Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Trader Joe’s, a national grocery store chain, has used its distinctive trademarks, including a unique red typeface and logo, since 1967 and does not franchise or license these marks. The company also sells branded merchandise such as reusable tote bags. Trader Joe’s United, a labor union representing some of Trader Joe’s employees, began selling merchandise—including tote bags, apparel, mugs, and buttons—on its website, allegedly using Trader Joe’s trademarks and design elements. Trader Joe’s sent cease-and-desist letters, objecting only to the union’s commercial use of its marks on merchandise, not to the union’s use of the company name for identification or advocacy. The union refused to comply, and Trader Joe’s filed suit, alleging trademark infringement, dilution, and related claims.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the union’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, finding no plausible likelihood of consumer confusion under the Sleekcraft factors and concluding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act (NLGA) barred injunctive relief because the dispute arose from a labor dispute. The district court also dismissed the trademark dilution claim under the nominative fair use doctrine and awarded attorneys’ fees to the union, finding the suit frivolous and improperly motivated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the trademark infringement claim, holding that, when viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Trader Joe’s, the district court erred in its application of the Sleekcraft likelihood-of-confusion test. The appellate court also held that the district court erred in dismissing the dilution claim without proper analysis and in concluding that the NLGA categorically barred injunctive relief at the pleading stage. The Ninth Circuit vacated the attorneys’ fees award and remanded for further proceedings. View "TRADER JOE'S COMPANY V. TRADER JOES UNITED" on Justia Law

A group of environmental and fishing organizations challenged the operation of a large drainage project in California’s Central Valley, which collects and conveys irrigation return flows from nearly 100,000 acres of farmland and discharges them into a wetland connected to the San Joaquin River. The plaintiffs argued that the project’s discharges included pollutants not related to irrigated agriculture, such as groundwater seepage, runoff from non-irrigated lands, sediment, and water from a solar facility, and therefore should not be exempt from federal permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act (CWA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California previously granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, including the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and local water authorities, finding that the project qualified for the CWA’s exemption for “discharges composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture.” On a prior appeal, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the defendants bore the burden of proving the exemption applied and that “entirely” meant wholly, not just a majority, of the discharge. The case was remanded for further proceedings under this standard.On the current appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s subsequent grant of summary judgment for the defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the CWA exemption applies so long as the return flow does not contain additional point source discharges from activities unrelated to crop production. The court found that the alleged pollutants were either from nonpoint sources or from point sources related to crop production, and that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the project’s exempt status under the CWA. View "PACIFIC COAST FED'N OF FISHERMEN'S ASS'NS, INC. V. NICKELS" on Justia Law

A group of former executives from an investment management company were prosecuted after the company collapsed and was placed in receivership. The company, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors, primarily through promissory notes and other investment vehicles, experienced severe financial distress following the default of a major asset. Despite this, the executives continued to solicit investments, representing to investors that their funds would be used to purchase secure receivables and that the company was financially healthy. In reality, most new investor funds were used to pay prior investors and cover operating expenses. The executives were accused of making material misrepresentations and misleading half-truths about the use of investor funds, the security of investments, and the company’s financial health.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. The jury found all three defendants guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and multiple counts of wire fraud; one defendant was also convicted of making a false statement on a loan application. The defendants argued that they were improperly convicted on an omissions theory of fraud and that they were prevented from presenting a complete defense based on disclosures in offering documents and financial statements. They also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the materiality of their statements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government’s theory at trial was based on affirmative misrepresentations and misleading half-truths, not mere omissions, and that the jury instructions fairly stated the law. The court found that evidence of what was not disclosed was relevant to materiality, and that disclaimers in offering documents did not render other representations immaterial in a criminal fraud prosecution. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. JESENIK" on Justia Law

A plaintiff who lost his job during the COVID-19 pandemic applied for and received regular unemployment benefits from the Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD). After exhausting those benefits, he applied for and received additional benefits under the federally funded Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) program, created by the CARES Act. Following an audit, ESD redetermined his eligibility, reduced his weekly benefit, and assessed overpayments, sending him multiple, confusing notices with inconsistent information and deadlines. While the plaintiff appealed, ESD began offsetting his ongoing PEUC benefits to recover the alleged overpayments.An administrative law judge later found that ESD’s notices failed to provide adequate explanation or legal basis for the benefit reductions and overpayment assessments, and ordered ESD to issue a new redetermination. ESD reimbursed the plaintiff for the offset amounts, but its system continued to show a balance owed. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging deprivation of property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. The district court held that while the plaintiff had a property interest in regular unemployment benefits, he did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in PEUC benefits, because state participation in the PEUC program was voluntary and could be terminated at any time.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that the CARES Act’s PEUC program, once a state opted in, created a constitutionally protected property interest in PEUC benefits for eligible individuals. The Act’s mandatory language and objective eligibility criteria significantly constrained state discretion, giving rise to legitimate claims of entitlement. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "STERLING V. FEEK" on Justia Law

A reporter who regularly covered sideshows—events involving drivers performing stunts in public intersections—sought to continue his on-site reporting, which included observing and recording these events within 200 feet of their occurrence. After the County of Alameda enacted an ordinance making it a misdemeanor to knowingly spectate a sideshow from within 200 feet, the reporter canceled his plans out of fear of prosecution, alleging that the ordinance impeded his ability to gather news and inform the public.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the reporter’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court found that, while the reporter had standing, the First Amendment did not protect his newsgathering and reporting activities in this context. The court reasoned that the ordinance did not specifically prohibit recording and that being present to observe a sideshow was not inherently expressive conduct. Alternatively, the district court concluded that the ordinance was content neutral and survived intermediate scrutiny.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporter’s newsgathering and reporting activities, including observation and recording, are protected by the First Amendment. The court determined that the ordinance is content based because it targets only spectating sideshows and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny. The court found that the ordinance fails strict scrutiny, as less restrictive alternatives exist to address public safety concerns, and the ordinance is underinclusive. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the reporter demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored an injunction. The court remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of the reporter. View "GARCIA V. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA" on Justia Law

A civilian employee of the Defense Logistics Agency in Hawaii, who had served in the National Guard and developed post-traumatic stress disorder, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. After a series of workplace incidents, the agency suspended him indefinitely, citing concerns about his access to sensitive information. The employee claimed that the agency failed to provide reasonable accommodations and improperly deemed him a direct threat.The employee filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint, which eventually led to a final agency decision (FAD) against him. The agency transmitted the FAD and related documents electronically using a secure system, but made several errors in providing the necessary passphrase to decrypt the document. As a result, the employee’s attorney was unable to access the FAD for several weeks, despite repeated requests for assistance and clarification. The attorney finally received an accessible, decrypted copy of the FAD by email on December 5, 2022. The employee filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii 88 days later. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Defense, finding the complaint untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the initial electronic transmission, and denied equitable tolling.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the 90-day limitations period for filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act did not begin until the attorney received effective notice of the agency’s decision, which occurred when he received the decrypted FAD on December 5. Alternatively, the court held that equitable tolling was warranted because the attorney diligently sought access to the FAD and was prevented by extraordinary circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the merits. View "ASUNCION V. HEGSETH" on Justia Law

A Canadian mining company operated a lead-zinc smelter in British Columbia, discharging millions of tons of slag and contaminated effluent containing hazardous substances into the Upper Columbia River over several decades. This pollution injured fish and benthic organisms in the river, which holds significant cultural and practical importance for a federally recognized Native American tribe whose reservation borders the river. The tribe sought damages for the interim lost use of these injured natural resources, including losses with a cultural dimension, such as reduced fishing and diminished ability to use the river for traditional purposes.Litigation began in 2004, with individual tribal members, later joined by the tribe and the State of Washington, bringing claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against the company. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found the company liable for response costs and, after a trial, awarded the tribe investigative expenses and attorney’s fees. The case then proceeded to a third phase to determine liability for natural resource damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the company on the tribe’s claims for interim lost use damages, reasoning that CERCLA does not authorize recovery for injuries to “cultural resources” or for damages with a cultural component.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CERCLA authorizes recovery for interim lost use of injured natural resources, even when those lost uses have a cultural dimension, provided the damages are for injury to natural resources as defined by the statute. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial to determine whether the tribe sustained damages from lost uses of injured natural resources. View "CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION V. TECK COMINCO METALS LTD" on Justia Law

Douglas Eligha Taylor was originally convicted in 1995 for robbing four banks in Los Angeles, pleading guilty to multiple counts including armed bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to 147 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. After his release in 2007, Taylor committed another bank robbery in 2008 and was prosecuted in state court, receiving a 17-year sentence. While in state custody, he was involved in a stabbing incident and accumulated multiple rules violations. Upon completing his state sentence in 2023, Taylor was transferred to federal custody, where the United States Probation Office petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on his 2008 conduct. Taylor admitted the allegations, and the district court accepted his admissions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California revoked Taylor’s supervised release and imposed a 60-month prison sentence, which was above the recommended Guidelines range of 18–24 months, followed by 24 months of supervised release. The court explained its decision by referencing Taylor’s repeated violations, the danger posed to the public, his lack of deterrence from prior sanctions, and the risk of recidivism. Taylor appealed, arguing that the district court committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence, improperly considering his prior criminal conduct, and imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not commit plain procedural error, adequately explained its reasons for the above-Guidelines sentence, and properly considered Taylor’s history and risk to the public. The court also found the sentence to be substantively reasonable and rejected Taylor’s arguments for a lower sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "USA V. TAYLOR" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated a civil enforcement action against Ongkaruck Sripetch and several other defendants, alleging that they engaged in fraudulent schemes involving at least 20 penny stock companies. The SEC claimed that the defendants obtained over $6 million in illicit proceeds through violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including securities fraud and the sale of unregistered securities. The SEC sought various remedies, including an order requiring the defendants to disgorge all ill-gotten gains.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over the case. Sripetch consented to the entry of judgment, agreeing that the court could order disgorgement and prejudgment interest, and that the complaint’s allegations would be accepted as true for the purposes of the SEC’s motion. The district court ordered Sripetch to disgorge $2,251,923.16 in net profits, plus prejudgment interest. Sripetch appealed, arguing that disgorgement under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7) requires a showing of pecuniary harm to investors, which he claimed the SEC had not demonstrated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s disgorgement order for abuse of discretion. The Ninth Circuit held that the SEC is not required to show that investors suffered pecuniary harm as a precondition to a disgorgement award under § 78u(d)(5) or (d)(7). The court reasoned that disgorgement is a profits-based remedy focused on depriving wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains, not compensating victims for losses. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. SRIPETCH" on Justia Law

A religious association that supports abortion as a core tenet challenged Idaho’s laws criminalizing abortion. The organization, which operates a telehealth abortion clinic in New Mexico, alleged that its members in Idaho were harmed by the state’s abortion restrictions. The association claimed that it had members in Idaho who could become involuntarily pregnant and would seek abortions as part of their religious practice, and that it had diverted resources to open its New Mexico clinic in response to Idaho’s and other states’ abortion bans.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the association lacked both associational and organizational standing. The district court determined that the association had not identified any specific member in Idaho who was injured or imminently would be injured by the abortion laws, nor had it shown that its organizational activities were directly impeded by the statutes. The district court also addressed the merits of the association’s constitutional claims and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the grounds of lack of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit held that the association failed to demonstrate associational standing because it did not identify any member who had suffered or would imminently suffer an injury in Idaho. The court also found no organizational standing, as the association’s diversion of resources to open a clinic in New Mexico and its claim of frustration of mission were insufficient under recent Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the constitutional claims. The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the complaint could be saved by amendment, noting that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction should generally be without prejudice. View "THE SATANIC TEMPLE V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law