Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with fourteen counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343 stemming from his scheme to defraud his employer. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal, a new trial, and for an arrest of judgment. The court rejected defendant's argument that routine transmissions occurring during the interbank collection process were not made for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud or in furtherance thereof; the district court erred in the jury instructions; there was insufficient evidence; and the wire fraud statute was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Jinian" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and thirty counts of money laundering. On appeal, defendant challenged the portion of his sentence that imposed forfeiture and restitution. Defendant argued that, because the FBI was essentially a part of the DOJ, the two entities were functionally the same. Thus, he argued, requiring him to pay forfeiture to the DOJ and restitution to the FBI would result in an impermissible double recovery for the government. The court concluded that the two payments represented different types of funds: punitive and compensatory. They were different in nature, kind, and purpose. Therefore, it was irrelevant as to what extent the FBI and DOJ were distinct entities and the district court did not clearly err when it did not offset defendant's forfeiture amount. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of securities fraud, arguing that he was prejudiced by the trial court's improper admission of a prior civil complaint filed by the SEC against him. The court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction, remanding for a new trial. View "United States v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Petitioner, in his capacity as the State Director of the United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO (UPW), negotiated contracts with dental and health insurance providers, HDS and PGMA, on behalf of UPW members and their families. A jury subsequently convicted petitioner of fifty counts of "theft of honest services" from the UPW and its members, as well as conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, and health care fraud. At issue was the instructional omission to the jury regarding honest services fraud in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Skilling v. United States. The court held that the error had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Accordingly, the court affirmed the theft of honest services, money laundering, and health care fraud judgments of conviction against petitioner and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In this case, an insurance agency had a contract with an insurance company that allowed the agency to commingle collected insurance premiums with its other funds in its general operating account. The government contended that the premiums collected by the agency were the property of the insurance company and held "in trust" by the agency; it alleged that when the funds were not remitted but used for other purposes, they were embezzled by the agency's treasurer, defendant. Defendant was charged with ten counts of embezzlement of insurance premiums in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1033(b)(1) and one count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement. The court held that under long-standing Arizona law, the contract between the agency and the company, which permitted agency commingling, required monthly agency payments whether premiums were collected or not, and created a right of interest on late payments, created a creditor-debtor relationship, not a trust. The agency had contractual and fiduciary duties to the company, but was not a trustee. Because the funds in question were not held "in trust" by the agency as a matter of law, an essential element of embezzlement was lacking. Therefore, the court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Defendant appealed from a restitution order imposed by the district court after a jury convicted her of various crimes associated with her involvement in a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. The court held that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation of its reasoning in calculating the amount of restitution owed to two of the victims and, therefore, vacated that portion of the restitution order. The court remanded for recalculation and explanation of the award pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A.

This case centered around the political corruption of former California Congressman Randall "Duke" Cunningham, who provided lucrative government defense contracts to defendant and others in exchange for expensive meals, lavish trips, a houseboat in Washington D.C., and mortgage payments for his multi-million dollar home. Defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of conspiracy, honest services wire fraud, bribery, and money laundering. The court held that, under its holding in United States v. Straub, the district court's determination that it was not authorized to compel use immunity for a defense witness absent a finding of prosecutorial misconduct was erroneous. Because the district court concluded that the proffered testimony would "counter" the testimony presented by the prosecution through immunized government witnesses, and the government did not challenge that finding as clearly erroneous, the court remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether compelled use immunity regarding the proposed testimony was constitutionally required. The court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Defendant appealed her jury conviction for one count of conspiracy, one count of bank fraud, and thirteen counts of loan fraud. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed prejudicial error by admitting two summary charts under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006; there was insufficient evidence to support each of her convictions; and the district court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the full amount of the victim lenders' loss, despite a prior civil settlement with the victim lenders that included a release from liability. The court held that the charts were properly admitted under Rule 1006, 404(b), and 403. The court also held that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to convict defendant of the crimes for which she was charged. The court held, however, that under the current restitution order, the victim lenders would receive more than their actual losses and therefore, the imposition of the order was plain error. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were affirmed and the restitution order vacated and remanded with instructions.

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 25 months' imprisonment plus five years of supervised release following his guilty plea to ten counts of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. 656, and eight counts of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344. The eighteen counts defendant pleaded guilty to related to two schemes to defraud Wells Fargo: an embezzlement scheme and a check-kiting scheme. On appeal, defendant's primary contention was that because he did not know he was the subject of a pending criminal investigation at the time he committed perjury in a civil suit concerning the very same conduct later charged in the criminal indictment, the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 to enhance his sentence for willfully obstructing justice. The court held that because the district court applied the correct legal standard and relied upon probative evidence submitted by the government, the district court did not err in calculating the intended loss at being over $200,000. The court also held that "willful" meant only that defendant had engaged in intentional or deliberate acts designed to obstruct any potential investigation, at the time an investigation was in fact pending; it did not mean that defendant had to know for certain that the investigation was pending. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.