Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 2018 convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Relying on the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), Defendant argued that his convictions should be overturned due to the district court’s failure to instruct the jury that the government “must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm,” which he argued was plain error.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s 2018 convictions. The panel wrote that it was undisputed that the district court’s failure to instruct on the Rehaif knowledge element was error and that the error was plain. The panel held, however, that Defendant cannot show that this error affected his substantial rights. In so holding, the panel did not need to reach whether being convicted as a juvenile or having been incarcerated for more than a year as a result of a juvenile conviction satisfies the Rehaif mens rea requirement. The panel held that Defendant’s two DUI convictions unambiguously demonstrate that there is no reasonable probability that a jury would find that Defendant did not know he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a year or more in prison at the time he possessed the firearm. The panel wrote that additional record evidence further demonstrates that Defendant clearly understood that he belonged to the category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. View "USA V. RYAN MICHELL" on Justia Law

Field Asset Services, Inc. (“FAS”) is in the business of pre-foreclosure property preservation for the residential mortgage industry. Plaintiff was the sole proprietor of BB Home Services, which contracted with FAS as a vendor. Plaintiff alleged that FAS willfully misclassified him and members of the putative class as independent contractors rather than employees, resulting in FAS’s failure to pay overtime compensation and to indemnify them for their business expenses. FAS first argued that the district court abused its discretion by certifying the class, despite the predominance of individualized questions over common ones.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order denying a petition for panel rehearing, denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the opinion filed on July 5, 2022; and (2) an amended opinion reversing the district court’s order certifying a class of 156 individuals who personally performed work for FAS, reversing the partial summary judgment in favor of the class, vacating the interim award of more than five million dollars in attorneys’ fees, and remanding for further proceedings.   The panel held that here, the class failed the requirement because complex, individualized inquiries would be needed to establish that class members worked overtime or that claimed expenses were reimbursable. The panel concluded that class certification was improper. The panel noted that FAS’s joint employment argument would likely succeed was an actual employee of a vendor suing FAS, claiming that FAS was an employer. The panel further held that the interim award of attorneys' fees must be vacated because the class certification and summary judgment orders were issued in error. View "FRED BOWERMAN, ET AL V. FIELD ASSET SERVICES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate any disputes regarding the terms and conditions of her employment, but when a dispute arose, she filed a complaint in federal district court. The district court ordered plaintiff to take her claims to arbitration, and the arbitrator ruled in favor Michael Stores, Inc. Plaintiff argued that Michaels waited too long to move for arbitration and therefore waived its right to the arbitral forum.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. The panel held that the record did not establish that Michaels chose to forgo arbitration. Michaels repeatedly reserved its right to arbitration, did not ask the district court to weigh in on the merits, and did not engage in any meaningful discovery. Michaels did not actively litigate the merits of the case for a prolonged period to take advantage of being in court. Although Michaels did not immediately move to compel arbitration, its actions did not amount to a relinquishment of the right to arbitrate. View "TERESA ARMSTRONG V. MICHAELS STORES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs represent a putative class of ticket purchasers (“Ticket Purchasers”) against Defendants Ticketmaster LLC and Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (“Defendants”). Ticket Purchasers sued Defendants in federal district court, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. Defendants moved to compel arbitration on the basis of their websites’ terms of use (“Terms”). The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the Terms constituted a valid agreement between the parties and that the requirements for mutual assent were met.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the terms of use were not invalid under California law for failure to identify Defendants as parties to the agreement properly. The panel concluded that it was possible for a reasonable user to identify the parties to the contract based on the terms’ repeated references to Defendants' common trade names, express references to “Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.,” and available avenues that would enable a reasonable user to identify Ticketmaster’s full legal name. The panel further held that Defendants did not fail to provide constructive notice of the terms of use. The panel concluded that it need not engage in a detailed choice-of-law analysis between California and Massachusetts law because the two states’ laws apply substantially similar rules. Finally, the panel held the district court did not err in deciding the constructive notice issue as a matter of law. View "MITCH OBERSTEIN, ET AL V. LIVE NATION ENT'M'T, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant Citizens Equity First Credit Union (CEFCU) petitioned the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel a trademark registration belonging to plaintiff San Diego County Credit Union (SDCCU). SDCCU procured a stay to the TTAB proceedings by filing an action seeking declaratory relief to establish that it was not infringing either of CEFCU’s registered and common-law marks and to establish that those marks were invalid. The district court granted SDCCU’s motion for summary judgment on noninfringement. After a bench trial, the district court also held that CEFCU’s common-law mark was invalid and awarded SDCCU attorneys’ fees.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and award of attorneys’ fees in favor of Plaintiff and remanded. The panel held that SDCCU had no personal stake in seeking to invalidate CEFCU’s common-law mark because the district court had already granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, which established that SDCCU was not infringing that mark. Hence, there was no longer any reasonable basis for SDCCU to apprehend a trademark infringement suit from CEFCU. After it granted summary judgment in favor of SDCCU, the district court was not resolving an actual “case” or “controversy” regarding the validity of CEFCU’s common-law mark; thus, it lacked Article III jurisdiction to proceed to trial on that issue. The panel therefore vacated the district court’s judgment and its award of attorneys’ fees, which was based, in part, on the merits of the invalidity claim over which the district court lacked Article III jurisdiction. View "SAN DIEGO COUNTY CREDIT UNION V. CEFCU" on Justia Law

The certified a question to the Supreme Court of California in a case where an insured who sued for declaratory judgment that its insurance policy provides coverage for its losses arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. At issue here is whether the policy’s virus exclusion is enforceable and precludes coverage.   The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of California: Is the virus exclusion in French Laundry’s insurance policy unenforceable because enforcing it would render illusory a limited virus coverage provision allowing for the possibility of coverage for business losses and extra expenses allegedly caused by the presence and impacts of COVID-19 at an insured’s properties, including the loss of business due to a civil authority closure order? View "FRENCH LAUNDRY PARTNERS, LP, ET AL V. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO., ET AL" on Justia Law

In 1981, while serving two life sentences for multiple convictions for first-degree murder, Defendant beat a fellow inmate to death. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to death in Idaho state court. Defendant obtained federal habeas relief with respect to his sentence and was resentenced to death in 1995. In a second petition, Defendant thereafter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief in the district court. The district court granted certificates of appealability (COAs) to two issues.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order (a) amending and replacing an opinion filed July 20, 2022, (b) denying a petition for panel rehearing, and (c) denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s denial of Defendant’s second amended habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence. The panel agreed with the district court that the Idaho Supreme Court reasonably found a lack of prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. The panel held further that under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(e)(2), the district court was correct in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the new evidence that Defendant sought to introduce to bolster his IAC resentencing claim.   The panel wrote that even in the absence of Ramirez, it would have agreed with the district court because the new evidence introduced on federal habeas review in support of Defendant’s argument that he suffers from brain damage and an organic brain disorder was largely duplicative of evidence that had been introduced during his 1982 sentencing and his 1995 resentencing. View "THOMAS CREECH V. TIM RICHARDSON" on Justia Law

Appellant is the owner of a rental house and property in Livingston, Montana (“Property”). Appellant purchased a Landlord Protection Policy (“Policy”) from Safeco Insurance Company (“Safeco”) to insure the Property. In 2017, a water main line leading into the house broke, saturating the area around and under the property with water. A few months later, soft spots developed on the floor of the house. An investigation determined that the soil under the foundation had contracted as a result of the water damage, causing the foundation slab to sag. Safeco informed Appellant that the damage to the Property was not covered under the Policy based on its Earth Movement and Water Damage exclusions, which are listed as excluded perils in the Policy’s ACC clause. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Safeco, finding that 1) the ACC clause barred coverage, 2) the Policy was not illusory or ambiguous, and 3) Safeco did not violate Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act when it denied Appellant coverage. Appellant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the Montana Supreme Court: 1) Whether an anti-concurrent cause (“ACC”) clause in an insurance policy applies to defeat insurance coverage despite Montana’s recognition of the efficient proximate cause (“EPC”) doctrine; and 2) Whether the relevant language in the general exclusions section on page 8 of the insurance policy in this case is an ACC clause that circumvents the application of the EPC doctrine. View "VIRGINIA WARD V. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

Appellee worked at a Xerox Business Services, LLC (“XBS”) call center and was compensated according to a proprietary system of differential pay rates known as Achievement Based Compensation (“ABC”). Section 4 of the 2002 Dispute Resolution Plan ("DRP") required XBS and its agents to submit “all disputes” to binding arbitration for final and exclusive resolution. Appellee never signed the 2002 DRP. XBS issued an updated DRP (“2012 DRP”). XBS filed a motion to compel individual arbitration by 2,927 class members who had signed the 2002 DRP. The district court found that XBS had waived its right to compel arbitration.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying XBS's motion to compel. The panel noted that following Morgan v. Sundance, 142 S. Ct. 1708 (2022), the Ninth Circuit’s test for waiver of the right to compel arbitration consists of two elements: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right. XBS challenged both prongs of the test. The panel held that XBS was correct that the district court could not compel nonparties to the case to arbitrate until after a class had been certified and the notice and opt-out period were complete. However, XBS failed to appreciate that waiver was a unilateral concept. The panel held that further undercutting XBS’s position was its own actions throughout the course of the litigation, in which XBS raised the 2012 DRP as to putative class members before the class had been certified and before it had the ability to move to enforce that agreement against them. View "TIFFANY HILL V. XEROX BUSINESS SERVICES, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a physically challenged athlete and motivational speaker who started the Scott Rigsby Foundation and registered the domain name “scottrigsbyfoundation.org” with GoDaddy.com. When Plaintiff and the Foundation failed to pay the annual renewal fee in 2018, a third party registered the then-available domain name. Scottrigsbyfoundation.org became a gambling information site. Plaintiff sued GoDaddy.com, LLC and its corporate relatives (collectively, “GoDaddy”), for violations of the Lanham Act and various state laws and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the return of the domain name. The Northern District of Georgia transferred the case to the District of Arizona, which dismissed all claims.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and dismissed Plaintiff’s and the Foundation’s appeal of an order transferring venue. The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia’s order transferring the case to the District of Arizona because transfer orders are reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court. The panel held that Plaintiff could not satisfy the “use in commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis GoDaddy because the “use” in question was being carried out by a third-party gambling site, not GoDaddy. As to the Lanham Act claim, the panel further held that Plaintiff could not overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.  The panel held that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded GoDaddy from liability for Plaintiff’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity, trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act. View "SCOTT RIGSBY, ET AL V. GODADDY INC., ET AL" on Justia Law