Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This criminal antitrust case stems from an international conspiracy between Taiwanese and Korean electronics manufacturers to fix prices for TFT-LCDs. Defendants, AUO, a Taiwanese company, and AUOA, AUO's retailer and wholly owned subsidiary (collectively, "the corporate defendants"), and two executives were convicted of conspiracy to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court concluded that venue in the Northern District of California was proper; defendants waived their jury instruction challenge regarding the extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act; the price-fixing scheme as alleged and proved is subject to per se analysis under the Sherman Act; the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. 6a, does not limit the power of the federal courts, but rather, it provides substantive elements under the Sherman Act in cases involving nonimport trade with foreign nations; the FTAIA does not apply to defendants' import trade conduct because the government sufficiently pleaded and proved that the conspirators engaged in import commerce with the United States and that the price-fixing conspiracy violated section 1 of the Sherman Act; there was no constructive amendment because the facts in the indictment necessarily supported the domestic effects claim; the evidence offered in support of the import trade theory alone was sufficient to convict defendants of price-fixing in violation of the Sherman Act; the unambiguous language of the Alternative Fine Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3571(d), permitted the district court to impose the $500 million fine based on the gross gains to all the coconspirators; and no statutory authority or precedent supports AUO's interpretation of the Alternative Fine Statute as requiring joint and several liability and imposing a "one recovery" rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hsiung" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit against the City and the LAPD alleging that he was fired in retaliation for testifying, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Plaintiff claimed that the real reason he was fired was not because he worked through lunch without requesting overtime, but rather because he testified in a lawsuit brought by a fellow officer. On appeal, the City and the LAPD contend that the jury was not correctly instructed. The court concluded that the Board of Rights recommendation that plaintiff's employment be terminated did not preclude his FLSA retaliation claim. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error in declining to give the jury two requested special instructions and to submit several proposed special verdict questions tied to those instructions. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and liquidated damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Avila v. LAPD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against defendants, motor carriers, alleging that defendants routinely violate California's meal and rest break laws, Cal. Lab. Code 226.7, 512; Cal. Code Regs. tit.8, 11090. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1), preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. The court concluded that the Act does not preempt California's meal and rest break laws as applied to defendants because those laws are not related to defendants' prices, routes, or services. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Iran, challenged the BIA's determination that he provided material support in the 1970s to a "Tier III" terrorist organization (MEK), making him statutorily ineligible for immigration relief other than deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court held that, under a normal reading of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B), as amended by the PATRIOT Act, the statutory terrorism bar applied retroactively to an alien's material support of a "Tier III" terrorist organization and that the statutory terrorism bar applied in petitioner's case. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that petitioner gave support to MEK in the 1970s and that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, or should not reasonably have known, that MEK was a terrorist organization during the time in which he gave it material support. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Bojnoordi v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, five individual "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" (DACA) recipients living in Arizona, sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing their policy that prevents DACA recipients from obtaining Arizona driver's licenses. The district court denied the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' requested preliminary injunction was prohibitory, not mandatory; the court need not rely on plaintiffs' preemption claim to determine whether plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits of their challenge to defendants' policy; plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on their equal protection claim and the subsequent revision of defendants' policy did not undermine this conclusion where the current policy continues to permit the use of Employment Authorization Documents as proof of authorized presence for two sizeable groups of noncitizens similarly situated to DACA recipients and where there was no rational relationship between the policy and a legitimate state interest; plaintiffs have shown that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, they are likely to suffer irreparable harm where, among other things, plaintiffs' inability to obtain driver's licenses limits their professional opportunities; and plaintiffs have established that both the public interest and the balance of the equities favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for criminal reentry, collaterally attacking his underlying removal order. The court concluded that defendant's attorney in the immigration proceedings provided ineffective assistance of counsel by erroneously conceding to his removability based on defendant's prior conviction under Missouri Revised Statutes 195.211 and by failing to appeal the removal order to the BIA and failing to petition the Seventh Circuit for review. The court held that defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his immigration proceedings, he was deprived of his right to due process, the proceedings were fundamentally unfair, and the indictment for criminal reentry must be dismissed. View "United States v. Lopez-Chavez" on Justia Law

The Diaz Defendants challenged the bankruptcy court's and district court's orders invalidating the transfer to them of a Mexican coastal villa owned by debtors and requiring them to convey the property to Kismet for the benefit of debtors' bankruptcy estate. The court concluded that, notwithstanding the local action doctrine, 28 U.S.C. 1334(e) granted the bankruptcy court exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the Villa interest; given the court's ruling that H&G was debtors' alter ego and its substantive consolidation of H&G with the bankruptcy estate, the Villa interest was property of the estate as of the petition date; the bankruptcy court properly declined to honor the forum selection clauses in the Mexican contracts and declined to abstain from ordering recovery of the property based on international comity; Mexico was not a necessary party and the bankruptcy court could enter judgment without Mexico; the bankruptcy court properly applied U.S. law rather than Mexican law; and the bankruptcy properly found that Martha Barba de la Torre purchased the property in bad faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment with respect to the postpetition transfer action; the fraudulent conveyance action is moot as a result; and the district court granted Kismet's and the Diaz Defendants' requests for judicial notice. View "In re: Icenhower" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to importation of heroin, alleging that the district court improperly engaged in judicial fact-finding in denying him safety valve relief from the mandatory minimum sentence and misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that the safety valve determination under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) does not implicate Alleyne v. United States where it does not increase the statutory minimum sentence; the district court correctly assigned more than one criminal history point to defendant where he was on probation when he committed the federal offense and where there was an intervening arrest between his two previous state convictions; and, therefore, defendant was ineligible for safety valve relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Carrizales" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on their challenge to the SFSD's policy prohibiting male deputies from supervising female inmates in the housing units of SFSD's jails. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims and derivative claims where the County was not entitled to summary judgment because it was unable to bear its burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was entitled to a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense. On summary judgment, the County may not rely on deference to the Sheriff's judgment in order to meet its burden of proving that it was entitled to a BFOQ defense. In the absence of deference to the Sheriff's judgment, the County was also unable to meet its burden of proving that there was no issue of material fact as to whether its policy of excluding all male deputies from the female housing units was a legitimate proxy for excluding only those deputies that truly pose a threat to the important interests SFSD rightfully sought to protect. Because the district court's conclusion that the County was entitled to a BFOQ defense was also the basis for its denial of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court also vacated the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion. The court dismissed plaintiffs' evidentiary challenges; affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees; and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Plaintiff Gray's retaliation claims. View "Ambat, et al. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a victim of a mailbox theft crime, challenged the district court's orders denying in part motions to quash two subpoenas duces tecum whose issuance defendant had requested under Rule 17(c)(3). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion or commit legal error in denying the motions to quash; the information sought by defendant meets the standard for issuing a Rule 17(c) subpoena; in ordering production of the requested documents, the district court appropriately balanced the victim's privacy interests against defendant's right to investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial; and, therefore, the court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771. Given the sensitive nature of the documents sought, production and disclosure of the documents on July 2, 2014 shall initially be limited to the district court. View "K.K. v. USDC-HI" on Justia Law