Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A man born in New York City in July 1950 lived for nearly seventy years in the United States, believing himself to be a U.S. citizen. His father, a Nicaraguan national, was working for Nicaragua’s permanent mission to the United Nations at the time of his birth. Over the years, the government repeatedly issued him passports and affirmed his citizenship. However, in 2018, after a review of historical records, the government determined that his father had been an attaché, not a consul, at the time of his birth. This distinction was crucial because, under federal and international law, the children of diplomats (such as attachés) are not considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States for purposes of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed the case after the government revoked the man’s passport and denied his claim to citizenship. The Secretary of State presented a recently executed certificate asserting that the man’s father had diplomatic immunity at the time of his birth. The district court declined to treat this certificate as conclusive evidence but, after considering the full record, found by clear and convincing evidence that the father was an attaché with diplomatic immunity, and thus the plaintiff was not a birthright citizen.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that while the President’s reception of a person as a diplomat is conclusive, whether that reception occurred is a factual question for the courts to decide, even when presented with a certificate from the executive branch. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the plaintiff’s father held diplomatic immunity at the time of birth, and therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to birthright citizenship. View "MONCADA V. RUBIO" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers in Montana suspected Danielle Williams of drug trafficking and observed her and Brandon Gordon engaging in suspicious activity, including Gordon climbing a fence with a black bag and entering Williams’s vehicle. After a traffic stop, officers found drug paraphernalia and two stolen handguns in the vehicle. Gordon later admitted to daily methamphetamine use and intent to use the stolen items to pay a drug debt. He was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for possessing a stolen firearm. At trial, the jury acquitted him of the stolen firearm charge but convicted him of being a felon in possession. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison.Gordon appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the conviction. He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his attorney misinformed him about sentencing exposure, failed to challenge the indictment, and did not move to suppress evidence. The district court denied his claims, declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed a second-in-time § 2255 motion as an unauthorized successive petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. The court held that counsel’s alleged sentencing predictions did not constitute ineffective assistance, so no evidentiary hearing was required. The court also held that, although the district court should have considered all ineffective assistance claims related to plea negotiations as a whole, Gordon’s claims failed on the merits. Finally, the court determined that Gordon’s second-in-time § 2255 motion should have been treated as a motion to amend, but denied relief because the only argument raised was foreclosed by binding precedent. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. GORDON" on Justia Law

A private company operating a federal immigration detention facility in Washington State challenged the enforcement of several provisions of a state law that imposed health, safety, and inspection requirements on private detention centers. The law required the state Department of Health to adopt rules ensuring sanitary and safe conditions, authorized unannounced inspections, provided for civil penalties for violations, and created a private right of action for detainees. The company argued that these provisions violated the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity and were preempted by federal law, claiming they improperly targeted federal contractors and conflicted with federal standards.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the challenged sections of the law violated intergovernmental immunity by discriminating against the federal government and its contractor. The court compared the requirements imposed on the federal facility to those imposed on state prisons and concluded that the law treated the federal contractor less favorably. The state appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Washington legislature amended the law, but the changes did not materially alter the issues on appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate comparison for determining discrimination under intergovernmental immunity is between the federal immigration facility and other civil detention facilities in the state, not state prisons. The court directed the district court to make this comparison in the first instance. The Ninth Circuit also held that the challenged provisions were not preempted by federal law and that the district court erred in enjoining the private right of action, as the state officials named as defendants had no enforcement authority under that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "THE GEO GROUP, INC. V. INSLEE" on Justia Law

After being convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the petitioner was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. While incarcerated, he participated in recidivism reduction programs and earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). He continued to accrue these credits while on home confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon nearing the end of his custodial sentence, he sought to have his earned time credits applied to reduce both his remaining time in custody and the length of his supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applied some credits to end his custody early but refused to apply the remaining credits to reduce his supervised release, arguing that the FSA did not permit such use.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed his habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the government that the FSA time credits could not be used to shorten the term of supervised release. The court found that the credits could only be applied to reduce time in custody, not supervised release, and thus denied the petitioner’s request for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the FSA, as well as relevant canons of statutory construction, demonstrate that Congress intended for earned time credits to be applied toward reducing the length of supervised release, not just custodial time. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to grant the petition in part, direct the government to recalculate the petitioner’s earned time credits, and provide the recalculation to his probation officer. The main holding is that, under the FSA, earned time credits may be used to reduce the term of supervised release. View "GONZALEZ V. HERRERA" on Justia Law

A nonprofit Christian ministry that provides youth programs in Oregon applied for state grant funding from the Oregon Department of Education’s Youth Development Division. The Division had recently added a rule requiring all grant applicants to certify that they do not discriminate based on religion in employment, vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery. The ministry, whose mission is to share Christian teachings, requires all employees and volunteers to affirm a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. After initially awarding the ministry a conditional grant, the Division withdrew the award upon discovering the ministry’s religious hiring requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the ministry’s request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the grant and enjoin enforcement of the rule, finding the ministry unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed all claims, including those for damages, based on qualified immunity, even though the defendants had only moved to dismiss the damages claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule, as applied to grant-funded initiatives, is likely neutral and generally applicable, thus not violating the Free Exercise Clause, and is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition for participation in the grant program. The court also found that the ministry’s religious autonomy claims were unlikely to succeed, as the relevant doctrines are affirmative defenses, not standalone claims. However, the court held that applying the rule to the ministry’s non-grant-funded initiatives likely imposes an unconstitutional condition on expressive association. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin enforcement of the rule as to non-grant-funded initiatives, affirmed the dismissal of damages claims due to qualified immunity, and reversed the dismissal of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

A medical school graduate, age 36 at the time of graduation, applied to the neurological surgery residency program at a university medical center but was not ranked or accepted by the program in two consecutive years. The applicant alleged that the refusal to rank him was due to age-based discrimination and retaliation for prior complaints about age-related harassment and discrimination during medical school. The university maintained that the decision was based on the applicant’s mediocre academic performance and poor evaluations during sub-internships, emphasizing the highly competitive nature of the residency program.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the university. The court determined that the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Act) did not apply to the residency selection process because it constituted an “employment practice” of an “employer,” which is expressly exempted from the Act’s coverage. The court also found that, even if the Age Act were applicable, there was no genuine dispute of material fact supporting the applicant’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the university’s decision not to rank or admit the applicant to its residency program was an “employment practice of an employer” and therefore not subject to the Age Act. The court further concluded that, to the extent any other allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory acts were identified, the applicant failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SPATZ V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured.A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena. View "In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals who frequently rented hotel rooms on the Las Vegas Strip brought a class action lawsuit, alleging that several major hotel operators and related entities caused them to pay artificially high prices for hotel rooms. The plaintiffs claimed that these hotels each entered into agreements to license revenue-management software from a single provider, Cendyn, whose products generated pricing recommendations based on proprietary algorithms. The software did not require hotels to follow its recommendations, nor did it share confidential information among the hotels. Plaintiffs alleged that, after the hotels adopted this software, room prices increased.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the complaint, which asserted two claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The first claim alleged a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy among the hotels to adopt and follow the software’s pricing recommendations, but the district court dismissed this claim for failure to plausibly allege an agreement among the hotels. The plaintiffs later abandoned their appeal of this claim. The second claim alleged that the aggregate effect of the individual licensing agreements between each hotel and Cendyn resulted in anticompetitive effects, specifically higher prices. The district court dismissed this claim as well, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a restraint of trade in the relevant market.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the independent decisions by competing hotels to license the same pricing software, without an agreement among them or a restraint imposed by the software provider, did not constitute a restraint of trade. The court concluded that neither the terms nor the operation of the licensing agreements imposed anticompetitive restraints in the market for hotel-room rentals on the Las Vegas Strip. View "Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC" on Justia Law

An individual whose nursing license was revoked in 2011 was subsequently excluded from participating in federally funded health care programs, a status that remains ongoing. When she later applied for a job involving health care consulting, the prospective employer requested a background check from a consumer reporting agency. The agency’s report disclosed both her current exclusion from federal health care programs and the fact that her license had been revoked in 2011. As a result, her job offer was rescinded. She disputed the report but was unsuccessful.She then filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the agency violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by including adverse information more than seven years old in its report. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency, holding that reporting the ongoing exclusion was permissible because it was a continuing event, and that reporting the reason for the exclusion (the license revocation) was also allowed. The court further found that, even if there was a violation, the agency’s interpretation of the FCRA was not objectively unreasonable, so there was no negligent or willful violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the agency did not violate the FCRA by reporting the ongoing exclusion, as such exclusions may be reported for their duration and for seven years after they end. However, the court found that reporting the underlying license revocation, which occurred more than seven years before the report, did violate the FCRA. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment because the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not objectively unreasonable, and thus its violation was neither negligent nor willful. View "Grijalva v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of a California corporation, who was represented by a union and covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), brought two lawsuits in state court against her employer. She alleged violations of various California labor and business statutes, including claims for unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, sick leave, wage statement inaccuracies, expense reimbursement, and retaliation. The CBAs included provisions regarding pay, leave, breaks, and a dispute resolution process for grievances.The employer removed both cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing that the employee’s claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which would create federal jurisdiction. The district court determined that only the claims related to untimely wage payments were preempted and thus converted to federal claims under § 301. These federal claims were dismissed because the employee had not exhausted the grievance procedures required by the CBAs. The court found that the remaining state law claims were not preempted, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and remanded those claims to state court. The employer appealed the remand orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because the district court’s remand was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining state law claims were not preempted by § 301, as they arose from California statutes rather than the CBAs and did not require interpretation of the CBAs. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the non-preempted claims to state court. The judgment was affirmed. View "RENTERIA-HINOJOSA V. SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC." on Justia Law