Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a representative Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2699, action against defendants alleging that they illegally deprived him and other nonexempt employees of meal periods, overtime and vacation wages, and accurate itemized wage statements. At issue on appeal was whether the penalties recoverable on behalf of all aggrieved employees could be considered in their totality to clear the federal diversity jurisdiction amount in controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The court concluded that the recoveries at issue could not be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement. To the extent plaintiff could assert anything but his individual interest, the court was unpersuaded that such a suit, the primary benefit of which would inure to the state, satisfied the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. The state, as the real party in interest, was not a "citizen" for diversity purposes. Accordingly, the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this quintessential California dispute. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded, directing the district court to return the matter to state court for resolution. View " Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, at issue was whether landowners could form the basis for membership in a particular social group for purposes of eligibility for asylum. The court granted petitioners', landowners, petition for review as to their asylum claim based on their membership in a particular social group; remanded for the BIA to reconsider its determinations that the particular social group offered by petitioners were not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in light of en banc decision in Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder; the BIA should address in the first instance whether the harm suffered by petitioners constituted persecution and whether that persecution was "on account of" a protected basis; and because the BIA denied petitioners' removal claims on the same basis as their asylum claims, the court reversed and remanded those determinations. Finally, the court granted Medina-Gonzalez's petition for review as to his Convention Against Torture claim, remanding for reconsideration of that claim in light of the court's recent decision in Tapia-Madrigal v. Holder. View "Cordoba v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute marijuana on March 24, 2010. On May 18, 2011, a superseding indictment issued adding a charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. Defendant was found guilty of the conspiracy charge and subsequently appealed, raising claims concerning the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq., and the use of a drug-detection dog. The court held that charges in a superseding indictment not required to be joined with the original charges come with a new seventy-day clock under the Act. In this instance, defendant's prosecution for the conspiracy charge complied with the Act because trial commenced within seventy days of the superseding indictment. The court concluded, however, that the government's failure to turn over a full complement of dog-history discovery was an error that was not harmless. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and vacated defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

This case concerned the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a government program created to help distressed homeowners with delinquent mortgages. At issue was whether Wells Fargo was contractually required to offer plaintiffs a permanent mortgage modification after they complied with the requirements of a trial period plan (TPP). Following the Seventh Circuit, the court held that Wells Fargo was required to offer the modification. The district court should not have dismissed plaintiffs' complaints when the record showed that Wells Fargo had accepted and retained the payments demanded by the TPP, but neither offered a permanent modification, nor notified plaintiffs they were not entitled to one, as required by the terms of the TPP. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A." on Justia Law

This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after Robert St. Jovite committed suicide when he was an inmate in the California Prison System. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims that the warden and captain impermissibly convened a staff meeting that resulted in the absence of all floor officers from the building where a jury could conclude that the complete withdrawal of all supervision created an unconstitutional risk of harm to the mentally ill inmates in St. Jovite's building and that the warden and captain were responsible for, and deliberately indifferent, to this lack of supervision. The jury could also conclude that the lack of floor staff was an actual and proximate cause of St. Jovite's death. The court also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims based on the failure to administer CPR by defendants where there was a triable issue of fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to St. Jovite's potentially serious medical need. Accordingly, the court vacated summary judgment with respect to these claims. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, sentenced to 254 years of imprisonment for nonhomicide crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his petition for federal habeas corpus relief. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits States from sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide crime. The court concluded that Graham established a new rule of law that was retroactively applicable on collateral review under Teague v. Lane. Further, the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established Federal law set forth in Graham where defendant's sentence was materially indistinguishable from the sentence in Graham and where defendant's nonhomicide crimes were materially indistinguishable from the nonhomicide crimes in Graham. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant defendant's petition. View "Moore v. Biter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Green Day and others, alleging violations of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq., because Green Day used plaintiff's illustration, "Scream Icon," in the video backdrop of its stage show. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Green Day on all claims and the grant of attorney's fees to Green Day under the Copyright Act. The court concluded that Green Day's use of the illustration was fair use under the Copyright Act where the purpose and character of the use was transformative and not overly commercial; the nature of the work included its status as a widely disseminated work of street art; Green Day's use of the work was not excessive in light of its transformative purpose; and Green Day's use did not affect the value of the piece or of plaintiff's artwork in general. In regards to plaintiff's claims under the Lanham Act, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish any trademark rights. The court concluded, however, that the district court clearly erred in finding that plaintiff's claims were objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment but vacated the award of attorneys fees. View "Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her sentence stemming from her conviction of crimes related to her involvement in the Ichihara drug network. The court concluded that the district court failed to use the Sentencing Guidelines as a starting point for its analysis but, instead, selected the sentence first and then placed defendant in the Guidelines range that would allow the sentence; the district court incorrectly calculated the base offense level because it improperly held that defendant had pled guilty to transporting methamphetamine of a certain purity level; and the district court failed to calculate the revised statutory mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and, therefore, the court could not determine the legality or appropriateness of defendant's 96-month sentence. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the court advised the district court to give further consideration at resentencing to defendant's age and the likelihood that she will die in prison. View "United States v. Lee" on Justia Law