Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Crime victim Jane Doe filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court; she and the defendant in the underlying criminal action also filed a joint stipulation requesting that we “resolve the case on a schedule that parallels a normal appellate process.”   The Ninth Circuit, on a petition for a writ of mandamus in which Jane Doe seeks to vindicate her right under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) to “full and timely restitution as provided in law,” a motions panel granted a joint motion, filed by Doe and the defendant in the underlying criminal action, stipulating to an extended period for this court to consider Doe’s petition beyond the 72-hour deadline imposed by the CVRA.   Under 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), the court of appeals “shall take up and decide a mandamus petition seeking relief under the CVRA within 72 hours after the petition has been filed, unless the litigants, with the approval of the court, have stipulated to a different time period for consideration. . . . In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a continuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing” rights under the Act. The panel resolved a question of first impression regarding whether the “proceedings” referred to in Section 3771(d)(3) are those of the district court or appellate court. The panel held that the parties can agree to an extension of the 72-hour deadline with the appellate court’s approval, so long as the extension does not involve a stay or continuance of the underlying district court proceedings for more than five days. View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that he had not established that his United States citizen children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed. 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit, held that: 1) 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) grants the court jurisdiction to review a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact presented in a challenge to an agency denial of cancellation of removal for failure to establish the required hardship; and 2) assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s petition presented such questions, his hardship claim failed on the merits.   Despite finding facial merit in the Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions, the panel concluded that it need not take a definitive side in the circuit split. The panel explained that it is settled that this court can assume statutory jurisdiction arguendo when the jurisdictional issue is complex, but the claim clearly lacks merit. The panel explained that it had no qualms with that approach here. The panel concluded that the BIA’s decision that exceptional and extremely unusual hardship was not established was clearly supported by the record. The panel explained that Petitioner largely focused on financial hardship, but the BIA has concluded that economic detriment alone is insufficient to support even a finding of extreme hardship. View "ANTONIO DE LA ROSA-RODRIGUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Apple entered into a $310 million settlement with a class of individuals based on claims that Apple secretly throttled the system performance of certain model iPhones to mask battery defects. Five class objectors sought to vacate the settlement on various grounds, including 1.) that the district court provided inadequate notice of the settlement to nonnatural persons; 2.) the settlement extinguished the claims of “all former or current U.S. owners” of certain devices who downloaded iOS software before Apple disclosed potential defect, but the settlement limited recovery to the subset of owners who can attest that “they experienced” the alleged defects; and 3.) that the district court cited the wrong legal standard in examining the settlement’s fairness by improperly applying a presumption of reasonableness to the settlement rather than applying a heightened scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when reviewing the settlement’s fairness. View "IN RE: NAMED PLAINTIFFS, ET AL V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Save the Bull Trout, Friends of the Wild Swan, and Alliance for the Wild Rockies challenge the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“Service”) 2015 Bull Trout Recovery Plan under the citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). It is not Plaintiffs’ first time bringing such a challenge. After the Oregon district court dismissed their initial complaint alleging claims concerning the Plan, Plaintiffs elected not to amend to fix the deficiencies identified in the court’s order. Instead, Plaintiffs appealed, and only after losing on appeal did they pursue amending their complaint. The Oregon district court denied their motion to amend, finding no grounds for reopening the judgment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service based on claim preclusion in an action brought by plaintiff environmental groups, challenging the Service’s 2015 Bull Trout Recovery Plan under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA. The panel held that Friends of the Wild Swan and Alliance for the Wild Rockies had standing to challenge the Plan. Plaintiffs asserted a procedural injury. Their member declarations established ongoing aesthetic, recreational, and conservation interests in bull trout. The procedures outlined in Section 1533(f) of the ESA served to protect these interests by requiring the implementation of a bull trout recovery plan. Because Plaintiffs established a procedural injury, they had standing as long as there was some possibility that the requested relief—revision of the Plan— would redress their alleged harms. The panel held that this benchmark was clearly met. View "SAVE THE BULL TROUT, ET AL V. MARTHA WILLIAMS, ET AL" on Justia Law

Polaris sells off-road vehicles that have roll cages, or rollover protective structures (“ROPS”). The labels on the Polaris vehicles stated that the ROPS complied with Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards. Plaintiffs filed a class action against Polaris, claiming that the statements made on these labels were misleading, and that they relied on the statements when purchasing the vehicles.The district court granted summary judgment to Polaris. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff could not bring his equitable UCL claim in federal court because he had an adequate legal remedy in his time-barred CLRA claim. However, the court held that it must still reverse the entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff because no decision was reached on the merits of the claim. Because the district court lacked equitable jurisdiction, which it recognized, it should have denied Polaris’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's UCL claim without prejudice for lack of equitable jurisdiction. View "PAUL GUZMAN, ET AL V. POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

This case involves challenges to five provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code (“GPMC”). The provisions can be described as an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anticamping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment and its permanent injunction in favor of Plaintiffs; affirmed certification pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), of a class of “involuntary homeless” persons; and remanded in an action challenging municipal ordinances which, among other things, preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City’s limits.   The panel stated that this court’s decision in Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), which held that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter” served as the backdrop for this entire litigation. The panel held that there was abundant evidence in the record establishing that homeless persons were injured by the City’s enforcement actions in the past and it was undisputed that enforcements have continued. The panel further held that the relief sought by plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of a few municipal ordinances aimed at involuntary homeless persons, was redressable within the limits of Article III. The panel held that based on the record in this case, the district court did not err by finding plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) such that a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). View "GLORIA JOHNSON, ET AL V. CITY OF GRANTS PASS" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of the murder of an Oregon Department of Corrections Director. However, since trial, another man has confessed to the killing and nearly all the witnesses who directly implicated Petitioner have recanted their testimony. Petitioner sought federal habeas relief making various claims including constitutional violations based on the trial court’s exclusion of the other man's confession. The constitutional claims are procedurally defaulted because Petitoner failed to raise them in state court as required.The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner's procedural default is excused under the “actual innocence” exception set forth in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). The panel wrote that other man's detailed and compelling confessions, when considered with the recantations of nearly all the State’s key witnesses, are more than sufficient to satisfy Schlup’s standard, as it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Petitioner in light of the new evidence.Reaching the merits of Petitioner's claim, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by excluding evidence of the confessor's guilt. View "FRANK GABLE V. MAX WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

In Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (Sonner I), 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020), the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend of Plaintiff's class action complaint. This court held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal equitable principles to claims for equitable restitution brought under California law and that, under such principles, dismissal was appropriate because Plaintiff could not show that she lacked an adequate remedy at law. After Sonner I was issued, Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in California state court. Premier Nutrition responded by returning to the district court and seeking a permanent injunction against the state court action. The district court denied the injunction.The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permanent injunction regardless of Sonner I’s preclusive effect. The panel did not determine the preclusive effect of Sonner I.The Ninth Circuit held that there was a strong presumption against enjoining a state court proceeding under the relitigation exception. Premier did not point to any clearly erroneous factual findings in the district court’s order, and the panel detected none. Res judicata principles are of high importance, but they can be addressed by the state court, and do not compel resorting to the heavy artillery of a permanent injunction. View "KATHLEEN SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, challenging his conviction and death sentence imposed in California state court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.   The California Supreme Court, whose opinion on direct review is the last reasoned decision on this issue, concluded that both the prosecutor’s questioning of the challenged jurors and the excusals were proper. Applying the deferential review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the last reasoned state court decision, the panel held that the California Supreme Court’s conclusion was neither an unreasonable factual determination nor contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.   In the second claim certified by the district court, Petitioner contended that his trial counsel were ineffective because the excusals were based upon counsel’s failure to investigate, adequately object, and/or rehabilitate the prospective jurors. On this issue, the California Supreme Court’s denial of Petitioner second state petition is the last reasoned decision. The panel took this opportunity to make explicit what has to this point been implicit: the California Supreme Court’s summary denial is a decision on the merits and thus entitled to AEDPA deference. The panel held that Petitioner failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of professional assistance, and failed to show how trial counsel’s failure to object or try to rehabilitate some of the jurors prejudiced him. View "SERGIO OCHOA V. RONALD DAVIS" on Justia Law

Appellants alleged they were not “brokers,” and thus did not have to register with the SEC because their client called the shots. Appellants appealed the district court’s liability and remedies orders. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the SEC in its enforcement action against Appellants alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.   The panel held that under the Exchange Act, the term “broker” encompassed much broader conduct: it included any person trading securities “for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. Section 78c(a)(4)(A). Because Appellants put their client’s capital at risk on their trades and acted as his agents, they behaved as “brokers” under the Exchange Act. By not registering as brokers with the SEC, Appellants appeared as if they were merely retail investors (who receive priority for municipal bonds), allowing them to circumvent municipal bond purchasing order priority. The panel affirmed the civil penalties imposed against Appellants. Though it appears that no individual investor suffered financial harm, Appellants’ conduct undermined the SEC’s system of broker-dealer oversight and circumvented retail priority regulations allowing municipalities to raise capital at the lowest possible price. View "USSEC V. JOCELYN MURPHY, ET AL" on Justia Law