Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was serving a sentence of supervised release for a prior federal conviction from Nevada when he was arrested and indicted on one count of Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud. Soon after Defendant’s arrest, the government obtained an order permitting it to seize the funds in his inmate trust account and apply them to a restitution obligation for a prior federal conviction from Washington. Defendant pleaded guilty in the conspiracy case, admitted a violation of his supervised release in his Nevada case, and was sentenced in both cases. Defendant urges that the seizure of his inmate funds violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his Fifth Amendment due process right. He also contends that the district court’s imposition of an undisputedly illegal sentence for his supervised release violation is reversible error.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in part, vacated the sentence imposed for the violation of supervised release, and remanded for re-sentencing on the supervised release violation. The panel concluded that the government’s seizure of Defendant’s inmate funds did not violate his right to either counsel of choice or due process. The court also concluded that the district court’s imposition of an illegally excessive sentence for Defendant’s supervised release violation was plain error that requires vacatur of that sentence and remand for re-sentencing. View "USA V. LONNIE LILLARD" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from her employment as a Revenue Officer at the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for assessed Unauthorized Access of Taxpayer Data (“UNAX”) offenses. After unsuccessfully pursuing an internal Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint, Plaintiff brought suit against the Treasury Secretary in the United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that her termination was based on impermissible criteria of age and national origin in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, respectively. The district court granted summary judgment to the Treasury Secretary on the grounds that Plainitff: (1) failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; and (2) failed to show that the IRS Management’s proffered reasons for terminating her were pretext for age or national origin discrimination.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that at step one of the legal framework for a discrimination action, the district court found that none of Plaintiff’s evidence established a prima facie case of age discrimination. The panel agreed with the district court that most of Plaintiff’s evidence comprised “circumstantial evidence”—her superior’s alleged exaggeration of her offenses, assignment of menial tasks, selection of draconian penalties. The panel held, however, that the record was not devoid of direct evidence of age discrimination. The panel was satisfied that the record taken as a whole supported Plaintiff’s prima facie case of age discrimination. The panel held that the Secretary’s proffered reasons for its action was sufficient. View "JOAN OPARA V. JANET YELLEN" on Justia Law

The Washington State Health Care Authority (“HCA”) and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community petition for review of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) decision denying Washington’s request to amend Apple Health, the Washington State Medicaid plan (the “State Plan”). HCA petitioned CMS to amend the State Plan to include dental health aide therapists (“DHATs”) on the list of licensed providers who can be reimbursed through Medicaid. CMS rejected the Amended State Plan on the basis that it violates the Medicaid free choice of providers statute and regulation guaranteeing all Medicaid beneficiaries equal access to qualified healthcare professionals willing to treat them. Petitioners challenged this denial.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition of review. The panel rejected CMS’s reasoning on the ground that the underlying Washington statute—Wash. Rev. Code Section 70.350.020—did not violate Section 1396(a)(23) because it merely authorized where and how DHATs can practice and did not in any way restrict Medicaid recipients’ ability to obtain service from DHATs relative to non-Medicaid recipients. CMS’s rejection of the Amended State Plan was “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the panel granted the petition for review and remanded to the agency with instructions to approve the Amended State Plan. View "WASHINGTON STATE HEALTH CARE A, ET AL V. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAI, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner asserts that he suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his familial association with his brother, who is a member of the Shiromani Akali Dal Party (Mann Party), and his own affiliation with that Party. The Mann Party advocates for the creation of a sovereign state for Sikh people and is opposed by the Congress Party. The immigration judge (IJ) and the BIA concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal because the injuries and threats that Petitioner had suffered at the hands of Congress Party members were not sufficiently serious.   The Ninth Circuit filed an order (1) amending the opinion filed on September 14, 2022; (2) denying the Respondent’s petition for panel rehearing; and (3) indicating that no further petitions for rehearing or for rehearing en banc would be entertained. In the amended opinion, the panel granted in part and denied in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and remanded, holding that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s determination that the harm Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution, but substantial evidence did support the BIA’s determination that the harm did not amount to past torture and that Petitioner failed to show that he would more likely than not face a clear probability of future torture. View "SHAMSHER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Defendant, an Iraqi citizen, was convicted of attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and of presenting a naturalization application with false statements. Both convictions were predicated on Defendant’s answers to two questions on his naturalization application, in which he asserted that he had never given false information to a U.S. Government official and that he had never lied to such an official to gain an immigration benefit.   On appeal, Defendant argued that the Government presented insufficient evidence to establish that any false statements he made during the asylum process were material to his subsequent naturalization application and that his motion for judgment of acquittal on both counts should have been granted.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction for attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and presenting a naturalization application with false statements. The panel concluded that ample evidence supports the Government’s reliance on the “investigation-based theory” of materiality. The panel concluded that a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a reasonable immigration judge apprised of the facts about Defendant’s presence in Germany would have found Defendant not to be credible, and would have denied asylum, on the ground that the claimed persecution in 2008 was fabricated and that Defendant thus had not established that he had suffered past persecution. Further, the panel concluded that the Government presented sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude on this basis that Defendant would have been ineligible for asylum and that his false statements on his later naturalization application were, therefore material to the naturalization decision under an “investigation-based theory.” View "USA V. SEVAN AMINTOBIA" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). One of the firearms that formed the basis of the enhancement was a Polymer80, which is typically sold online as a kit of component parts and need not be serialized. Defendant argued that the Polymer80 could not be counted because it did not qualify as a “firearm” as that term is defined within the meaning of Section 2K2.1(b)(1).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on the ground that the offense involved three firearms. The court explained that the requirement that the owner of an unserialized firearm apply for a serial number or other identifying mark does not render the owner’s possession of the gun unlawful. Second, the government presented no evidence that Defendant was in fact the owner of the Polymer80, much less that he owned the gun "as of July 1, 2018," as the statute then required.   The panel nevertheless agreed that the enhancement was proper under Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because Defendant unlawfully possessed the Polymer80 in violation of a different California statute, Penal Code Section 29800. That statute, which is California’s analogue to Section 922(g)(1), prohibits any “person who has been convicted of a felony” from having “any firearm” in his possession or under his custody or control. The panel held that the district court did not err in finding that the Polymer80 qualified as a firearm under California law. View "USA V. ELIGIO MUNOZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a set of tires from Walmart.com, which included a Terms of Use with an arbitration provision. Plaintiff had the tires shipped to and installed at a Walmart Auto Center, and while waiting for the tires to be installed, he purchased the lifetime balancing and rotation Service Agreement. Plaintiff received tire services once in 2019 but was later denied service on several occasions in 2020 at multiple Walmart Auto Centers. Plaintiff brought a putative class action alleging breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Walmart sought to compel individual arbitration of its dispute with Plaintiff pursuant to the arbitration provisions of the Terms of Use. The district court found that the plain meaning of the Terms of Use precluded the applicability of the arbitration provision to in-store purchases.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Walmart Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration and agreed with the district court that Plaintiff contested the existence, not the scope, of an arbitration agreement that would encompass this dispute. As the party seeking to compel arbitration, Walmart bore the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. The panel held that substantial evidence supported that the two contracts between Plaintiff and Walmart were separate, independent agreements. The two contracts—though they involved the same parties and the same tires—were separate and not interrelated. Therefore, the arbitration agreement in the first did not encompass disputes arising from the second. View "KEVIN JOHNSON V. WALMART INC." on Justia Law

Mongol Nation is an unincorporated association whose members include the official, or “full-patch,” members of the Mongols Gang. A jury convicted the association of substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy violations; it also found various forms of Mongol Nation property forfeitable. That property included the collective membership marks—a type of intellectual property used to designate membership in an association or other organization. The district court denied forfeiture of those marks, holding that the forfeiture would violate the First and Eighth Amendments.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that in Mongol Nation’s appeal, it argued for the first time that it is not an indictable “person” under RICO because the indictment alleges that the association was organized for unlawful purposes only. The panel concluded that this unpreserved argument is non-jurisdictional. The panel did not resolve the Government’s contention that Mongol waived it. The panel wrote that regardless of the merits of Mongol Nation’s argument, it mischaracterizes the allegations in the indictment.    On the Government’s cross-appeal of the order denying its second preliminary order of forfeiture, the panel did not need to decide whether forfeiture of the membership marks would violate the First and Eighth Amendments. Nor did the panel reach the question of whether the marks may be forfeitable without the transfer of any goodwill associated with the marks. The panel held that the forfeiture was improper for a different reason—the Government effectively sought an order seizing and extinguishing the Mongols’ right to exclusive use of its marks without the Government itself ever seizing title to the marks. View "USA V. MONGOL NATION" on Justia Law

A Huntington Beach City Councilperson appointed Plaintiff to the city’s Citizen Participation Advisory Board (“CPAB”). Each councilperson appoints one member to the seven-person CPAB and may remove that member without cause. After being appointed to the CPAB, Plaintiff was photographed at an immigrants’ rights rally standing near individuals whom the councilperson believed to be “Antifa.” After determining that Plaintiff’s public denouncement of Antifa was insufficient, the councilperson removed Plaintiff from the CPAB, citing lack of shared values.   Plaintiff sued the City of Huntington Beach, claiming retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights to free speech, association, and assembly and alleging the councilperson’s demand for a public statement amounted to unconstitutionally compelled speech. The district court dismissed the complaint.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim, the panel held that the First Amendment does not protect a volunteer member of a municipal advisory board from dismissal by the city councilperson who appointed her and who is authorized under a city ordinance to remove her. The panel held that given the statutory structure and duties of the CPAB, the public could readily infer that a CPAB member’s actions and statements while serving in the role reflected the current views and goals of the appointing councilperson. Like each of her fellow board members, Plaintiff was the “public face” of her appointor. She could therefore be dismissed for lack of political compatibility. The panel further rejected Plaintiff’s compelled speech claim. View "SHAYNA LATHUS V. CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH" on Justia Law

Defendant asserted that permitting a juror to participate remotely via Zoom violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the error was structural and could not be waived, and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial without having to show prejudice. Defendant asserted that the alleged error is akin to depriving him of his right to a jury trial, depriving him of his right to a fair and impartial jury, depriving him of a representative jury, and/or depriving him of his right to confront witnesses   The Ninth Circuit affirmed his robbery convictions. The court assumed without deciding that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the in-person participation of jurors during their trial. The panel wrote that none of these comparisons is apt, as there is no indication in the record—and no reason to suppose—that the remote participation of a duly empaneled juror interfered with the functioning of the jury, somehow made that juror partial or unrepresentative, or impacted the procedures used for the presentation of witnesses. The panel wrote that allowing remote juror participation does not impact the entire framework of the trial in ways that cannot be accurately measured on review. The court explained that none of those errors Defendant alleged will necessarily arise simply because a juror is participating remotely. The panel wrote that there is no case law or record evidence to support a presumption that the remote participation of a juror will always render a trial unfair and the judgment unreliable. View "USA V. EDWARD KNIGHT" on Justia Law