Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An attorney, Jeffrey Cogan, filed a federal lawsuit challenging an Arizona state court judgment against him for malicious prosecution. The state court judgment arose from Cogan's actions during a federal bankruptcy proceeding involving Arnaldo Trabucco. Cogan sought a declaration that the state court lacked jurisdiction over the malicious prosecution claim because it involved conduct exclusively within federal jurisdiction.The Arizona state court had granted partial summary judgment against Cogan, finding him liable for malicious prosecution and awarding $8 million in damages. Cogan appealed, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the liability finding but vacated the damages award, remanding for a new trial on damages. Cogan then filed the federal lawsuit before the retrial, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Cogan's federal complaint under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the malicious prosecution claim was completely preempted by federal law, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The court reasoned that state courts lack jurisdiction over malicious prosecution claims arising from federal bankruptcy proceedings, as established in MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc. Therefore, the state court judgment was subject to collateral attack in federal court.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Cogan's challenge to the state court judgment to proceed in federal court. View "COGAN V. TRABUCCO" on Justia Law

In early 2018, the DEA began investigating drug smuggling at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and received a tip implicating Lemack Bellot. Using a confidential source (CS), the DEA conducted a series of recorded meetings and phone calls with Bellot, who indicated he had previously smuggled drugs through the airport. Bellot and the CS agreed on plans to smuggle cocaine through SFO on two occasions, with the CS using fake cocaine provided by the DEA. Bellot advised the CS on how to package the drugs and introduced an associate to assist. The CS successfully smuggled the fake cocaine through airport security both times, paying Bellot fees for his assistance.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged Bellot with two counts of attempting to aid and abet possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Bellot was convicted by a jury on both counts. He then moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury instructions and the evidence presented at trial constructively amended the indictment, effectively convicting him of a different crime than the one for which he was indicted. The district court denied his motion, and Bellot appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed Bellot’s conviction. The court held that the indictment was not constructively amended. It explained that whether Bellot was charged with aiding and abetting an attempt to possess cocaine or attempting to aid and abet possession of cocaine, the crime charged remained the same: knowingly attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court also found that the government’s statements during closing arguments did not alter its theory of the case or constructively amend the indictment. The court concluded that Bellot had sufficient notice of the charges against him and that the jury instructions were appropriate. The conviction was affirmed. View "USA V. BELLOT" on Justia Law

A group of Google Chrome users who chose not to sync their browsers with their Google accounts alleged that Google collected their personal data without consent. They believed that, based on Google's Chrome Privacy Notice, their data would not be collected if they did not enable sync. The users filed a class action lawsuit against Google, claiming violations of various state and federal laws.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Google. The court found that the data collection was "browser-agnostic," meaning it occurred regardless of the browser used. It concluded that Google's general privacy policies, which the users had consented to, governed the data collection. The court held that a reasonable person would understand from these policies that Google collected data when users interacted with Google services or third-party sites using Google services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court should have determined whether a reasonable user would understand Google's various privacy disclosures as consenting to the data collection. The court found that the district court erred by focusing on the technical distinction of "browser agnosticism" rather than the reasonable person standard. The appellate court noted that Google's Chrome Privacy Notice could lead a reasonable user to believe that their data would not be collected without enabling sync. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether the users consented to Google's data collection practices. View "CALHOUN V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves current and former San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) employees who sued the United States, alleging that the Navy misled the City of San Francisco and the SFPD about the safety of a contaminated former Naval shipyard leased by the City for use as a facility for SFPD employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy's misrepresentations about the safety of the site caused them to be exposed to hazardous substances, resulting in health problems.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, indicating that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) misrepresentation exception likely barred their claims. The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which the district court also dismissed, concluding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally based on the Navy's alleged misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Navy’s alleged misrepresentations, even if the misrepresentations were made to the City and the SFPD rather than directly to the plaintiffs. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) implicitly limited or suspended the misrepresentation exception, finding no indication that Congress intended CERCLA to override the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ABBEY V. USA" on Justia Law

J.B., a student with multiple disabilities, was enrolled in the Kyrene Elementary School District. Due to concerns about the school's handling of J.B.'s behavioral issues, J.B.'s parent, L.B., withdrew J.B. from the District and placed J.B. in a private school, Brightmont Academy. The District attempted to conduct evaluations to update J.B.'s Individualized Education Program (IEP), but L.B. refused to consent to these evaluations, proposing instead that the District use video recordings for assessments.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the District did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and ruled in favor of the District. L.B. appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, which affirmed the ALJ's decision. The District Court found that L.B. refused to consent to the District's evaluations and made it clear that she did not intend to re-enroll J.B. in the District.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District did not deny a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) to J.B. because L.B.'s refusal to consent to evaluations relieved the District of further obligations under IDEA. Additionally, the court found that the District's procedural error in stating that no further IEP meetings would occur because J.B. was not enrolled in the District was harmless, as it did not result in a deprivation of educational opportunity for J.B. Consequently, L.B. was not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and related expenses. View "J.B. V. KYRENE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 28" on Justia Law

Gail Manney was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6), which criminalizes making false statements in connection with the acquisition of firearms. On April 21, 2021, Manney visited Hi-Cap Firearms in Reno, Nevada, and selected seven handguns to purchase. She filled out the required ATF Form 4473, certifying she was the actual purchaser. However, after her purchase, a Hi-Cap employee suspected her of being a straw purchaser and contacted the ATF. Upon investigation, ATF Special Agent Joshua Caron found incriminating messages on Manney’s phone indicating she was buying the firearms for her son, Razaaq, a convicted felon prohibited from possessing firearms.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada indicted Manney on May 27, 2021, for making false statements on ATF Form 4473. She was convicted after a jury trial. Manney appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) violated her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was not material under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Manney’s Second Amendment challenge, stating that the Second Amendment does not protect false statements. The court emphasized that § 922(a)(6) regulates false statements made during firearm acquisitions, not the possession of firearms. The court also dismissed Manney’s argument regarding the materiality of her false statement, citing Abramski v. United States, which held that a false statement about the actual purchaser of a firearm is material even if the actual purchaser could legally possess a firearm.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Manney’s conviction, concluding that § 922(a)(6) did not violate her Second Amendment rights and that her false statement was material under the statute. View "USA V. MANNEY" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) for racially profiling Latino drivers and passengers under the guise of immigration enforcement. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court issued a permanent injunction in 2013, followed by a supplemental injunction appointing an independent monitor to oversee MCSO’s compliance. In 2016, a second supplemental injunction required MCSO to reform its internal misconduct investigation procedures. In 2022, a third supplemental injunction found the Sheriff in contempt for non-compliance and set forth curative measures, including creating a Constitutional Policing Authority (CPA) and assigning its duties to the Monitor.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially issued the permanent injunction and subsequent supplemental injunctions. The court found MCSO in contempt for failing to comply with the injunctions and ordered additional remedial measures. The district court relied on its inherent equitable powers rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 in issuing these orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s amended third supplemental permanent injunction. It held that the district court acted within its inherent equitable powers in assigning the CPA’s duties to the Monitor. The court rejected the Sheriff’s contention that this assignment violated Article III of the Constitution and separation of powers principles. It also found that the First Order provided adequate judicial review of the Monitor’s actions and that the Third Order did not contravene Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65’s specificity requirement. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court’s actions were appropriate and affirmed the Third Order. View "MELENDRES V. SKINNER" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing a class of drivers whose cars were totaled in accidents, alleged that their insurers, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, failed to pay the actual cash value of their vehicles. They contended that State Farm applied two unlawful discounts: a negotiation discount, which reduced the value based on typical buyer negotiations, and a condition discount, which adjusted for the car's condition compared to similar vehicles.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington initially certified two classes: a negotiation class and a condition class. However, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lara v. First National Insurance Company of America, the district court decertified both classes and granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's decertification of the negotiation class, holding that plaintiffs could prove injury on a class-wide basis by adding back the unlawful negotiation adjustment to determine the value each class member should have received. However, the court affirmed the decertification of the condition class, as determining injury required an individualized comparison of the unlawful condition adjustment and a hypothetical lawful adjustment.The Ninth Circuit also vacated the district court's summary judgment against the named plaintiffs, remanding the case for the district court to reassess whether the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of injury. The court clarified that plaintiffs could rely on the Autosource reports, minus the unlawful adjustments, as relevant evidence of injury. The court rejected State Farm's argument that Article III standing was a barrier to the plaintiffs' suit, affirming that the plaintiffs' claim of receiving less than owed under their insurance policies constituted a concrete injury. View "JAMA V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

A national trade association of online businesses challenged the California Age-Appropriate Design Code Act (CAADCA), which aims to protect children's online privacy and ensure that online products accessed by children are designed with their needs in mind. The association argued that the CAADCA's requirements, particularly those mandating businesses to assess and mitigate risks of exposing children to harmful content, violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the association was likely to succeed in its First Amendment challenge. The court held that the CAADCA's requirements compelled businesses to express opinions on controversial issues and act as censors, which constituted a violation of free speech. The court enjoined the entire law, concluding that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the rest of the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the CAADCA's requirement for businesses to create Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) reports, which included assessing and mitigating risks of exposing children to harmful content, likely violated the First Amendment. The court affirmed the injunction against these provisions and those not grammatically severable from them.However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the remainder of the preliminary injunction, finding that it was unclear whether other challenged provisions of the CAADCA facially violated the First Amendment. The court noted that further proceedings were necessary to determine the full scope and impact of these provisions. The case was remanded to the district court for further consideration. View "NETCHOICE, LLC V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "NEISS V. BLUDWORTH" on Justia Law