Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Since illegally entering the United States in 2000, Petitioner has been convicted of four DUI offenses. In 2018, an Arizona court convicted Petitioner of aggravated DUI. Before sentencing, he spent 183 days in pretrial detention. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal but, through counsel, waived applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because he believed he did not have “a viable claim under current law.”The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether pretrial detention that is not credited toward a defendant’s sentence is confinement “as a result of conviction.” See 8 U.S.C. Section 1101(f)(7). The court held that it is not. The court also held that the agency properly relied on counsel’s representations that the petitioner waived his applications for asylum, withholding, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.The court concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a due process violation, explaining that he was represented by counsel, the IJ relied on counsel’s statements to hold that the claims had been withdrawn, and the BIA properly affirmed. Moreover, the court explained that Petitioner did not contend that his counsel was ineffective or that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. View "ESTEBAN TRONCOSO-OVIEDO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 1988, a California jury sentenced Petitioner to death for murdering another person with an ax. The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and later denied his state habeas petition. Petitioner now seeks federal habeas relief. He argues that the state prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness’s credibility, that his attorney was ineffective in not objecting to the vouching, and that the state trial court, in the penalty phase, improperly excluded the prosecution’s earlier plea offer to Petitioner as claimed mitigating evidence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The court that no clearly established federal constitutional law holds that an unaccepted plea offer qualifies as evidence in mitigation that must be admitted in a capital penalty proceeding. The court held that regardless, Petitioner cannot show prejudice. The court wrote that given the extreme aggravating factors that the State put forward coupled with Petitioner’s already extensive but unsuccessful presentation of mitigating evidence, there is no basis to conclude that the jury would have reached a different result if it had considered Petitioner’s unaccepted plea. View "CURTIS FAUBER V. RONALD DAVIS" on Justia Law

In three FERC orders, FERC found that the State Board had engaged in coordinated schemes with the Nevada Irrigation District, the Yuba County Water Agency, and the Merced Irrigation District (“Project Applicants”) to delay certification and to avoid making a decision on their certification requests. According to FERC, the State Board had coordinated with the Project Applicants to ensure that they withdrew and resubmitted their certification requests before the State’s deadline for action under Section 401 in order to reset the State’s one-year period to review the certification requests. FERC held that, because of that coordination, the State Board had “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to act” on requests and therefore had waived its certification authority under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. Section 1341(a)(1).The Ninth Circuit granted petitions for review, and vacated orders issued by FERC. The court held that FERC’s findings of coordination were unsupported by substantial evidence. Instead, the evidence showed only that the State Board acquiesced in the Project Applicants’ own unilateral decisions to withdraw and resubmit their applications rather than have them denied. The court held that even assuming that FERC’s “coordination” standard was consistent with the statute, the State Board’s mere acquiescence in the Project Applicants’ withdrawals and resubmissions could not demonstrate that the State Board was engaged in a coordinated scheme to delay certification. Accordingly, FERC’s orders could not stand. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "CALIFORNIA STATE WATER RESOURC V. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged copyright infringement in the posting by Pub Ocean Ltd. of an article about an ephemeral lake that formed on the desert floor in Death Valley, using twelve of Plaintiff’s photos of the lake without seeking or receiving a license.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendant, based on a fair use defense in an action under the Copyright Act, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that Pub Ocean could not invoke a fair use defense to Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim. Under 17 U.S.C. Section 107, in determining whether fair use applies, a court must analyze the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.The court explained that because all four statutory factors pointed unambiguously in the same direction, the court held that the district court erred in failing to grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the fair use issue. View "ELLIOT MCGUCKEN V. PUB OCEAN LIMITED" on Justia Law

Defendant contended that the district court committed a procedural error because it improperly enhanced his sentence in violation of the First Step Act of 2018. Despite the district court imposing a sentence that is below his guidelines range, Defendant argued that the court ran afoul of this proscription when it relied on information from his safety valve proffer to deny him a further sentence reduction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed a sentence imposed following Defendant’s guilty plea to importing methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. Sections 952 & 960. The court held that the district court did not impose an improper sentence “enhancement” of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(f)(5). The court wrote that the district court’s imposition of a sentence not just below the mandatory minimum, but also below the low end of Defendant’s guidelines range, after considering a host of aggravating mitigating factors, does not constitute an enhancement; and that the failure to reduce a sentence is not an enhancement. The court also held that the sentence is substantively reasonable, rejecting Defendant’s arguments concerning a disparity with similarly situated offenders and the district court’s application and weighing of the 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. View "USA V. MARQUIS BROWN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s mother was arrested at a traffic stop and fell ill in police custody. Tragically, she died nine days later. Her minor son, J.K.J., brought constitutional claims against the City of San Diego and two officers who participated in the traffic stop. The District Court dismissed J.K.J.’s amended complaint with prejudice. The district court dismissed J.K.J.’s amended complaint with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order granting a petition for rehearing, denying as moot a petition for rehearing en banc, and amending the prior opinion and dissent; and (2) an amended opinion affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging constitutional violations by police officers in their treatment of Plaintiff’s mother.   The court first held that the district court validly exercised its discretion in choosing to review a bodycam video that Plaintiff had incorporated by reference into the amended complaint. Second, the district court did not assign the video too much weight. Lastly, to the extent the district court found that the video contradicted anything in the amended complaint, it rejected Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations regarding whether the officers’ conduct met the legal standard of a constitutional violation.   The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the amended complaint. The court further held that the alleged violative nature of the officers’ conduct, in failing to recognize and respond to the woman’s serious medical need, was not clearly established in the specific context of this case. View "J. J. V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff hospices exceeded their aggregate caps in the 2013 fiscal year, and three Silverado hospices also exceeded their aggregate caps in the 2014 fiscal year. Plaintiffs appealed their cap determinations to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (“PRRB”), arguing that their MAC had failed to calculate the aggregate cap using the “actual net amount of payment received by the hospice provider.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the government.   The court held that CMS correctly concluded that the Budget Control Act required it to reduce the total annual amounts paid to hospices, not only the periodic reimbursements, and that the agency’s chosen method for implementing sequestration was consistent with the Medicare statute. The court further held that the agency was not required to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking before implementing the Budget Control Act’s sequestration mandate. The agency’s sequestration method, as reflected in the TDL and the PRRB’s decisions, did not amount to the “establish[ment]” or “change[]” of a substantive legal standard governing payment for services under Medicare, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 1395hh. Rather, Congress enacted the Budget Control Act’s sequestration requirements, and the President implemented sequestration when the statutory conditions were triggered. View "SILVERADO HOSPICE, INC. V. XAVIER BECERRA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed based on a 1997 conviction. He then filed a motion to reopen, which was denied. In 2018, he filed a second motion to reopen, claiming that he was no longer removable as charged because a state court, in 2018, had modified his conviction due to a “constitutional defect” in his criminal proceeding. Petitioner argued that his removal order was invalid, and therefore, the BIA should reopen proceedings, set aside his removal order, and terminate proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as both number barred and time-barred.   Denying in part and dismissing in part Petitioner’s petition for review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen, which challenged his removal order on the ground that his underlying conviction was allegedly invalid. The court concluded that none of the circumstances in which an alien may challenge a removal order based on the claim that a conviction underlying a removal order is invalid were applicable here.   The court also concluded that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deciding that equitable tolling of the time and number bar was not available to Petitioner, explaining that he waited 21 years to seek a modification of his conviction, provided no basis as to his reasonable efforts to pursue relief during that period, and provided no explanation for such an exceedingly long delay. Finally, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA erred in denying Petitioner’s request to sua sponte reopen proceedings. View "LUIS PEREZ-CAMACHO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged his conviction and sentence through the PCR proceeding because pleading defendants in noncapital cases in Arizona are prohibited from taking a direct appeal. The district court found that the Arizona Court of Appeals had incorrectly determined that Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), did not apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. The district court also determined, on de novo review, that Arizona’s PCR procedure was deficient under Anders.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of conditional habeas relief to Petitioner. The panel first explained that it was clearly established that Anders and its progeny apply to Arizona’s of-right PCR proceedings. Because the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision can be construed as finding Anders applicable and nothing clearly suggests otherwise, and a federal habeas court must give the state court of appeals the benefit of the doubt and presume that it followed the law, the panel found that the Arizona Court of Appeals correctly found Anders applies to of-right PCR proceedings. The court, therefore, reversed the district court’s contrary determination. The court held that the district court also erred in reviewing de novo whether Arizona’s of-right PCR procedure is constitutionally adequate under Anders, and should have applied the required deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). View "LINO CHAVEZ V. MARK BRNOVICH" on Justia Law

The dispute at issue is between Jones Day and one of its former partners, a German national who was based in its Paris office until he left to join Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe (“Orrick”). Jones Day’s partnership agreement provides for mandatory arbitration of all disputes among partners, and that all such arbitration proceedings are governed by the FAA. The partnership dispute proceeded to arbitration in Washington D.C., the location designated in the arbitration agreement.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick to comply with an arbitrator’s subpoena. First, the court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action to enforce arbitral summonses issued by the arbitrator in an ongoing international arbitration being conducted in Washington, D.C., under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention. The court further held that venue was proper in the Northern District of California. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enforce Jones Day’s petitions to compel Orrick and its partners to comply with the arbitral summonses. View "JONES DAY V. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE" on Justia Law