Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his convictions on twenty-four counts of wire fraud, seven counts of money laundering, and one count of investment-adviser fraud. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring defendant's expert witness from testifying and, even if the district court did not abuse its discretion, the error was harmless; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding defendant's status as a fiduciary where nothing in the record indicates that testimony and argument regarding defendant's fiduciary status impermissibly infected his prosecution, and any concerns about the jurors’ equating violations of fiduciary duty with criminal liability were put to rest by the district court’s careful instructions on the elements of the offenses and the absence of reference to breach of fiduciary duty as a consideration in determining guilt; the district court did not violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights when it declined to strike Count 33 from the indictment; and there is no cumulative error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Spangler" on Justia Law

Defendant, a contractor, appealed his conviction of two counts of conversion and misapplication of funds from a tribal organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1163. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in projects he performed for the Navajo Nation. The court held that, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1163, funds paid from an Indian tribal organization to a contractor continue to be “property belonging to any Indian tribal organization,” as long as the tribal organization maintains sufficient supervision and control of disbursed funds and their ultimate use. In this case, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find (a) that the funds misappropriated or converted by defendant belonged to a tribal organization, even if the funds were considered reimbursement for work already completed; and (b) that NHA had sufficient supervision and control of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA), 25 U.S.C. 4101-4212, funds. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of misappropriating tribal funds. The court further concluded that the district court did not err by requiring a forensic auditor to be certified as an expert witness and compelling expert disclosures, and the district court did not err by allowing the auditor's summary charts to be admitted into evidence. Finally, the district court did not commit error in instructing the jury and the district court did not err in applying two sentencing enhancements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Aubrey" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, appealed the district court's denial of a motion for a new trial and request for an evidentiary hearing. The court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial or evidentiary hearing based on a juror’s affidavit alleging that other jurors discussed the evidence against him and made up their minds about his guilt before the start of deliberations. The court rejected defendant's contention that Rule 606(b) provides leeway for a court to delve into the internal affairs of the jury simply because the discussions took place before deliberations commenced. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shiu Lung Leung" on Justia Law

Defendant, a registered investment advisor and securities agent, appealed his conviction and sentence for wire fraud and money laundering. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to defraud his clients. The court concluded that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the district court’s decision to proceed with victim allocution in the absence of trial counsel during a portion of defendant’s critical sentencing stage. The court concluded that the denial of counsel during a portion of the allocution phase of the sentencing proceeding was structural error, that the error was complete when the right to counsel was denied, and that no additional showing of prejudice was required. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the trial court committed structural error by proceeding with victim allocution while defense counsel was not present, and because the victim’s statements were highly significant in the judge’s sentencing consideration, reassignment to a different district judge is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Yamashiro" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted and sentenced for conspiracy to obstruct justice, accessory after the fact to mail fraud and securities law violations, altering documents to influence a federal investigation, and aiding and abetting false testimony at an SEC deposition. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err at sentencing by applying both the “Broker-Dealer” enhancement and the “Special Skill” enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the district court did not err in calculating loss and victim amounts, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines; (3) Defendant was competent to waive his right to a jury trial, and his waiver was knowing and intelligent; and (4) the district court did not plainly err in (a) excluding a non-lawyer’s testimony reciting facts and the legal conclusion that Defendant did not break the law; (b) determining that the district court was capable of understanding an expert’s opinion regarding Defendant’s professional and ethical duties as an attorney; and (c) admitting coconspirator nonhearsay testimony. View "United States v. Tamman" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for making excessive campaign contributions, and making contributions in the name of another. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing defendant's proffered jury instructions that an unconditional gift of funds cannot violate 2 U.S.C. 441f if the funds have become the property of the donors under Nevada law because defendant's theory is not supported by law; to the extent defendant's theory is that the unconditional nature of the gifts prevented him from forming the necessary intent, the instructions given by the district court adequately encompassed his theory; defendant's claim that the individual contribution limits of section 441a and the prohibition on conduit contributions in section 441f violate defendant's free speech and association rights under the First Amendment is foreclosed by Buckley v. Valeo; the court rejected defendant's claims of evidentiary errors; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Whittemore" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of making false, fictitious, and fraudulent claims to the United States Treasury, assisting in the filing of false tax returns, criminal contempt, and mail fraud. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and the district court's supervised release conditions. The court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error under the Sixth Amendment when it did not prompt defendant to present a closing argument to the jury and where defendant simply chose to remain silent; nothing in Herring v. New York or the court's precedents gives a self-represented defendant a right to be affirmatively and individually advised that he or she has a right to present a closing argument; Herring and the court's precedent held that a court may not prevent a litigant from making a closing argument; the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that defendant assisted another in the filing of fraudulent tax returns; but the district court did abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to abstain from alcohol and drug consumption and participate in treatment as conditions of his supervised release where the record contains no evidence showing that defendant abused alcohol or other substances and the district court made no relevant findings during the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud and making a false statement on a loan application. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's imposition of a 16-level increase to defendant's base offense level based on that court's calculation that the banks suffered a loss of over a million dollars. The court held that, in a mortgage fraud case, loss under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b) is calculated in two steps. First, calculating actual or intended loss allowed for a reasonable foreseeability analysis although the actual loss generally consisted of the entire principal of the fraudulently obtained loan. Second, crediting against the actual or intended loss the value of any collateral recovered or recoverable, did not permit a foreseeability analysis. Rather, the value of the collateral was credited against the amount of the loss calculated at the first step, whether or not the value of the collateral was foreseeable. The court affirmed the sentence because the district court followed this rule in calculating the loss attributable to defendant as $1,033,500. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of bank fraud and two counts of mail fraud. The court held that mailings designed to avoid detection or responsibility for a fraudulent scheme fell within the mail fraud statute when they were sent before the scheme was completed. In order to determine when a scheme is completed, the court looks to the scope of the scheme as devised by the perpetrator. In this case, a reasonable jury could have found that defendant sent the September 16 letter prior to the scheme's completion. Accordingly, the court rejected defendant's argument that his conviction on count 2 must be reversed because the scheme was completed before the September 16 letter was mailed. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument that the September 16 letter could not support a conviction for mail fraud because it was sent after the fraud was uncovered. Therefore, sufficient evidence supported defendant's mail fraud conviction on count 2 and the court affirmed the conviction. Further, the court affirmed the district court's application of a 2-level sentencing enhancement for making a misrepresentation during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) and application of a 2-level enhancement for using sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The court held, in accord with the government's concession, that the district court plainly erred by including $44,715.21 in restitution for fraudulent credit cards and $1,851.38 in restitution for wage overpayments that were not part of the offenses of conviction and by failing to note the waiver of interest on restitution on the judgment. View "United States v.Tanke" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and three counts of health care fraud. On appeal, defendants challenged their sentences. The court held that, in health care fraud cases, the amount billed to an insurer shall constitute prima facie evidence of intended loss for sentencing purposes. If not rebutted, this evidence shall constitute sufficient evidence to establish the intended loss by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the parties may introduce additional evidence to support arguments that the amount billed overestimated or understated the defendant's intent. In this instance, the court vacated defendants' sentences on the issue of intended loss because the record left the court uncertain as to what the district court understood the law to be with respect to calculating intended loss for sentencing purposes and there was evidence suggesting that defendants may have been aware that Medicare only payed a fixed amount. When viewed in conjunction with the evidence that defendants were the only two named physicians on the clinic's sign, the documents were sufficient to support the district court's finding that Defendant Popov's bills to Medicare were foreseeable to Defendant Prakash. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Popov" on Justia Law