Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In January 1996, Hoang Ai Le and his co-conspirators planned to steal computer chips from Diamond Flower Electric Instruments (DFI). The plan involved two teams: an "entry" team to invade the home of a DFI employee to obtain alarm codes, and a second team, led by Le, to use those codes to access DFI and steal the chips. The entry team invaded the home of Zhou Shi Wen, mistakenly believing he had the codes. They tortured Wen and tied up his family and a friend, but Wen did not have the codes. The plan was abandoned, but the entry team still stole $1,500 in valuables from Wen's home.A jury convicted Le in 2007 of Hobbs Act conspiracy and a related firearm offense. He was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Le appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, which governs inchoate offenses, rather than § 2B3.1, which governs completed robberies. The Ninth Circuit agreed and remanded for resentencing. On remand, Le sought a three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), which applies to incomplete conspiracies. The district court denied the reduction, finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery and that the failure was due to circumstances beyond their control.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the conspirators were "about to complete" the robbery, as they had already taken significant steps, including torturing Wen and positioning themselves to proceed to DFI. The court also found that the failure of the robbery was due to Wen's lack of knowledge of the alarm codes, which was beyond the conspirators' control. Therefore, Le was not entitled to the three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2). The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. LE" on Justia Law

The case involves a trademark infringement dispute between two Arizona-based personal injury law firms. The plaintiff, Lerner & Rowe, PC, owns three registered trademarks, including the name "Lerner & Rowe." The defendant, Brown, Engstrand & Shely, LLC, doing business as The Accident Law Group (ALG), used a marketing strategy called "conquesting" by purchasing the term "Lerner & Rowe" as a Google Ads keyword. This caused ALG's advertisements to appear when users searched for "Lerner & Rowe" on Google.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of ALG on Lerner & Rowe's claims of trademark infringement and unjust enrichment but denied summary judgment on the unfair competition claims. ALG moved for reconsideration, and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment on all claims. Lerner & Rowe appealed the ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Lerner & Rowe failed to establish that ALG's use of the "Lerner & Rowe" mark was likely to cause consumer confusion. The court found that while the strength of the mark favored Lerner & Rowe, the evidence of actual confusion was de minimis, the reasonably prudent consumer's degree of care and the labeling and appearance of ALG's advertisements weighed in favor of ALG. The court concluded that Lerner & Rowe did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, which is essential for a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. The judgment was affirmed. View "LERNER & ROWE PC V. BROWN ENGSTRAND & SHELY LLC" on Justia Law

A mother and her two minor children, who entered the United States seeking asylum, were scheduled for an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington. On their way to the hearing, they encountered two major car accidents, causing them to be two hours late. Upon arrival, they attempted to have their case heard but were unsuccessful. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. They promptly moved to reopen the case, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival.The IJ denied the motion, stating that ordinary traffic delays do not constitute exceptional circumstances and that the mother failed to make a prima facie case for asylum. The IJ did not address the minor children’s claims or their eligibility for derivative citizenship through their father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, holding that the petitioners failed to establish exceptional circumstances and that the children did not demonstrate eligibility for adjustment of status through their newly naturalized father.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion by not considering the totality of the circumstances. The court noted that the petitioners did everything reasonably possible to attend their hearing, including leaving home early and documenting the extraordinary traffic caused by the accidents. The court also found that the IJ and BIA failed to consider the petitioners' lack of motive to evade the hearing and the unconscionable results of the in absentia removal order, particularly for the minor children eligible for derivative citizenship.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the facts amounted to exceptional circumstances warranting reopening of the in absentia removal order. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MONTEJO-GONZALEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Rose Court, LLC's predecessor defaulted on a mortgage loan secured by real property. Rose Court filed and voluntarily dismissed multiple lawsuits in state and federal courts challenging the lender's foreclosure efforts. After the foreclosure sale, Rose Court initiated an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against U.S. Bank, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS), and Quality Loan Service Corporation (Quality), alleging fraudulent transfer of the property.The bankruptcy court dismissed Rose Court's claims and denied its motion to amend the complaint to assert a fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim, citing the two-dismissal rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B). This rule applies when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the same claim twice, making any subsequent dismissal an adjudication on the merits. The court found that Rose Court had previously dismissed similar claims in state and federal court actions.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. Rose Court then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial of leave to amend.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The court held that the two-dismissal rule barred Rose Court from asserting the same fraud-based wrongful-foreclosure claim for a third time. The court adopted a transactional approach, determining that a subsequent claim is the same as a previously dismissed claim if it arises from the same set of facts. The court also declined to address Rose Court's new argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that it should be allowed to amend to assert a new wrongful-foreclosure claim based on interference with its right to reinstate the loan. View "ROSE COURT, LLC V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC." on Justia Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law

The case involves Denys Korotkiy, the Chief Engineer of a foreign-flagged ship, who was charged with violating U.S. regulations by failing to maintain accurate records of bilge-water operations in the ship's Oil Record Book. The ship, MV Donald, dumped oily bilge water on the high seas and made misleading entries in the Oil Record Book to cover it up. Upon arriving in the U.S., the Coast Guard inspected the ship and found the records to be inaccurate and incomplete.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied Korotkiy's motion to dismiss the indictment. Korotkiy argued that the regulation did not require accurate records, that Congress and the international community did not intend for such prosecutions, and that only shipmasters, not chief engineers, should be charged. The district court, relying on precedents from other circuits, found that Korotkiy could be charged for failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 requires ships to maintain accurate records in their Oil Record Books while in U.S. waters. The court joined other circuits in interpreting the regulation to impose a duty on foreign-flagged vessels to ensure the accuracy of their records upon entering U.S. territorial waters. The court also rejected Korotkiy's argument that only shipmasters could be charged, noting that chief engineers can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the failure to maintain accurate records. The court concluded that the regulation's plain language and the legislative purpose of preventing oceanic pollution supported the prosecution. View "USA V. KOROTKIY" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

Reginald Elmore was convicted in 2019 for using or possessing a firearm during a murder in aid of racketeering, violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). The predicate crime for this conviction was a VICAR (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering) murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), which itself required a violation of state or federal law. Elmore challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the VICAR murder did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Elmore’s motion to vacate his conviction. The court held that VICAR murder is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause and thus a valid predicate for Elmore’s § 924(j)(1) conviction. The court did not address the government’s procedural arguments and granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of the proper mode of analysis for determining whether a VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the VICAR statute is divisible, requiring the application of the modified categorical approach to determine the elements of Elmore’s charged VICAR offense. The court concluded that Elmore was charged with VICAR murder predicated on California murder. The Ninth Circuit determined that courts should look through to the elements of the state-level predicate violation to decide if the VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether California murder involves the requisite force to be a valid predicate for a § 924(j)(1) conviction and to address the government’s procedural arguments. View "USA V. ELMORE" on Justia Law

Briseyda Meza Diaz and her minor daughter, Gabriela Segundo Meza, fled Mexico after experiencing severe violence and threats from cartel members. Meza Diaz's brother was murdered, her husband was kidnapped and tortured, and she received numerous death threats. In 2016, armed men invaded her home, beat her unconscious, and threatened her life. The local police, unable to ensure her safety, advised her to flee the country, which she did, seeking asylum in the United States.An Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Meza Diaz's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They concluded that her experiences did not constitute past persecution and that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ and BIA also determined that the harm she suffered was not on account of a protected ground and that the Mexican government was not unable or unwilling to control her persecutors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the record evidence compelled the conclusion that Meza Diaz experienced past persecution by forces that Mexican authorities are either unable or unwilling to control. The court held that the BIA erred by failing to consider key evidence, including the attackers' statements and the police report, which linked the harm to her family status. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings on Meza Diaz's claims of future persecution and withholding of removal. View "Diaz v. Garland" on Justia Law