Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Plaintiff provided his phone number to an insurance company on a website, he began receiving marketing texts from eFinancial. Plaintiff sued under the TCPA, claiming that eFinancial uses a “sequential number generator” to pick the order in which to call customers who had provided their phone numbers. He says that this type of number generator qualifies as an “automatic telephone dialing system” (often colloquially called an “autodialer”) under the TCPA. But eFinancial responds that it does not use an autodialer. eFinancial argues that the TCPA defines an autodialer as one that must generate telephone numbers to dial, not just any number to decide which pre-selected phone numbers to call.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that an “automatic telephone dialing system” must generate and dial random or sequential telephone numbers under the TCPA’s plain text. eFinancial thus did not use an autodialer, and its texts to Plaintiff did not implicate the TCPA. View "DAVID BORDEN V. EFINANCIAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner is scheduled to be executed in Arizona on Wednesday, November 16, 2022. Petitioner filed a second-in-time habeas petition in the district court under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, alleging a freestanding innocence claim, violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and a due process violation based on the surviving victim’s unreliable pretrial identification. The district court dismissed the Brady and Napue claims, finding that they were unauthorized second or successive claims. It also dismissed the due process claim, finding that it had been presented in Petitioner’s first federal petition.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the due process and actual innocence claims. The court agreed with the district court that the Brady and Napue claims are second or successive claims subject to Section 2244(b)(2). The court wrote it construed Petitioner’s notice of appeal as an application for authorization to file a second or successive petition as to those claims. So construed, the court denied Petitioner’s request to file a second or successive petition because he has failed to satisfy the stringent standards under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). View "MURRAY HOOPER V. DAVID SHINN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff moved under state law for an order permitting him to conduct DNA testing and fingerprint analysis on evidence found at the crime scene more than forty years ago. The superior court denied relief in an October 21, 2022 order. Plaintiff sought a review of this order via a special action petition in the Arizona Supreme Court. The state supreme court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court's ruling. Plaintiff then commenced this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He sought a declaratory judgment that the Arizona statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to permit him to conduct the forensic testing. He moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until he obtains this relief. The district court denied the injunction, and he appealed.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this action amounted to an improper appeal of the state court's judgment. View "MURRAY HOOPER V. MARK BRNOVICH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of murder in 2012. Following his conviction, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court arguing that two letters allegedly written by his codefendant, exonerated Petitioner. The California Court of Appeal summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition, and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner, who conceded that 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(1) does not apply, argued that the state court made an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2) by rejecting his claim of actual innocence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition challenging his California murder conviction. The panel applied the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d). The panel held that Petitioner did not waive his actual innocence argument in his briefing to the district court. Turning to the merits, the panel wrote that Petitioner cannot challenge the substance of the state court's factual findings because the state courts made no factual findings. In the absence of substantive factual findings by the state courts, Petitioner contended that the state courts’ factfinding process was unreasonable because no court could have reasonably found that Petitioner’s allegations failed to establish a prima facie case of actual innocence. The panel held that it was not unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to reject Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the authenticity of the letters. View "EARNEST PRESCOTT V. KELLY SANTORO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant used excessive force while attempting an arrest on June 10, 2018, in Berdoo Canyon, which is considered BLM land. Plaintiff and her husband failed to yield to a park ranger, at which point Defendant was called to assist. As Defendant was trying to stop Plaintiff's vehicle, he fired several shots, hitting her in the hand and grazing her head.Plaintiff filed a Sec. 1983 claim against Defendant. The district court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment related to Plaintiff's excessive force claim and Defendant appealed.On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, declining to extend Bivens. The existence of alternative remedial structures is reason enough to not infer a new Bivens cause of action. Similarly, uncertainty about the potential systemwide consequences of implying a new Bivens cause of action is by itself a special factor that forecloses relief. The panel held that there was no Bivens cause of action for Plaintiff’s claim, which presented a new context. View "DENISE MEJIA V. WESLEY MILLER, ET AL" on Justia Law

=This appeal arises from Appellee’s efforts to avoid, in bankruptcy, a judgment lien recorded in 2014 against his Carlsbad, California home. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of Appellee and against the Chapter 7 Trustee. The panel was called upon to decide how the Bankruptcy Code’s procedure for avoiding judgment liens that “impair[] an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled,” 11 U.S.C. Section  522(f)(1), interacts with California’s homestead exemption, which allows a debtor to claim a limited exemption in bankruptcy in connection with his primary residence.   The issue gained complexity here because the amount of California’s homestead exemption increased significantly between the time the lien on Appellee’s home was recorded in 2014 and the time he filed for bankruptcy in 2021. Under California law, the exemption Appellee could claim would be fixed at the 2014 amount. Appellee argued that the Bankruptcy Code requires looking to the exemption he could have claimed, but for the lien, at the time he filed his bankruptcy petition. The panel held that in deciding whether a judgment lien impairs a debtor’s California homestead exemption, the Bankruptcy Code requires courts to determine the amount of the exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled in the absence of the lien at issue. Thus, the bankruptcy court correctly applied the $600,000 homestead exemption available in 2021, which, consequently, allowed Appellee to avoid the entirety of the judgment lien placed on his home. View "CHRISTOPHER BARCLAY V. DEJAN BOSKOSKI" on Justia Law

Punchbowl is an online party and event planning service. AJ Press owns and operates Punchbowl News, a subscription-based online news publication that provides articles, podcasts, and videos about American politics, from a Washington, D.C. insider’s perspective. Punchbowl claimed that Punchbowl News is misusing its “Punchbowl” trademark (the Mark).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of AJ Press, LLC, in an action brought by Punchbowl, Inc. (Punchbowl), alleging violations of the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition and related state law claims. The panel wrote that no reasonable buyer would believe that a company that operates a D.C. insider news publication is related to a “technology company” with a “focus on celebrations, holidays, events, and memory-making.” The panel wrote that this resolves not only the Lanham Act claims, but the state law claims as well. The panel explained that survey evidence of consumer confusion is not relevant to the question of whether AJ Press’s use of the Mark is explicitly misleading, which is a legal test for assessing whether the Lanham Act applies. The panel held that the district court’s denial of Punchbowl’s request for a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) to permit further discovery was not an abuse of discretion. View "PUNCHBOWL, INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC" on Justia Law

San Antonio Winery, Inc.’s filed a proof of service in which it stated that it had served Jiaxing Jiaxing Micarose Trade Co., Ltd., through the Director of the PTO. When Jiaxing did not appear to defend itself in the action, the district court clerk granted San Antonio’s request for entry of default, after which San Antonio filed the motion for default judgment in which it asked the district court to issue a permanent injunction. Noting the lack of circuit-level precedent on whether the procedures of Section 1051(e) provide a means of serving defendants in court proceedings, the district court denied the motion on the ground that Jiaxing had not been properly served.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying San Antonio’s motion for a default judgment against in an action in which San Antonio asserts claims under the Lanham Act and related state-law claims. The panel held that the service procedures of Section 1051(e) apply not only in administrative proceedings before the PTO but also in court proceedings. Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise, the panel vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "SAN ANTONIO WINERY, INC. V. JIAXING MICAROSE TRADE CO." on Justia Law

Unicolors, which creates designs for use on textiles and garments, alleged that a design it created in 2011 (the EH101 design) is remarkably similar to a design printed on garments that H&M began selling in 2015 (the Xue Xu design). The Supreme Court held that lack of either factual or legal knowledge on the part of a copyright holder can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under the Copyright Act's safe-harbor provision, 17 U.S.C. Section 411(b)(1). Accordingly, the panel reviewed anew the threshold issue whether Unicolors holds a valid copyright in registration No. VA-1-770-400 (the '400 Registration), and concluded that under the correct standard, the '400 Registration is valid because the factual inaccuracies in the application are excused by the cited safe-harbor provision.   On remand, from the Supreme Court in this copyright-infringement action the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in general, save that it vacated and remanded with instructions to grant a new trial, limited only to damages, if Unicolors rejects the remittitur amount of $116,975.23. The panel held that a party seeking to invalidate a copyright registration under Section 411(b) must demonstrate that (1) the registrant submitted a resignation application containing inaccuracies, (2) the registrant knew that the application failed to comply with the requisite legal requirements, and (3) the inaccuracies in question were material to the registration decision by the Register of Copyrights. View "UNICOLORS, INC. V. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sell products as third-party merchants through Amazon’s “Fulfilled by Amazon” (“FBA”) program. Prior to October 2019, California required FBA merchants to collect and pay sales tax on sales to California residents. California’s Marketplace Facilitator Act altered that requirement. However, the Marketplace Facilitator Act is not retroactive and the Department continued to seek sales tax remittances from third-party FBA merchants for pre-October 2019 sales.Plaintiffs claimed that the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration’s tax collection efforts against Guild members violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution, as well as the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 151. The district court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss, holding that the Guild’s claims were barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1341.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district cour properly dismissed the action pursuant to the TIA, which bars federal jurisdiction over the Guild’s claims because the Guild seeks an injunction that would to some degree stop the assessment or collection of a state tax and an adequate state law remedy exists. View "ONLINE MERCHANTS GUILD V. NICOLAS MADUROS" on Justia Law