Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were reporters with CIR (“Reporters”) and they published stories alleging misuse of funds by two charitable organizations, Planet Aid, Inc., and Development Aid from People to People Malawi (“DAPP Malawi”). In response, Planet Aid and the director of DAPP Malawi, Lisbeth Thomsen, filed a defamation suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the Reporters with the Center for Investigative Reporting (“CIR”)’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike a complaint alleging defamation under California law.The court held that the district court correctly found that Planet Aid and Thomsen were limited-purpose public figures and that the Reporters did not act with “actual malice” within the meaning of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The panel agreed with the district court’s determination in applying the Makaeff test that: (i) there was an existing public controversy with respect to Planet Aid and Lisbeth Thomsen’s use of charitable funds; (ii) the Reporters’ alleged defamation was relevant to this preexisting controversy, and (iii) the voluntariness requirement—which examines whether the plaintiff voluntarily injected itself into the controversy for the purpose of influencing the controversy’s ultimate resolution—was satisfied. The court further agreed with the district court, for the reasons stated by the district court in its order, that a reasonable factfinder could not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Reporters acted with actual malice. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of the Reporters’ motion to strike complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. View "PLANET AID, INC. V. REVEAL" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the question of whether the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) may order an employer to reimburse a union for legal fees incurred during the contract bargaining process. The Ninth Circuit held that it may, and granted the NLRB’s petition for enforcement of its compliance order.The Board found that the employer engaged in unusually aggravated misconduct sufficient to warrant more than a traditional remedy, and ordered the employer to reimburse the union for the costs and expenses the union incurred during collective bargaining sessions. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s findings and enforced its orders in full. The parties could not reach an agreement on the total amount the employer should be required to pay in remedies, and in July 2018, the Regional Director for NLRB Region 27 issued a compliance specification detailing how much the employer owed.The court rejected the employer’s argument that D.C. Circuit precedent established that the Board lacked the power to order the reimbursement of legal fees. The court held that the D.C. Circuit’s opinions were specifically limited to the context of litigation, and they did not bar the award at issue here. The National Labor Relations Act grants the Board broad discretion to impose remedies for unfair labor practices. The court held that the award of legal fees, in this case, was exactly the sort of remedy that courts have upheld as within the Board’s statutory remedial authority. View "NLRB V. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING, LLC" on Justia Law

The Government and Hyten (together, Appellants) seek review of the district court’s decision denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss Spletstoser’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). Specifically, the district court concluded that the Feres doctrine does not bar Spletstoser’s claims because the “alleged sexual assault [could] not conceivably serve any military purpose.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court wrote that the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) created a broad waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity. The court applied the factors developed in Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983), and held that the Feres doctrine did not bar the claims raised by Plaintiff at this stage of the proceedings. The court initially emphasized that this case involved an allegation of sexual assault, and that this case was before the court on a motion to dismiss where the court must assume the truth of the allegations as pled. After considering the Johnson factors and other cases analyzing the Feres doctrine, the court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s action was not barred by the Feres doctrine at this stage, and therefore the motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "KATHRYN SPLETSTOSER V. JOHN HYTEN" on Justia Law

The Governor issued Proclamation 20-57, “Concerning the Health of Agricultural Workers,” and an addendum, “Agricultural COVID-19 Requirements” (collectively, the “Proclamation”). The Proclamation acknowledged the hazards posed by “the worldwide spread of COVID-19” and prohibited “any agricultural employer from continuing to operate beyond June 3, 2020, unless the employer complied with all provisions of the Agriculture COVID-19 Requirements – Provisions for All Worksites and Work-Related Functions.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim and held that certain mandates issued by the Governor of Washington to address the public health crisis caused by the spread of coronavirus (COVID-19) were not preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.The court first held that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Proclamation was ripe for review because Washington’s Department of Labor & Industries’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health had issued a citation to Plaintiff for violation of the requirements set forth in the Proclamation and imposed a $4,200 fine that had to be paid within fifteen working days. There was nothing speculative about this enforcement action.The court held that the Proclamation was not preempted because the requirements in the Proclamation did not relate to an occupational health and safety standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). In light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in NFIB v. OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661 (2021), OSHA lacked the authority to promulgate a public health measure that would regulate the general risk of COVID-19 in the workplace. View "FLOWER WORLD, INC. V. JOEL SACKS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit alleging medical malpractice by government physicians at Naval Hospital Bremerton in the state of Washington. Plaintiff first submitted a timely administrative claim to the Navy under the FTCA, which was denied. She filed her complaint in the Western District of Washington within six months thereafter, as required by the FTCA. The Government sought dismissal on grounds that Plaintiff’s claim had been extinguished by a Washington statute of repose.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings to determine the constitutionality of the statute of repose under Washington’s state constitution. The panel held that the only question at issue was whether the FTCA’s statute of limitations supplanted the eight-year statute of repose embodied in the latter clause of Section 4.16.350.The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar question in a parallel context in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2014). CTS explained the consequences of the distinction between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose. Here, Plaintiff concedes that the eight-year limit in Section 4.16.350 is a statute of repose, and that it represents substantive law of the state of Washington. The court held that because there was no contradictory statute of repose in the FTCA, and the FTCA generally applied the substantive law “of the place where the omission occurred,” it followed that Section 4.16.350 applied to Plaintiff’s claims and precluded them., The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that state statutes of repose do not apply to claims under the FTCA. View "BETTE BENNETT V. USA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—a collection of organizations and individuals interested in petitioning in Montana—alleged that both of these restrictions violated their speech and association rights under the First Amendment. In upholding both restrictions, the district court held that strict scrutiny did not apply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either restriction imposed a severe burden on their rights. It went on to find that both restrictions sufficiently furthered Montana’s important regulatory interest to survive less exacting review.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court reversed the district court’s holding with regards to the residency requirement because it (1) imposed a severe burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights and therefore was subject to strict scrutiny, and (2) was not narrowly tailored to further Montana’s compelling interest.The court affirmed the district court’s holding with regards to the pay-per-signature restriction because it concluded that (1) on the basis of the record produced here, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the pay-per-signature ban imposed a severe burden on First Amendment rights and therefore less exacting review applied; and (2) the state had established that an important regulatory interest was furthered by this restriction. View "NATHAN PIERCE V. CHRISTI JACOBSEN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant and the Maricopa County Community College District (the “College District”). Plaintiffs allege that a module on Islamic terrorism within a course in world politics taught by Defendant at Scottsdale Community College (the “College”) violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant’s disparaging treatment of Islam was part of an official policy embraced by the College District. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Plaintiffs appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. The court held that Plaintiffs could not sustain a claim for municipal liability against the College District. First, Plaintiffs abandoned their municipal liability claim on appeal by failing to address it in their Reply Brief even after the College District raised the argument in its Answering Brief on appeal.But even on the merits, the claim could not survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Although Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant has taught his World Politics class for 24 years, they did not allege that the course in other years contained the same content that offended Plaintiff, or that Defendant’s views or teaching methods were so persistent and widespread as to constitute part of the College District’s standard operating procedure. Further, the court held that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Free Exercise claims. View "MOHAMED SABRA V. MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Kinetic Concepts, Inc., and its indirect subsidiary KCI USA, Inc. (collectively, “KCI”) submitted claims to Medicare in which KCI falsely certified compliance with certain criteria governing Medicare payment for the use of KCI’s medical device for treating wounds. The district court granted summary judgment to KCI, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the False Claims Act elements of materiality and scienter.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that compliance with the specific criterion that there be no stalled cycle would not be material if, upon case-specific review, the Government routinely paid stalled-cycle claims. In other words, if stalled-cycle claims were consistently paid when subject to case-specific scrutiny, then a false statement that avoided that scrutiny and instead resulted in automatic payment would not be material to the payment decision. The court concluded, however, that the record did not show this to be the case. The court considered administrative rulings concerning claims that were initially denied, post-payment and pre-payment audits of particular claims, and a 2007 report by the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The court concluded that none of these forms of evidence supported the district court’s summary judgment ruling.   The court held that the district court further erred in ruling that there was insufficient evidence that KCI acted with the requisite scienter and that the remainder of the district court’s reasoning concerning scienter rested on a clear failure to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. View "STEVEN HARTPENCE V. KINETIC CONCEPTS, INC." on Justia Law

The Chickasaw Nation, a sovereign and federally recognized Indian tribe, operates its own healthcare system, which includes five pharmacies. Under federal law, members of federally recognized Native nations are eligible to receive healthcare services at the nations’ facilities at no charge, and a nation may recoup the cost of services that it provides to a tribal member from that member’s health insurance plan. Caremark is the pharmacy benefit manager for health insurance plans that cover many tribal members served by the Chickasaw Nation’s pharmacies. The Nation signed agreements with Caremark. Each of these agreements incorporated by reference a Provider Agreement and a Provider Manual. The Provider Manual included an arbitration provision with a delegation clause requiring the arbitrator, rather than the courts, to resolve threshold issues about the scope and enforceability of the arbitration provision. The Nation sued Caremark, claiming violations of 25 U.S.C. Section 1621e, a provision of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act referred to as the “Recovery Act.”   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting the petition to compel arbitration. The court rejected the Nation’s argument that it did not actually form contracts with Caremark that included arbitration provisions with delegation clauses. The court concluded that the premise of the Nation’s argument— that an arbitration agreement always and necessarily waives tribal sovereign immunity—was incorrect. Rather, the arbitration agreement simply designated a forum for resolving disputes for which immunity was waived. View "CAREMARK, LLC V. CHICKASAW NATION" on Justia Law

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff benefits based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) that there were an estimated 72,000 “Table worker,” 65,000 “Assembler,” and 32,000 “Film touch up inspector” jobs in the national economy that claimant could perform. After the ALJ issued her decision, claimant’s attorney submitted to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Appeals Council different estimates for those same jobs, allegedly using the same software program used by the VE. The Appeals Council considered the new evidence but denied claimant’s request for review.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Commissioner of Social Security and affirming the denial of Plaintiff’s claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits, and remanded to the district court with directions that the case be remanded to the agency for further proceedings. The court held that under Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2017), remand was required to allow the ALJ to address claimant’s evidence of widely discrepant job number estimates.The claimant estimated—using SkillTRAN Job Browser Pro and the same DOT codes the VE had used—that there were 2,957 table worker, 0 assembler, and 1,333 film tough-up inspector jobs in the national economy. The discrepancy between the VE and the claimant’s estimates was comparable to the discrepancy in Buck. View "TYRONE WHITE V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law