Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Petitioner’s removal proceeding, the government introduced into the record an INTERPOL Red Notice as the only evidence that Gonzalez-Castillo had committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador.   The Ninth Circuit granted in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The panel held that: (1) substantial evidence did not support the agency’s determination that Petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal; (2) the agency erred by failing to consider all of Petitioner’s evidence under the Convention Against Torture, and (3) Petitioner waived review of the agency’s application of the one-year bar to asylum.   The panel held that, in this case, the Red Notice did not, by itself, establish probable cause that there were serious reasons to believe that Petitioner committed a serious nonpolitical crime in El Salvador. Explaining that probable cause requires a “fair probability” that the noncitizen committed a serious nonpolitical crime, the panel concluded that the Red Notice, in this case, did not meet that standard due to errors that cast doubt on its reliability, and its failure to articulate any specific crime of which Petitioner was accused. The panel rejected the government’s argument that by presenting “some evidence” in the form of the Red Notice, even if scant, it had shifted the burden to disprove the existence of probable cause on to Petitioner. The panel held Petitioner never alerted the agency to the two possible grounds for excusing the filing deadline that he raised in his briefing to the court. View "OSCAR GONZALEZ-CASTILLO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner was accused of sexually abusing two young girls and fled Alaska soon after. The State of Alaska filed an information that same year, but Petitioner was neither apprehended nor charged by indictment until 2004, when an employment background check in Minnesota alerted Alaskan authorities to Petitioner’s whereabouts, leading to his arrest and extradition. Petitioner completed his prison sentence and probation in 2016.   Petitioner challenged the 2009 conviction as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because of Alaska’s delay in apprehending and indicting him after he fled. Before he filed this habeas petition, Petitioner was convicted in federal court in Tennessee for failing to register as a sex offender pursuant to its laws.   At issue in this appeal was whether Petitioner was “in custody pursuant to” the Alaska judgment he challenges when he filed his Section 2254 petition; if he wasn’t, the federal court lacks jurisdiction over it. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition.   The panel explained that Petitioner failed to establish jurisdiction under his restraint-on-liberty theory for reasons similar to the Supreme Court’s rejection of his supervised release theory, that is, because Petitioner does not demonstrate that Tennessee’s sex offender registration laws establish custody “pursuant to” the Alaska judgment. The panel noted that Petitioner in no way argued that he is significantly restrained by the sex offender registration laws of Alaska. View "SEAN WRIGHT V. STATE OF ALASKA" on Justia Law

At issue was whether police officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff either for reports that he followed and harassed an attorney outside a courthouse or for Plaintiff’s refusal to identify himself during an investigatory stop. Defendants asserted that they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff on two grounds: (1) disturbing the peace under California Penal Code Section 415(2); and (2) obstructing an officer under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Pasadena and Pasadena police officers in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that plaintiff was unlawfully arrested. Plaintiff first argued that, because he was arrested under California Penal Code Section 148(a)(1), that means it was disputed whether probable cause existed under Section 415(2). The panel disagreed, stating first that it was well-established that if the facts support probable cause for one offense, an arrest may be lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense that lacked probable cause. Second, by the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, the officers learned enough facts to believe that Plaintiff had violated Section 415(2) and therefore had probable cause to make the arrest.   Having found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, there was no need to proceed to the second question of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct was not “clearly established.” Further, the panel held that no “controlling authority” or “robust consensus of cases” prohibited the officer from arresting Plaintiff under the facts confronting him View "JAVIER VANEGAS V. CITY OF PASADENA" on Justia Law

In an action brought by the State of Hawaii challenging the U.S. Department of the Army’s changes to the operation of its dining facilities at Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Army Airfield in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Randolph-Shepard Act (“RSA”) did not apply to Dining Facility Attendant (“DFA”) contracts, and affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the RSA advance review provision applied to the reclassification of a Schofield Barracks contract.   The panel held that the district court applied an incorrect standard of review to the RSA arbitration panel’s construction of 20 U.S.C. Section 107(a) when it deferred heavily to the arbitration panel’s interpretation. Because the RSA did not delegate interpretive authority to the arbitration panel, the panel reviewed de novo. The panel held that the term “operate” was ambiguous in Section 107(a).   The panel held further that the statutory structure of the RSA supported a broad interpretation in favor of increased opportunities for blind vendors, and the implementing regulations swept even more broadly and counseled strongly in favor of applying the RSA to DFA contracts. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the RSA advance review requirement applied to the Army’s reclassification of Schofield Barracks’ dining facilities. View "STATE OF HAWAII V. USEDU" on Justia Law

At issue were several statements in articles published by Morgan Simon on Forbes.com that connected CoreCivic to the detention of separated families at the U.S. border and characterized its lobbying efforts as pushing for punitive criminal and immigration laws. Simon’s firm is Candide Group. CoreCivic filed suit against Simon and Candide Group (collectively “Candide”) for defamation and defamation by implication. Candide made a special motion to strike CoreCivic’s complaint under California’s antiSLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 425.16.   The Ninth Circuit held that the special motion provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court, and affirmed in part the district court’s order granting Candide Group, LLC’s motion to strike the defamation complaint. The panel held that the court’s prior precedents control. In United States ex rel. v. Lockheed Missiles &Space Co., the court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal diversity actions because there was “no ‘direct collision’” between the statute and the relevant rules, and the twin purposes of Erie favored its application.   The panel turned to the merits of Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion. Because CoreCivic did not contest on appeal that the suit implicated Candide’s First Amendment rights, the panel needed only to determine–applying the 12(b)(6) standard–whether CoreCivic stated a claim for defamation under California law. The panel concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead a defamation or a defamation by implication claim based on statements about its connection to the separation of immigrant families at the U.S. border, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. View "CORECIVIC, INC. V. CANDIDE GROUP, LLC" on Justia Law

The police officers at first complied with the requirement that a warrant includes a description of the “place to be searched,” by obtaining a warrant that listed a motel room suspected of being a hub for drug trafficking. The officers then decided to search the suspect’s home as well and asked the judge over the phone to expand the scope of the warrant to include the home. The judge agreed, but the officers did not physically amend the warrant.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The panel agreed with the district court that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant was facially defective. While a judge had orally approved the search of the home, the text of the Fourth Amendment still requires the warrant to specify the place to be searched. But the panel held that the district court erred in denying the officers qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time that the search would violate the Fourth Amendment. An officer could have believed—based on the lack of direct case law at the time—that he or she could search the home because the court had orally approved the search, even if the officer failed to make that change on the warrant. View "RICHARD MANRIQUEZ V. JOEL ENSLEY" on Justia Law

Petitioner initially sought asylum claiming that he was persecuted in India on account of being a Sikh who supports the creation of Khalistan and the Akali Dal (Mann) Party. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s claims after concluding that Petitioner’s testimony was not credible because of inconsistencies and a lack of detail. The IJ also highlighted a State Department report showing that the situation for Sikhs had greatly normalized and the IJ found further that Petitioner had failed to even establish his identity.   The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition. The panel held that the BIA erred in holding that earlier adverse credibility finding barred Petitioner’s motion to reopen, and in concluding that Petitioner failed to show that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed qualitatively since his last hearing.   The panel explained that although the BIA may rely on a previous adverse credibility determination to deny a motion to reopen if that earlier finding still factually undermines the petitioner’s new argument, here, Petitioner’s motion included newly submitted evidence based on information independent of the prior adverse credibility finding.   The panel concluded that the BIA erred in rejecting Petitioner’s new evidence for two other reasons. First, the panel held that the record did not support the BIA’s determination that Petitioner was not similarly situated to the people harmed in 2017 political violence. Second, the panel held that Petitioner provided sufficient evidence demonstrating that the conditions for Sikhs in India had changed in the two decades since his asylum hearing. View "RUPINDER SINGH V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Pacific Gas & Electric Company (“PG&E”), sought chapter 11 protection in a bid to proactively address massive potential liabilities related to a series of wildfires in Northern California. But PG&E was solvent. Its assets at the time of the bankruptcy filing exceeded its known liabilities by nearly $20 billion. As a result, several creditors—including Plaintiffs, the Ad Hoc Committee of Holders of Trade Claims—claimed PG&E must pay post-petition interest at the rates required by their contracts in order for their claims to be “unimpaired” by the reorganization plan   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The panel held that under the “solvent-debtor exception,” the creditors possessed an equitable right to receive post-petition interest at the contractual or default state rate, subject to any other equitable considerations before PG&E collected surplus value from the bankruptcy estate. The solvent-debtor exception is a common-law exception to the Bankruptcy Act’s prohibition on the collection of post-petition interest as part of a creditor’s claim.   The panel concluded that Cardelucci merely interpreted 11 U.S.C. Section 726(a)(5), which requires that creditors of a solvent debtor receive post-petition interest at “the legal rate.” Section 726(a)(5), however, applies only to impaired chapter 11 claims, and the panel concluded that Cardelucci, therefore, did not address what rate of post-petition interest must be paid on the Ad Hoc Committee’s unimpaired claims. The panel reversed and remanded to the bankruptcy court to weigh the equities and determine what rate of interest the creditors were entitled to. View "PG&E CORPORATION V. AD HOC COMMITTEE OF HOLDERS" on Justia Law

The Fellowship of Christian Athletes (“FCA”) requires students serving in leadership roles to abide by a Statement of Faith, which includes the belief that sexual relations should be limited within the context of a marriage between a man and a woman. The San Jose Unified School District (the “School District”) revoked FCA’s status as an official student club at its high schools, claiming that FCA’s religious pledge requirement violated the School District’s non-discrimination policy.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction sought by a derecognized student club, the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, and directed the district court to enter an order reinstating the Fellowship as a student club within the San Jose Unified School District.   The panel first held that FCA National had direct organizational standing and Pioneer High School FCA had representational organizational standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. The School District’s denial of Associated Student Body (“ASB”) recognition hampered FCA National’s ability to further student engagement with the Christian faith and required it to expend significant time and resources to assist its student members.   Addressing the merits, the panel first held that Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction sought to maintain the status quo that existed before the School District’s novel scrutiny of FCA—a prohibitory injunction—so the district court erred in applying the heightened standard for mandatory injunctions. The panel held that Plaintiffs would likely prevail on the merits of its selective enforcement claim under the Free Exercise Clause. View "FELLOWSHIP OF CHRISTIAN ATHLET V. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRI" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted that he is entitled to relief on several grounds, the majority of which the panel addressed in a memorandum disposition filed on January 15, 2021. In this opinion, as amended, the panel addressed Petitioner’s certified claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel— that counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.   The Ninth Circuit (1) filed an amended opinion along with Judge Gould’s separate concurrence, (2) denied a petition for panel rehearing, and (3) denied on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc, in a case in which the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition challenging his Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder.   Because Washington filed his habeas petition before the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the panel reviewed the claim under the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny, without the added deference required under AEDPA.   The panel held that Washington did not meet his burden under the first Strickland prong of showing constitutionally deficient performance by failing to obtain and review Washington’s education and incarceration records. The panel held that Washington did not meet his burden of showing that trial counsel erred by not further investigating Washington’s childhood abuse, to the extent that he could have, or by not presenting the information he did not have regarding abuse at sentencing hearing. View "WASHINGTON V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law