Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their first amended complaint and the district court's denial of leave to further amend their complaint. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants improperly initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings after plaintiffs failed to comply with the mortgage obligations financing their residence. Because the provisions of the deed of trust foreclosed the pleading of a plausible "show me the note" claim by plaintiffs, the district court appropriately dismissed this claim; the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' claims premised on the unauthorized appointment of a successor trustee and/or the lack of proof of ownership of the note where these claims lacked legal and factual plausibility; because Arizona law countenances the trustee sale as conducted, plaintiffs failed to allege any plausible claims premised on the PEB Report or the UCC; plaintiffs' constitutional challenges of A.R.S. 33-811(b) were rejected by the court; plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentation claims were barred by A.R.S. 12-543(3); and denial of leave to amend was within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Zadrozny, et al. v. Bank of New York Mellon, et al." on Justia Law

ACT brought this suit against PCI and First National, alleging claims of breach of contract, quantum meruit, and recovery on a payment bond under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131(b). Because United States ex rel. Celanese Coatings Co. v. Gullard was clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority, the court overruled it and held that the Miller Act's statute of limitations was a claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional rule. Because nothing on the face of ACT's complaint indicated that it did not work on the project or rent equipment to PCI within one year of the date it filed the complaint, the complaint could not have been dismissed if the district court had treated the Miller Act's statute of limitations as a claim-processing rule. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Air Control Tech. v. Pre Con Indus." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss his federal grand jury indictment, charging him with one count of possessing child pornography, on double jeopardy grounds because he had been subject to nonjudicial proceedings (NJP) with the Coast Guard. At issue was whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited civilian criminal prosecution of a servicemember who previously received NJP without being informed of or waiving his statutory right to reject such punishment and demand a court-martial instead. The court concluded that the inquiry for the Double Jeopardy Clause was whether the defendant actually was previously placed in jeopardy, not whether he might have been placed in jeopardy if other procedures had been followed. Therefore, the court held that defendant's prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument, reversing and remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Stoltz" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's decision finding her removable, denying her temporary protective status (TPS) relief, and granting her voluntary departure in lieu of removal. Petitioner argued that she was denied due process when the government placed her in removal proceedings without her husband but she did not raise this argument before the IJ or the BIA. The court concluded that petitioner's claim did not fall within the exception to the exhaustion requirement because the IJ or BIA could have addressed petitioner's claim if she had raised it. The court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because she failed to exhaust her claim. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Sola v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed a state-law wage-and-hour class action naming CHA as a defendant. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 153(c)(1). At issue was whether the two thirty-day periods described in 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) were the only periods during which the defendant could remove, or if they were merely periods during which a defendant must remove if one of the thirty-day time limits was triggered. The court concluded that sections 1441 and 1446, read together, permitted a defendant to remove outside the thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it had not run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines. Accordingly, the court held that removal was not barred in this case and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Roth, et al. v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal was consolidated from lawsuits brought by the City against two insurance companies. Both insurers rejected the City's claims for coverage for the underlying litigation between the City and condominium buyers. The insurers claimed that the City's alleged negligence and wrongful conduct in connection with the underlying litigation occurred prior to their policy periods. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The court rejected the City's argument for extending Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co., which held that claims for pollutants deposited in the ground prior to the policy period, but continuing to leach into soil and groundwater during the policy period, gave rise to a duty to defend, because continuance of the property damage during the policy period gave rise to coverage. View "City of San Buenaventura v. The Ins. Co. of PA" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction for sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or coercion. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-point enhancement for undue influence under U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(b)(2); the district court did not err in applying a two-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) because defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in a criminal activity; and, therefore, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Bank filed a motion for relief from an automatic stay and submitted a copy of the promissory note, which was a second-generation copy, as well as a declaration certifying that the original note was in the Bank's files. The trustee argued that a duplicate of a duplicate of the original was insufficient to establish prudential standing. The court concluded that a duplicate of a duplicate was a duplicate for purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 and concluded that the Bank established prudential standing to file the motion for relief from the stay. View "In re: Toni Griffin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner claimed that the trial court's ruling regarding the testing of a blood sample violated his constitutional rights to counsel and due process. The court concluded that the Supreme Court had not squarely addressed petitioner's claim or articulated a rule that clearly extended to the present case; the California Court of Appeal's decision therefore could not be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; and, therefore, the court deferred to the state court and affirmed the conviction. View "Varghese v. Uribe, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico admitted to the United States in 1976 as a lawful permanent resident, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming an IJ's decision that he was ineligible for relief from removal under former Immigration and Naturalization Act 212(c), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), because his conviction for an aggravated felony was the result of a trial. The court concluded that Vartelas v. Holder made it clear that the essential inquiry of retroactivity analysis was to determine whether the new law attached new legal consequences to completed conduct and that evidence regarding reliance was not required to prove that a new law was impermissibly retroactive. The repeal of section 212(c) relief impermissibly attached new legal consequences to the trial convictions of aliens like petitioner by rendering these aliens ineligible for relief as a result of convictions that pre-dated the repeal of section 212(c). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cardenas-Delgado v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law