Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this copyright infringement suit, SOFA claimed that Dodger infringed its copyright in using a seven-second clip of Ed Sullivan's introduction of the Four Seasons on "The Ed Sullivan Show" and could not justify its unlicensed use of the clip as "fair use." The clip was used in Dodger's musical about the Four Seasons, "Jersey Boys," to mark a historical point in the band's career. The court held that, by using the clip for its biographical significance, Dodger has imbued it with new meaning and did so without usurping whatever demand there was for the original clip. Dodger was entitled to prevail on its fair use defense as a mater of law and to retain the attorney's fees award granted by the district court. View "SOFA Entertainment, Inc. v. Dodger Productions, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that there was no "realistic probability" that California would apply California Penal Code 243.4(e) to conduct that was not normally turpitudinous and the BIA's decision denying his motion to reconsider. The court held that section 243.4(e)(1)'s requirement that defendant specifically intended to damage his victim psychologically evidenced the malicious intent that was the essence of moral turpitude. The BIA's decision that this kind of behavior was per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong was persuasive. Because the court agreed that there was no "realistic probability" that California courts would apply section 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude, the court denied the petitions. View "Gonzalez-Cervantes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Respondent (the Warden) appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioner. The court held that the California Supreme Court necessarily decided that it was not reasonably probable that either petitioner's conviction or sentence would have turned out differently had counsel objected to the brace (knee restraint) petitioner wore beneath his clothing during the trial. Given what "prejudice" means in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the strength of the evidence, the nature of the brace, the atrociousness of petitioner's crimes, and the quality of the mitigation, the court could not say that the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Walker v. Martel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants enforced two local ordinances in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendants. The court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for retrospective relief because those claims were not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; the court reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief because those claims have not been mooted by defendants' voluntary conduct; the court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment challenges; and the court held that jurisdiction existed as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims and remanded for a consideration of the merits in the first instance. View "Bell, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a now-retired member of Local 166, filed suit under section 101(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(3), to challenge the legality of an organizing fee and a dues increase imposed on Local 166 members by the local union's umbrella organizations. The court held that the plain text of the LMRDA authorized a labor organization, other than a local labor organization or a federation of national or international labor organizations, to levy assessments or increase dues or initiation fees payable by its members by any of the procedures enumerated in section 101(a)(3)(B), provided that union members' rights were adequately protected in the approval process. Because Defendant LIUNA satisfied both prerequisites in this case, the court concluded that it complied with the LMRDA when it enacted an organizing fee, applicable to all of its members working in the construction industry, following a majority vote of its delegates at a general convention. The court held, however, that Defendant NCDCL lacked the statutory authority to ratify such an increase because Local 166 members were not members of the NCDCL. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Corns v. Laborers Int'l Union, et al" on Justia Law

Alaska Rent-A-Car sued Avis claiming that Avis had breached a settlement agreement causing Alaska business to be switched to Budget Rent-A-Car, its local competitor. The district court granted a partial summary judgment, establishing that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement, and that Avis had breached the agreement by using the same personnel to sell and market both Avis and Budget cars. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Alaska Rent-A-Car for $16 million and Avis appealed. The court held that the district court was correct in ruling that Alaska Rent-A-Car was a party to the settlement agreement by virtue of its sufficiently timely joinder. The court rejected Avis's peremptory challenge claim under Batson v. Kentucky. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to listen to Alaska Rent-A-Car's expert as well as Avis's. The evidence sufficed to establish reasonable certainty for the damages awarded. The district court did not err by applying Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 to the attorney's fee award. The parties agreed that the amount of prejudgment interest was awarded in error, double counting, and that the judgment should be reduced. View "Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to an information charging misprision of a felony based on her concealment and failure to notify authorities of her husband's drug trafficking activities. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court should have allowed her to withdraw her plea because the misprision charge violated her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the information failed to allege an essential element of misprision, and the plea lacked an adequate factual basis. The court dismissed the appeal because defendant could not overcome the appeal waiver contained in her plea agreement. View "United States v. Brizan" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and claimed that her Mercedes was exempt from her bankruptcy estate under California Civil Procedure Code 703.140(b)(5) (the "wildcard" or "grubstake" exemption). The court held that a motor vehicle could fall within the wildcard exemption and that if an exempt vehicle was a tool of the debtor's trade and was secured by a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien, the debtor could avoid the lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 522(f)(1)(B). The court affirmed the district court's ruling and remand of the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the Mercedes was in fact a tool of debtor's trade as a real estate agent. View "In re: Angie M. Garcia" on Justia Law

This case involved two provisions in Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, which makes it unlawful for a motor vehicle occupant to hire or attempt to hire a person for work at another location from a stopped care that impedes traffic, or for a person to be hired in such a manner. At issue was whether these provisions violated the First Amendment by restricting and penalizing commercial speech for day laborers and for those who hire them. The court held that the district court correctly determined that, though Arizona had a significant government interest in promoting traffic safety, the day labor provisions failed Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York's requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were satisfied. Therefore, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. View "Valle del Sol, et al v. State of Arizona, et al" on Justia Law