illinois conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse was a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In Descamps v. United States, the Supreme Court clarified the proper application of the modified categorical approach. Applying Descamps, the court concluded that the district court erred in holding that defendant's crime was a crime of violence, an error which resulted from the district court's application of the modified categorical approach when it compared the elements of defendant's offense with the elements of its federal analogue. Because the error was not harmless, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Acosta-Chavez" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to five counts of mail fraud and two counts of wire fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction, sentence, order of restitution, and imposition of a special condition. The court concluded that there was no breach of the plea agreement where the government's arguments at sentencing were directed to the specific objective identified in and permitted by the plea agreement; notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(h) was not required in this instance where the district court's outside the Guidelines sentence was the result of a variance, not a departure, where it relied on 8 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors; the district court did not err by failing to sua sponte determine the sufficiency and reliability of the statements proffered by the government in support of restitution for newly-discovered victims; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Special Condition No. 8, which required that defendant apply all monies received to his court-ordered financial obligations, to ensure that the victims received restitution should defendant receive any sort of unexpected financial gain. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Moschella" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of obstruction of justice for their involvement in leaking information regarding an FBI investigation to members of the Hells Angels gang and thus facilitating their criminal enterprise. On appeal, defendants claimed that they could not be convicted under the obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512, because their alleged obstruction of an FBI investigation did not qualify as obstruction of an "official proceeding" under the statute. In light of the plain meaning of the term "proceeding," its use in the grammatical context of the "official proceeding" definition, and the broader statutory context, the court concluded that a criminal investigation was not an "official proceeding" under the obstruction of justice statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded so the district court could enter a judgment of acquittal on those charges. View "United States v. Ermoian" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, purchasers of condominiums in the Hard Rock Hotel San Diego, filed a putative class action suit under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., and California state law, against the Hotel's developer and others. At issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs have alleged the sale of a security based on their purchase of the condominiums. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that plaintiffs have not adequately alleged facts showing that they were offered the real-estate and rental-management contracts as a package. Plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that they were induced to buy the condominiums by the rental-management agreement. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not alleged the sale of a security and plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed. View "Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel" on Justia Law