Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of Latino voters from Washington State’s Yakima Valley challenged the state’s legislative district map, arguing that the configuration of one district diluted their votes and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state’s bipartisan redistricting commission had drawn the map following the 2020 Census, but the plaintiffs contended that the map “cracked” their community, undermining their voting power. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoined the enacted map, and, when the commission declined to draw a new map, imposed its own remedial map.Three Yakima Valley voters, who had intervened in the district court, appealed. They challenged both the district court’s finding of a Section 2 violation and the remedial map, arguing that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge panel was not convened.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction, ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge court only for constitutional, not statutory, challenges to legislative apportionment. The court found that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the Section 2 liability finding and to challenge the remedial map under Section 2, as they failed to show traceable or redressable injuries or vote dilution. However, one intervenor had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the remedial map.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the remedial map did not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, as race was not the predominant factor in its design. The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction except for the equal protection claim, which it affirmed, upholding the district court’s remedial map. View "PALMER V. TREVINO" on Justia Law

Ashley Popa visited a website operated by PSP Group LLC, which used a session-replay technology called “Clarity,” owned by Microsoft Corporation. This technology recorded users’ interactions with the website, including mouse movements, clicks, and some text inputs. Popa alleged that Clarity collected information such as her browsing activity and partial address details, and that this data was used to recreate her visit for analysis by PSP. She filed a putative class action, claiming violations of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA) and intrusion upon seclusion.Popa initially filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, later amending it. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Both defendants moved to dismiss; PSP argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, while Microsoft moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court found that Popa failed to establish Article III standing, concluding that the information collected did not constitute the type of private information historically protected by law. The court dismissed the action without prejudice and denied Microsoft’s motion as moot.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Popa did not allege a “concrete” injury sufficient for Article III standing, as required by TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. The court found that the alleged harm was not analogous to common-law privacy torts such as intrusion upon seclusion or public disclosure of private facts, as Popa did not identify any highly offensive or private information collected. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Popa v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Oregon enacted a law requiring prescription drug manufacturers to report detailed information about certain drugs, including pricing, costs, and factors contributing to price increases, to the state’s Department of Consumer and Business Services. The law also directs the agency to post most of this information online, but prohibits public disclosure of information designated as a trade secret unless the agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest. Since the law’s enactment, manufacturers have claimed thousands of trade secrets, but the agency has not publicly disclosed any such information.A trade association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers sued the director of the Oregon agency in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, raising several facial constitutional challenges. The district court granted summary judgment for the association on two claims: that the reporting requirement violated the First Amendment by compelling speech, and that any use of the public-interest exception to disclose trade secrets would constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court declared the entire reporting requirement unconstitutional and held that any disclosure of trade secrets under the public-interest exception would violate the Takings Clause unless just compensation was provided.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the association on both the First and Fifth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporting requirement compels commercial speech and survives intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, as it directly advances substantial state interests in transparency and market efficiency and is not more extensive than necessary. On the takings claim, the court found the association’s challenge justiciable but concluded that, under the Penn Central regulatory takings framework, none of the factors supported a facial claim that every disclosure under the public-interest exception would constitute a taking. The court remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the state on these claims. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Stolfi" on Justia Law

Two individuals alleged that the Arizona Department of Revenue, through its Unclaimed Property Act (UPA), unlawfully took possession of checks owed to them by various businesses. Under the UPA, property presumed abandoned is transferred from the holder to the state, which then lists it on a public website but does not provide direct notice to the apparent owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this process constituted an unlawful taking without just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case. It found that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief, both for retrospective and prospective relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they alleged a concrete injury: the state’s possession of their property without consent. The court also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims, as the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and alleged unconstitutional conduct. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the takings claim failed as a matter of law because property held in trust by the state is not considered “taken.” However, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a viable due process claim, as they plausibly alleged a property interest and that Arizona’s notice procedures were constitutionally inadequate under circuit precedent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim, reversed the dismissal of the due process claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARZA V. WOODS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

Two University of Washington professors, who serve as moderators for a faculty email listserv, were investigated by the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after forwarding emails that allegedly contained political discussion and requests for fundraising. The Board reviewed several months of their emails during its investigations. One professor was ultimately fined $750 for improper use of state resources, while the other was not disciplined. The professors, on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of listserv subscribers, filed suit challenging the Board’s investigatory policies and practices, alleging that these chill their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the professors’ complaint as unripe under Article III, finding that they had not sufficiently alleged that the Board’s policies chilled their speech. The district court also concluded that the professors’ emails, as public employees, were public records and thus not protected by a First Amendment privacy interest. Additionally, the court found the claims prudentially unripe because the Board’s investigations were ongoing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the professors’ claims are ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. The court found that the professors had sufficiently alleged a credible threat of future enforcement and chilling of speech, given their ongoing roles and the Board’s history of enforcement. The court also determined that the issues presented are fit for judicial decision and that withholding review would impose substantial hardship on the professors. The panel remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the professors’ First Amendment claims against the Board’s investigatory policies and practices are ripe for adjudication. View "FLAXMAN V. FERGUSON" on Justia Law

A group of researchers at the University of California received multi-year federal research grants from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). In April 2025, the EPA and NEH sent form letters to these researchers, terminating their grants. The letters cited changes in agency priorities and referenced the implementation of several Executive Orders issued in early 2025, which directed agencies to eliminate funding for projects related to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI), environmental justice, and similar initiatives. The researchers alleged that these terminations were not based on individualized assessments but were instead the result of broad policy changes.The researchers filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the mass termination of grants on constitutional and statutory grounds, including violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and separation of powers. The district court provisionally certified two classes: one for those who received form termination letters without specific explanations, and another for those whose grants were terminated due to the DEI-related Executive Orders. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the agencies to reinstate the terminated grants, finding that the terminations were likely arbitrary and capricious and, for the DEI class, likely violated the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government’s motion for a partial stay of the injunction. The court denied the motion, holding that the government had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding jurisdiction, standing, or the substantive claims. The court found that the agencies’ actions were likely arbitrary and capricious under the APA and likely constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the balance of harms and public interest did not favor a stay. View "THAKUR V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Several former members of the rock band Supertramp entered into a 1977 publishing agreement with their bandmates and manager, allocating specific percentages of songwriting royalties among themselves. These royalties were distributed according to the agreement for decades. In 2018, two of the principal songwriters and their publishing company stopped paying royalties to the plaintiffs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a breach of contract action. The dispute centered on whether the agreement could be unilaterally terminated or whether the obligation to pay royalties continued as long as the songs generated income.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants could terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time,” finding no express or implied duration in the contract. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the contract had been terminated after a reasonable time. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied California contract law, which requires courts to first look for an express duration in the contract, then to determine if a duration can be implied from the contract’s nature and circumstances, and only if neither is found, to construe the duration as a reasonable time. The Ninth Circuit agreed there was no express duration but held that the contract’s nature implied a duration: the obligation to pay royalties continues as long as the songs generate publishing income, ending only when the copyrights expire and the works enter the public domain. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on liability. View "Thompson v. Hodgson" on Justia Law