Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California state jury convicted him of robbery, burglary, and felony murder. He appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. Petitioner raised several certified claims, including claims that the prosecutor knowingly used false and misleading testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and failed to disclose favorable material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus as to the special-circumstances findings and the imposition of the death penalty and affirmed the district court’s holding as to Petitioner’s certified guilt-phase claims. The panel wrote that this is an exceptional case in which the prosecutor deliberately elicited, and then failed to correct, false and misleading testimony from the State’s star witness. The prosecutor went on to exploit the witness’s false testimony in his closing argument. He also failed to produce evidence to the defense team that would have seriously impeached the witness’s testimony. The panel wrote that the record makes clear that the State’s special-circumstances evidence depended on the witness’s testimony. Reviewing under the deferential standard afforded to state-court decisions by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the panel concluded it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to decide that the prosecutor’s misconduct was immaterial to the jury’s special circumstances findings. View "COLIN DICKEY V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of sixteen counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and one count of possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B). At trial, the jury heard extensive evidence that Defendant placed a hidden camera in his bathroom with the purpose of secretly recording and amassing a collection of nude videos of his then fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant asserts there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, arguing on appeal (1) that he did not “use” his stepdaughter in a way that violates Section 2251(a) and (2) that the videos did not depict “sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. Section 2256(2)(A)(v), which applies to both Sections 2251(a) and 2252A.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the videos reasonably fell within the definition of sexually explicit conduct. The panel wrote that the district court did not clearly err in determining that a reasonable jury could find (1) that the focal point of the videos was on T.A.’s genitals or pubic area, (2) that T.A. is fully nude in the videos, and (3) that the videos were intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. The panel reached the same result under a de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence. View "USA V. TEL BOAM" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that a particular noncitizen in immigration detention poses a danger to the community, and so is not entitled to release on bond. Judge Berzon, joined by Chief Judge Murguia and Judges Wardlaw, W. Fletcher, Paez, Christen, Hurwitz, Koh, Sung, Mendoza, and Desai, disagreed with the Court’s refusal to reconsider the panel opinion en banc. View "JAVIER MARTINEZ V. LOWELL CLARK, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for possessing a Jimenez Arms .380 semiautomatic handgun in violation of the felon in possession of a firearm statute. He was not tried until August 30, 2021— 557 days after his indictment—largely because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over Defendant’s objection, the district court excluded much of this time from Defendant’s Speedy Trial Act calculation using the “ends of justice” provision of the Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3161(h)(7)(A), and as a result, denied Defendant’s Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act motions to dismiss his indictment. At trial, the district court rejected Defendant’s request for a jury instruction requiring the jury to find that he knew that the handgun he possessed had traveled in interstate commerce. Defendant appealed both the speedy-trial and jury instruction issues.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court properly excluded time under the ends of justice provision. The panel held that the non-exhaustive factors set forth in United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2022), support the district court’s exclusion of time and that the district court did not err in its ends of justice determination. The panel wrote that the district court acted commendably in doing its best to balance speedy trial rights and public safety in the face of what is hopefully a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic. The panel held that the district court did not err by refusing to give Defendant’s requested mens rea instruction. The panel rejected his challenge to the revocation of supervised release. View "USA V. TOMMY WALKER" on Justia Law

Appellee Jason Scott Collection, Inc. (JSC) and Appellants Trendily Furniture, LLC, Trendily Home Collection, LLC and Rahul Malhotra (collectively, “Trendily”) are high-end furniture manufacturers that sell their products in the Texas market. Trendily intentionally copied three unique furniture designs by JSC and sold them to Texas retailers. The district court granted summary judgment to JSC on its copyright claim and then held Trendily liable on the trade dress claim following a bench trial. On appeal, Trendily challenged only the latter ruling, arguing that trade dress liability is precluded here because JSC did not demonstrate either secondary meaning or the likelihood of consumer confusion.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that JSC did so. The panel wrote that Trendily’s clear intent to copy nonfunctional features of JSC’s pieces supports a strong inference of secondary meaning. Noting that copyright and trademark are not mutually exclusive, the panel rejected Trendily’s argument that it should be held liable only under the Copyright Act. The panel held that the district court properly considered several other factors, including that the JSC pieces were continuously manufactured and sold since 2004, that JSC had a longstanding and well-known presence in the high-end furniture market, and that JSC’s furniture was distinctive in the minds of purchasers. The panel held that the district court did not err in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the JSC pieces and the Trendily pieces. View "JASON SCOTT COLLECTION, INC. V. TRENDILY FURNITURE, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Several organizations sought to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management challenging the grant of two rights-of-way. The district court denied intervention, and the proposed intervenors filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the district court held that the decision to grant the rights-of-way was arbitrary and capricious, vacated it, and remanded the matter to the agency.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court’s ruling mooted the intervention dispute. Generally, if the underlying litigation is complete, an appeal of a denial of intervention is moot and must be dismissed. The panel held that an intervention dispute would remain alive if this court could grant effectual relief or if there were some other way for the proposed intervenors to obtain their desired relief. Here, the district court’s proceedings are complete. No party has filed an appeal of the district court’s merits order, and under Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004), the court would not have jurisdiction over such an appeal brought by Appellants even if they were granted intervention. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. BLM, ET AL" on Justia Law

In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment by his trial counsel waiving closing argument and failing to consult a forensic pathologist expert.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and 10-to-25-year sentence for the second-degree murder. The panel agreed with Petitioner that his counsel’s decision to waive the closing argument was not based on strategy and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s waiver. Addressing deficient performance, the panel wrote that neither reason offered by trial counsel during post-conviction proceedings testimony—that he chose to waive closing argument to cut off the possibility that the lead prosecutor would give a more powerful rebuttal closing argument, and to preclude the prosecutor from arguing for first-degree murder—is supported by the record.   The panel wrote that trial counsel’s decision to waive closing argument was also unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. The panel held that Petitioner successfully showed that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s waiver of closing argument. Had trial counsel made a closing argument, he could have explained that Petitioner’s actions were not the proximate cause of the victim’s death and asked the jury to convict, if at all, on a lesser offense. The panel also agreed with Petitioner that trial counsel’s decision not to consult a forensic pathologist expert was not based on strategy and that Petitioner was prejudiced by this decision. View "ZACHARY KELSEY V. TIM GARRETT, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 lawsuit against Defendants—each present or former employees of the California Department of Public Health—on the grounds that Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiffs of certain rights secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged a “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983 on the grounds that Defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before publishing a purportedly erroneous investigative report on an unsuccessful cardiac surgery. They contend that the publication of this report caused Plaintiffs to be deprived of protected employment-related interests. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to establish several necessary elements of their claim and, thus, dismissed the action in its entirety; Plaintiffs challenged each of the district court’s negative elemental findings.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court’s negative causation finding was plausible in light of record evidence establishing; the timing and conclusions of the hospital’s internal investigations, the independent actions of a hospital employee to alert the family to potential malfeasance by Plaintiff, the family and estate’s pursuit of legal action; the accounts of key percipient witnesses to the surgery as part of the malpractice case; and the sizable malpractice judgment awarded against Plaintiff. The panel thus sustained the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs failed to prove that Defendants’ conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury and concluded that, at a minimum, Plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite causation element of their “stigma-plus” due process claim under Section 1983. View "PERVAIZ CHAUDHRY, ET AL V. TOMAS ARAGON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determination that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order withdrawing the opinion filed March 17, 2023, and reported at 62 F.4th 1223 (9th Cir. 2023), replacing that opinion with a concurrently filed amended opinion and, with these amendments, denying the government’s motion to amend; and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and granting in part Petitioner’s petition for review. In the amended opinion, the panel: (1) denied the petition as to Petitioner’s unexhausted argument that the omission of required time and place information in his NTA amounted to a claim-processing error; (2) remanded Petitioner’s administrative closure claim for further consideration in light of intervening precedent; and (3) remanded Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims because the BIA erroneously reviewed the immigration judge’s nexus determination for clear error, rather than de novo. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture. View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Arizona prisoner, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing as untimely Petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The panel held that a post-conviction relief application in Arizona ceases to be “pending” under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(2) for purposes of tolling AEDPA’s one-year limitation period as long as a state avenue for relief remains open, whether or not a petitioner takes advantage of it. Applying the same statute, the panel also held that Petitioner’s post-conviction application ceased to be pending when the time for him to seek further relief in the state courts expired, which was not precisely when the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate. Applying those principles and correcting some misunderstandings as to when certain events occurred and certain periods expired, the panel reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "PAUL MELVILLE, JR. V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law