Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. At issue was the opening statement of defense counsel regarding the presence of an alibi witness. Petitioner argued that counsel's statement constituted a broken promise that prejudiced the outcome of the trial and rendered counsel's assistance constitutionally ineffective. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the California Court of Appeal was not unreasonable in concluding that counsel had not made a promise to produce an alibi witness. Counsel's statement was merely an expression of hope that the witness would in fact appear. View "Saesee v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of twelve felonies stemming from her work as a tax preparer for various clients. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the superseding indictment where there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that defendant's fraud scheme affected the banks within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1343, regardless of whether the banks ultimately suffered any actual loss; the predicate offenses for Counts 16 and 17 happened after 18 U.S.C. 1028A was enacted and, therefore, the jury was not wrong in convicting defendant of aggravated identity theft while relying on the predicate wire fraud offenses; the district court did not err in allowing defendant's former attorney to testify at the sentencing hearing where no attorney-client privilege was implicated; and the district court did not clearly err in calculating the loss and restitution amounts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stargell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from a conviction for use or carrying and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (Count IV). The district court relied on Harris v. United States when it sentenced defendant. Harris has since been overruled in Alleyne v. United States, which held that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, the government conceded that Count IV did not comport with Alleyne because the increased mandatory minimum sentence was based on a fact found by the district court by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing where the district court must reexamine the entire sentence in light of the vacated sentence on Count IV. View "United States v. Lira" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction for drug-related charges. The court vacated and remanded for resentencing, concluding that any error in estimating the quantity of drugs attributable to the conspiracy was harmless, but that the district court erred in imposing the sentencing enhancement for use of a minor under U.S.S.G. 3B1.4 without an adequate factual basis. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not list, as one of his outstanding debts, a $350,000 arbitration award to Fiero Brothers (creditor). At issue on appeal was whether the creditor's lawyer's knowledge of the bankruptcy constituted notice to the creditor. In this instance, the lawyer learned of debtor's bankruptcy during his representation of another client and, although the lawyer continued to represent the creditor on other matters, he no longer represented the creditor in relation to the debt at issue. Under these facts, the court declined to impute the notice or actual knowledge of debtor's bankruptcy filing that the lawyer had to creditor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the BAP's ruling that the arbitration debt was nondischargeable under sections 523(a)(3) and 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. View "In re: Cery Perle" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with illegal reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's rejection of his guilty plea to illegal reentry into the country, asserting that the rejection violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court court concluded that its prior opinions have rejected defendant's assertions that the indictment must set forth an enhancement under section 1326(b) and mention defendant's underlying conviction; the district court properly rejected defendant's guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and offered him the choice of again pleading guilty or proceeding to trial; because jeopardy attached when defendant pled guilty before the magistrate judge, this jeopardy never terminated and defendant had not been placed in double jeopardy; and defendant's claim was nonetheless colorable so the court had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Valenzuela-Arisqueta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the imposition and enforcement of two conditions of his parole: a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a GPS device. The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that habeas corpus provided the exclusive federal remedy for plaintiff's claims. The court held, however, that such an action was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey if it was not a collateral attack on either the fact of a parolee's confinement as a parolee or the parolee's underlying conviction or sentence. Because petitioner's action was such an attack, the court reversed and remanded . View "Thornton v. Brown" on Justia Law

Former starting quarterback for Arizona State University, Samuel Keller, filed a putative class action suit against EA, alleging that EA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code 3344 and California common law by using Keller's likeness as part of the "NCAA Football" video game series. EA moved to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The court concluded that EA could not prevail as a matter of law based on the transformative use defense where EA's use did not qualify for First Amendment protection because it literally recreated Keller in the very setting in which he had achieved renown. The court also concluded that, although there was some overlap between the transformative use test and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test, the Rogers test should not be imported wholesale to the right-of-publicity claims. Finally, the court concluded that state law defenses for reporting of information did not protect EA's use. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to strike the complaint. View "In re: NCAA Licensing Litig." on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs filed shareholder derivative suits in California state court alleging that PICO's compensation policies violated state law. Defendants removed the cases to federal court, arguing that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(1), barred the suits. The court concluded that Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa(a), did not confer federal jurisdiction; defendants identified no significant federal issue that would confer jurisdiction; and the doctrine of complete preemption did not apply. Therefore, removal was improper and the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than remand them to state court. Accordingly, the court vacated with instructions to remand the cases to state court. The court dismissed defendants' cross appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "Dennis v. Hart" on Justia Law

Retired Hall of Fame football player, James "Jim" Brown, filed suit against EA, alleging that EA violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), through the use of Brown's likeness in EA's "Madden NFL" series of football video games. The court rejected the "likelihood of confusion" test and the "alternative means" test, concluding that the only relevant legal framework for balancing the public's right to be free from consumer confusion about Brown's affiliation with "Madden NFL" and EA's First Amendment rights in the context of Brown's section 43(a) claim was the Rogers v. Grimaldi test. Applying the Rogers test, the court concluded that the use of Brown's likeness was artistically relevant to the "Madden NFL" games and that there were no alleged facts to support the claim that EA explicitly mislead consumers as to Brown's involvement with the games. In this case, the public interest in free expression outweighed the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of EA's motion to dismiss. View "Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc." on Justia Law