Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Hollywood Foreign Press Association (HFPA) is a California non-profit mutual benefit corporation whose members are involved in reporting for media outlets outside of the United States. The members are offered advantages such as access to Hollywood talent granted by movie studios. The HFPA strictly limits the admission of new members   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust action brought by two entertainment journalists who challenged the membership policies of HFPA. The panel affirmed the dismissal of the journalists’ antitrust claims. The journalists alleged that the HFPA’s exclusionary membership practices violated section 1 (restraint of trade) and section 2 (monopolization) of the Sherman Act, as well as California’s Cartwright Act. The panel held that the journalists also failed to state a claim that the HFPA’s practices were unlawful under a rule of reason analysis.   The panel held that the journalists did not state a claim of per se liability based on a horizontal market division agreement because this theory was inconsistent with statements in the complaint that the HFPA’s members do not participate in the same product market. The panel held that, under a rule of reason analysis, the journalists failed to allege that the HFPA had market power in any reasonably defined market. The panel also affirmed the dismissal of the journalists’ claim based on California’s right of fair procedure, which protects, in certain situations, against arbitrary decisions by private organizations. View "KJERSTI FLAA, ET AL V. HOLLYWOOD FOREIGN PRESS ASSOC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to build housing on their properties in an area that under the the City of Half Moon Bay’s (City) Land Use Plan (LUP) was designated for public recreation and which severely restricted housing development. Plaintiffs took the position that California Senate Bill 330 (SB 330), enacted in 2019 to increase the stock of affordable housing in the state, required the City to approve their proposed development plan. After rejecting Plaintiffs’ proposal, the City informed plaintiffs that it intended to acquire their properties through eminent domain and made a purchase offer based on the properties’ appraised values. Plaintiffs rejected the offer and filed this action in district court claiming, among other things, that the City effected a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by rejecting their building proposal and enforcing LUP’s restrictions on their property.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the City’s motion to abstain pending resolution of an eminent domain action in state court. The panel held that as an initial matter, neither Knick nor Pakdel, which address when a claim accrues for purposes of judicial review, explicitly limit abstention in takings litigation. Abstention allows courts to stay claims that have already accrued. The panel held that the requirements for Pullman abstention were met in this case. First, the complaint touched a sensitive area of social policy, land use planning. Second, a ruling in the state eminent domain action would likely narrow the federal litigation. View "THOMAS GEARING, ET AL V. CITY OF HALF MOON BAY" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted under section 273a(a) of the California Penal Code for willfully permitting a child under his care or custody to be “placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered” “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” The IJ and BIA concluded that this conviction rendered Petitioner removable.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Looking at the federal generic crimes encompassed by the phrase “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment,” a plurality of the en banc court concluded that the normal tools of statutory construction do not lead to an unambiguous interpretation. The dictionaries also did not limit the definition of “child neglect” to conduct committed by a parent or legal guardian. The plurality further explained that the surrounding provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and definitions in other federal statutes, are likewise inconclusive. Thus, the plurality concluded that the phrase is ambiguous, agreeing with this court’s sister circuits that have considered the issue. Finally, the en banc court concluded that section 273a(a), is a categorical match to Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).   The en banc court thus agreed with the BIA’s reasoning and conclusion that all violations of section 273a(a) are encompassed by the BIA’s definition of a crime of “child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment” in Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). View "RAFAEL DIAZ-RODRIGUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Dreamstime alleged that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining a monopoly in the online search advertising market. Dreamstime asserted that Google furthered this monopoly by impeding Dreamstime’s use of Google’s paid advertising services as well as harming Dreamstime’s performance on Google’s free search engine. The district court dismissed on the ground that Dreamstime did not sufficiently allege anticompetitive conduct in the relevant market of online search advertising.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an antitrust claim brought by Dreamstime.com, LLC, an online supplier of stock images, against Google LLC. The panel held that the record did not support Dreamstime’s contention that it defined the relevant market to include the online, organic search market (in addition to the online search advertising market). Rather, by its course of conduct before the district court, Dreamstime waived any Section 2 claim arising from the online search market. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Dreamstime failed to allege anticompetitive conduct in the online search advertising market.   Further, allegations related to Dreamstime’s performance in Google’s unpaid, organic search results did not plausibly state a claim for anticompetitive conduct in the online search advertising market. Dreamstime’s allegation that Google unlawfully captured data from users and advertisers also did not state anticompetitive behavior. Finally, the panel held that the district court properly dismissed Dreamstime’s Section 2 claim with prejudice and without leave to amend. View "DREAMSTIME.COM, LLC V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant, along with an accomplice, surreptitiously approached a remote set of railroad tracks during the midnight hour. Defendant then secretly placed a “shunt” on the tracks to tamper with the rail signaling system and force trains to halt.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed on Defendant, whom a jury convicted of Violence Against Railroad Carriers. The panel held that the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2A5.2(a)(2) for recklessly endangering the safety of a mass transportation vehicle. Disagreeing with Defendant’s argument that she was unaware of the risks posed by the shunt, the panel held that the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable person would understand that unexpectedly stopping a freight train, as it barrels down the tracks, poses an obvious risk of harm.   The panel also held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1(a). The panel wrote that the district court recognized that Defendant’s decision to go to trial did not necessarily bar her from receiving a sentencing reduction but determined that she had not shown genuine acceptance of responsibility. The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination. View "USA V. ELLEN REICHE" on Justia Law

Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. owns and operates numerous local television stations. Nexstar acquired KOIN-TV, a local television station in Portland, Oregon, from LIN Television Corporation (LIN). When it acquired KOIN-TV, Nexstar adopted the CBA between Local 51 and LIN. A union representative, began asking employees to sign a petition in support of the union, but a Nexstar manager allegedly interfered with her activities by interrupting her and telling her not to talk about the union or to hand out union bulletins.   Based on a finding that the Regional Director was likely to succeed on the merits of the complaint and applying an inference of likely irreparable harm, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. An administrative law judge ruled in favor of the Regional Director, finding that Nexstar had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. The Board affirmed the ALJ decision and ordered relief for the union. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting a petition of the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) for preliminary injunctive relief.   The panel held that a Section 10(j) injunction proceeding is the type of case that is inherently limited in duration because the controversy over the injunction exists only until the Board issues its final merits decision. The panel concluded that the Section 10(j) injunction met the first prong. The panel held that the Section 10(j) injunction also met the exception’s second prong, because there was a reasonable expectation that the complaining party, Nexstar, will be subject to a petition for a Section 10(j) injunction in the future. View "RONALD HOOKS V. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING, INC." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed based on a 1997 conviction. He then filed a motion to reopen, which was denied. In 2018, he filed a second motion to reopen, claiming that he was no longer removable as charged because a state court, in 2018, had modified his conviction due to a “constitutional defect” in his criminal proceeding. Petitioner argued that his removal order was invalid, and therefore, the BIA should reopen proceedings, set aside his removal order, and terminate proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as both number-barred   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed August 1, 2022, and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and dismissing in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. In the amended opinion, the panel concluded that the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen, which challenged his removal order on the ground that his underlying conviction was allegedly invalid.   The panel concluded that none of the circumstances in which an alien may challenge a removal order based on the claim that a conviction underlying a removal order is invalid were applicable here. First, the BIA’s authority to consider such a challenge when the alien brings a motion to reopen that is not time- or number-barred was not implicated here. Next, Petitioner could not raise arguments that are available for an alien challenging a reinstatement proceeding or reinstatement order. View "LUIS PEREZ-CAMACHO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of an opinion by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld a decision by the immigration judge (IJ) denying his motion to reopen his prior removal proceedings. Petitioner argued that the IJ had jurisdiction over his motion because an alien may collaterally challenge a removal order when it results in a gross miscarriage of justice. The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed July 18, 2022; and 2) an amended opinion denying Petitioner’s petition.   The court held that: 1) 8 U.S.C. Section 1231(a)(5), which generally bars reopening reinstated orders of removal, is not subject to an exception for removal orders that result in a gross miscarriage of justice; and 2) the agency lacks authority to reopen such reinstated removal orders sua sponte. The panel concluded that this argument was not cognizable in the context of this current appeal, explaining that an alien may raise such a collateral attack, but only in a petition for review of a reinstatement proceeding or order. The panel further explained that, although the then-applicable regulation gave the agency the authority to reopen cases sua sponte, that regulation did not expressly provide that such authority overrode Section 1231(a)(5). Nor could it, the panel observed, given that a regulation does not trump an otherwise applicable statute unless the regulation’s enabling statute so provides. View "RICARDO BRAVO-BRAVO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

the California Department of Toxic Substances Control and the Toxic Substances Control Account (“DTSC”) brought suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and state law relating to the remediation of hazardous materials alleged to be present at a site in Elmira, California. In 2013, a certificate of cancellation had been filed with the Delaware Secretary of State, cancelling the legal existence of defendant Collins & Aikman Products. The Delaware Court of Chancery granted DTSC’s petition to appoint a receiver empowered to defend claims made against Collins & Aikman. The receiver declined to file an answer to DTSC’s complaint, and the district court clerk entered default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). DTSC later moved for a default judgment.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying insurers’ motions to intervene to defend their defunct insured in an environmental tort action, dismissed the insurers' appeal of the denial of their motions to set aside default, and remanded. Here, there was no dispute that the insurers timely sought to intervene in. Thus, whether the insureds could intervene as of right turned on whether they had an “interest” under Rule 24(a)(2). The panel held that, under Donaldson v. United States and Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv,  the word “interest” must be read in a specifically legal sense, to mean a right or other advantage that the law gives one person as against another person, rather than read more broadly to refer to anything that a person wants, whether or not the law protects that desire. View "CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC, ET AL V. CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL" on Justia Law

The district court certified a class of approximately 22.4 million members and approved a settlement that provided both monetary and injunctive relief. The district court held that Class Action Fairness Act’s (CAFA) attorney fee restrictions did not apply. Plaintiffs had requested $8.125 million in fees—25% of the face value of the settlement fund and a 4.4 multiplier on their lodestar of $1,961,905. The district court, applying the percentage-of-fund method, granted fees but reduced the award to $5,689,440, which was approximately 17.5% of the face value of the fund and 2.9 times the lodestar. Three objectors appealed the fee award.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment awarding attorneys’ fees. The panel held that the settlement was not a coupon settlement, and, therefore, not subject to the restrictions on the award of attorneys’ fees to class counsel imposed by CAFA. The panel applied the three factors identified in Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2015), to determine whether a particular instance of class relief was a coupon.   The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in calculating class counsel’s fee award. The district court did not err in awarding fees for hours spent pursuing unsuccessful settlements. The second, and final, settlement merely amended the first, so the hours spent negotiating the first settlement were not redundant or unnecessary. The district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in making the fee award View "BYRON MCKNIGHT, ET AL V. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law