Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Escondido Union School District (“Escondido”) appealed the district court’s ruling that Escondido denied D.O. a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) by failing to timely assess him for autism. An administrative law judge ruled that Escondido’s delay in assessing D.O. for autism was neither a procedural violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) nor a denial of a free appropriate public education, or FAPE. The district court reversed the ALJ in part, holding that Escondido’s four-month delay in assessing D.O. constituted a procedural violation of IDEA and that this procedural violation denied D.O. a FAPE by depriving him of educational benefits.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The panel concluded that Escondido’s duty to propose an assessment in an area of suspected disability was triggered on December 5, 2016, when Escondido was put on notice that D.O. might be autistic by Dr. M.D., who had completed an assessment and report. The panel concluded that Escondido’s subsequent four-month delay in proposing an autism assessment plan did not violate any California statutory deadlines or any federal statutory timeline. The panel held that Escondido’s delay did not constitute a procedural violation of IDEA because Escondido did not fail to assess D.O., and some delay in complying with IDEA’s procedural requirement is permissible. The panel held that the district court erred in determining that Escondido’s delay was due, at least in part, to the subjective skepticism of its staff. The panel also held that even if the delay were a procedural violation of FAPE, it did not deny D.O. a FAPE. View "D.O. V. ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL DIST." on Justia Law

Members of the Metlakatlan Indian Community (“the Community”) and their Tsimshian ancestors have inhabited the coast of the Pacific Northwest and fished in its waters. In 1891, Congress passed a statute (the “1891 Act”) recognizing the Community and establishing the Annette Islands Reserve as its reservation. In 2020, in response to Alaska’s attempt to subject the Metlakatlans to its limited entry program, the Community sued Alaskan officials in federal district court. The Community contended that the 1891 Act grants to the Community and its members the right to fish in the off-reservation waters where Community members have traditionally fished. The district court disagreed, holding that the Act provides no such right.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion reversing the district court’s dismissal of the Metlakatlan Indian Community’s suit against Alaskan officials. The panel applied the Indian canon of construction, which required it to construe the 1891 Act liberally in favor of the Community and to infer rights that supported the purpose of the reservation. At issue was the scope of that right. The panel concluded that a central purpose of the reservation, understood in light of the history of the Community, was that the Metlakatlans would continue to support themselves by fishing. The panel, therefore, held that the 1891 Act preserved for the Community and its members an implied right to non-exclusive off-reservation fishing for personal consumption and ceremonial purposes, as well as for commercial purposes. View "METLAKATLA INDIAN COMMUNITY V. MICHAEL DUNLEAVY, ET AL" on Justia Law

One week after an armed robbery of a Sprint store in Los Angeles, Defendant was stopped and frisked by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). A handgun was recovered from the car and later introduced at Defendant’s trial as the weapon used in the Sprint store robbery. Defendant was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and brandishing a firearm.   At issue on appeal is whether officers violated Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by exceeding the scope of their patdown search and seizing the car key, and, if a constitutional violation occurred, whether the handgun evidence was nevertheless admissible because Defendant’s flight from officers attenuated the discovery of the handgun.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery and a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.1, reversed his conviction for brandishing a firearm, and remanded for a reduction of sentence or retrial on the Section 924(c) count. The court concluded that the handgun evidence was illegally obtained and should have been excluded at trial and that this error prejudiced Defendant as to the brandishing conviction but was harmless as to the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the panel concluded that Defendant did not objectively demonstrate his intent to abandon the car key. The panel wrote that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the handgun evidence at Defendant’s trial unless an exception to the rule applies. View "USA V. TERRANCE BAKER" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) petitioned for enforcement of a final order issued against Aakash, Inc. d/b/a Park Central Care and Rehabilitation Center (Aakash). The Board ruled that Aakash had violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), 29 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(5) and (1), by refusing to recognize and bargain with Service Employees International Union, Local 2015 (the Union). Aakash cross-petitioned, admitting that it refused to bargain but asserted that the court should nonetheless vacate the Board’s order.   The Ninth Circuit granted the Board’s petition for enforcement. The panel rejected Aakash’s contentions. The panel held that the President may remove the Board’s General Counsel at any time and for any reason. The panel held that several canons of construction supported their conclusion. Even if history mattered here, past administrations have maintained that the General Counsel was removable at will. Finally, neither of the established two exceptions to the President’s plenary removal power applied here. The panel disagreed with Aakash’s claims that the RNs were supervisors because they held the authority to assign, discipline, and responsibly direct employees, and they exercised that authority using independent judgment. First, Aakash failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the RNs assigned work using independent judgment within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 152(11). Nor did the RNs discipline employees. The power to issue verbal reprimands or report to higher-ups did not suffice. Finally, Aakash did not prove that the RNs responsibly directed other employees using independent judgment. The panel, therefore, concluded the RNs were not statutory supervisors under the National Labor Relations Act. View "NLRB V. AAKASH, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs submitted health plan coverage requests, which United Behavioral Health (“UBH”) denied. Plaintiffs brought claims under ERISA for breach of fiduciary duty and improper denial of benefits. The parties stipulated to a sample class, from which they submitted a sample of health insurance plans. Plaintiffs alleged that the plans provided coverage for treatment consistent with generally accepted standards of case (“GASC”) or were governed by state laws specifying certain criteria for making coverage or medical necessity determinations. Plaintiffs alleged that UBH’s Level of Care Guidelines and Coverage Determination Guidelines for making these determinations were more restrictive than GASC and were also more restrictive than state-mandated criteria. The district court certified three classes, conducted a bench trial, and entered judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor. The district court issued declaratory and injunctive relief, directed the implementation of court-determined claims processing guidelines, ordered “reprocessing” of all class members’ claims in accordance with the new guidelines, and appointed a special master to oversee compliance for ten years.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel held that Plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their breach of fiduciary duty and improper denial of benefits claims. And the district court did not err in certifying three classes to pursue the fiduciary duty claim. However, because Plaintiffs expressly declined to make any showing, or seek a determination of, their entitlement to benefits, permitting Plaintiffs to proceed with their denial of benefits claim under the guise of a “reprocessing” remedy on a class-wide basis violated the Rules Enabling Act. View "DAVID WIT, ET AL V. UNITED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) streamlined affirmance of the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioner was verbally and physically harassed and received death threats because her community in Guatemala perceived her to be a lesbian, including because she wore men’s clothing to work. Petitioner challenged the IJ’s findings that: (1) this treatment did not amount to persecution, (2) the relevant social group for asylum purposes is based on “manner of dress,” and (3) no persecution was committed by the Guatemalan government or by forces that the government was unwilling or unable to control.   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel held that (1) substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that the treatment Petitioner suffered did not amount to persecution, (2) the agency erred in characterizing Petitioner’s proposed social group and concluding that it was not cognizable, and (3) the agency erred by failing to consider highly probative evidence regarding the Guatemalan government’s willingness or ability to control the persecution.   The panel explained that in concluding that this treatment amounted simply to threats, the immigration judge failed to recognize that threats may be compelling evidence of past persecution, particularly when the threats are specific and menacing and accompanied by violent confrontations, near-confrontations and vandalism. Further, the panel wrote that the record suggested that the agency failed to consider all of the evidence. View "REBECA CRISTOBAL ANTONIO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his jury convictions for attempted coercion and enticement of a child. Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions because the government failed to show that he attempted to persuade or entice a minor to engage in sexual activity. According to Defendant, the messages reveal that the only issues discussed were the costs of the shows and the specific acts requested.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that Defendant’s argument conflicts with the trial record, which would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that he attempted to persuade certain minors to perform his abhorrent desires, despite some apparent hesitancy on their part, and that the children’s participation in the live stream was contingent on how much Defendant was willing to pay. The panel noted that, more importantly, Defendant’s argument ignores Section 2422(b)’s focus. The panel wrote that the statute applies whether the minors are real or fictional, and an attempt through an intermediary or an undercover officer still leads to criminal liability. Whether Defendant’s intended victims were “willing” to engage in these acts is ultimately irrelevant— the focus always remains on the defendant’s subjective intent because the statute is designed to protect children from the act of solicitation itself. The panel concluded that, with that focus, the evidence of Defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. View "USA V. FRANKLIN ELLER, JR." on Justia Law

Petitioner made an offer in compromise (OIC) to settle his outstanding tax liability. Under the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act (TIPRA), Petitioner submitted a payment of twenty percent of the value of his OIC, acknowledging that this TIPRA payment would not be refunded if the OIC was not accepted. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not accept the OIC because the Commissioner concluded that ongoing audits of Petitioner's businesses made the overall amount of his tax liability uncertain. Petitioner then sought a refund of his TIPRA payment.   In a previous appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Internal Revenue Service did not abuse its discretion by returning the OIC, but vacated the Tax Court’s determination that the IRS had not abused its discretion in refusing to return the TIPRA payment. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the Tax Court to consider its refund jurisdiction in the first instance. On remand, the Tax Court held that it did not have jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision because there is no specific statutory grant conferring jurisdiction to refund TIPRA payments. The panel explained that, as the Tax Court correctly noted, it is a court of limited jurisdiction, specifically granted by statute, with no authority to expand upon that statutory grant. View "MICHAEL BROWN V. CIR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a paraplegic man, disability advocate, and serial litigant. Plaintiff cannot walk, so he uses a wheelchair to get around and drives a van that deploys a ramp from the passenger side. For Langer to park and exit his vehicle, a parking lot must have an accessible parking space with an adjacent access aisle. When Plaintiff comes across a place that he believes is not compliant with the ADA, he takes photos to document the condition of the premises and often sues. Plaintiff is a “serial” ADA litigant, a fact featured prominently at trial, and he has filed close to 2,000 ADA lawsuits in the thirty-two years since Congress enacted the ADA. Plaintiff sued the Defendants over the lack of accessible parking, bringing claims under Title III of the ADA and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. Defendants filed a trespass counterclaim against Plaintiff. The district court held a one-day bench trial and, at its conclusion, entered judgment for the Defendants.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. First, the panel held that Plaintiff had Article III standing to bring his claim for injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA. The panel held that to establish standing, a plaintiff suing a place of public accommodation must show actual knowledge of an access barrier or ADA violation and must show a sufficient likelihood of injury in the future. The panel also held that so-called “serial litigants” can have tester standing to sue for Title III violations because a plaintiff’s motive for going to a place of public accommodation is irrelevant to standing. View "CHRIS LANGER V. MILAN KISER, ET AL" on Justia Law

This case involved a Washington licensing scheme that disciplines healthcare providers for practicing conversion therapy on minors. The 9th Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.Judge O'Scannlain, joined by Judges Ikuta, Nelson and Vandyke, issued a statement respecting from the court's decision to deny rehearing en banc because the decision correctly applied existing precedent. However, Judge Scannlain noted that the court should have used this case as an opportunity to resolve a circuit split and to "clarify that regulation of the medical profession is not a First-Amendment-free zone."Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Bumatay wrote that because the speech underpinning conversion therapy is overwhelmingly—if not exclusively— religious, the court should have granted Plaintiff's petition for en banc review to evaluate his Free Speech claim under a more exacting standard. View "BRIAN TINGLEY V. ROBERT FERGUSON, ET AL" on Justia Law