Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves an encounter between the Hawai'i Police Department (HPD) and Steven Hyer, which resulted in Hyer's death. On June 22, 2018, HPD officers responded to calls about Hyer's erratic behavior. Hyer, who had a history of mental illness, barricaded himself in his apartment. After several hours of failed negotiations and attempts to subdue him, including the use of a Taser and chemical munitions, HPD officers deployed a police dog. When Hyer allegedly threatened the officers with a compound bow, Corporal Torres shot and killed him.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City and County of Honolulu, and several HPD officers. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert reports, finding them speculative, unreliable, and containing legal conclusions. The court ruled that the use of force was objectively reasonable and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and various state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in excluding the entirety of the plaintiffs' expert reports, as the reports were based on sufficient facts and data. The Ninth Circuit found that the exclusion of these reports was prejudicial because they created genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the use of deadly force and chemical munitions, as well as potential ADA violations. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on these claims but affirmed the grant of qualified immunity regarding the use of the police dog, as the law was not clearly established. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HYER V. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU" on Justia Law

The plaintiff pleaded guilty to obstructing a peace officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) after an incident where San Diego County Deputy Sheriffs came to his home to investigate a report of domestic violence. During the encounter, the plaintiff did not comply with the deputies' orders, leading to his being pushed to the floor, which he claims resulted in a dislocated shoulder and rotator cuff tear. He later filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the deputies used excessive force.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, citing Heck v. Humphrey, which bars § 1983 actions if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. The district court concluded that the plaintiff's resistance and the force used by the deputies were part of the same factual context and could not be separated into isolated events. Therefore, the court held that the § 1983 action was barred by Heck and denied the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Heck did not bar the plaintiff's suit because he engaged in multiple acts of resistance or obstruction that could serve as the factual basis for his conviction, both before and after the use of force he claimed was excessive. Since the plaintiff's guilty plea did not specify which act was the basis of his conviction, success in his § 1983 action would not necessarily undermine his conviction. The court emphasized that a § 1983 action is barred by Heck only if success in the action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MARTELL V. COLE" on Justia Law

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

In 2020, Milos Product Tanker Corporation transported approximately 40,000 tons of jet fuel belonging to Valero Marketing and Supply Company. Milos had a maritime transportation contract (Charter Party) with GP Global PTE Ltd., which arranged the voyage. Valero purchased the fuel from Koch Refining International PTE Ltd. on "cost and freight" terms, meaning Koch paid for the transportation. Upon delivery, Valero refused to pay Milos, arguing it had already paid Koch. GP Global, facing financial difficulties, also did not pay Milos, leading Milos to sue Valero for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Milos, concluding that Valero breached an express or implied contract to pay Milos for the transportation. The court reasoned that Valero's conduct showed its consent to be bound by the Charter Party between Milos and GP Global. The court also found that Valero was alternatively liable under an implied promise to pay, based on its acceptance of the fuel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that under maritime law, the shipper (GP Global) is primarily liable for freight charges, even if a bill of lading suggests otherwise. The court found no express contract between Milos and Valero that would rebut this presumption. The Charter Party specifically stated that GP Global would pay the freight. The court also determined that Valero's conduct did not imply an agreement to be bound by the bills of lading or to pay freight. Additionally, the court found no basis for an implied obligation for Valero to pay under the principles established in States Marine International, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank. The court concluded that Valero was not unjustly enriched, as it had paid Koch for the freight charges. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "MILOS PRODUCT TANKER CORPORATION V. VALERO MARKETING AND SUPPLY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (CERF) sued Naples Restaurant Group, LLC, and its owner over the restaurant’s annual Fourth of July fireworks show at Alamitos Bay in Los Angeles, alleging violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA) due to fireworks discharges into the water without a permit. The district court found that one firework malfunctioned and fell into the water, but this single incident was insufficient to establish a continuing violation of the CWA. Consequently, the district court dismissed CERF’s claim without prejudice.After the district court’s decision, the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board began issuing a general National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for public fireworks displays over Los Angeles waters. Naples applied for and received this permit, which authorized the discharges that CERF had challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that it was constitutionally moot. The court held that the issuance of the NPDES permit made it absolutely clear that the alleged CWA violations could not reasonably be expected to recur, as Naples now had a permit authorizing the discharges. Therefore, CERF’s claims for declarative and injunctive relief were moot. The court also held that the same mootness standard applied to CERF’s claim for civil penalties, following the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. Finally, the court concluded that CERF’s claim for attorneys’ fees was also moot.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "COASTAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION V. NAPLES RESTAURANT GROUP, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves International Petroleum Products and Additives Company (IPAC), a California-based company, which entered into sales and distribution agreements with Black Gold S.A.R.L., a Monaco-based company. Black Gold breached these agreements by using IPAC’s confidential information to develop competing products. IPAC won an arbitration award of over $1 million against Black Gold. However, Black Gold declared bankruptcy in Monaco, complicating IPAC’s efforts to collect the award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment against Black Gold. During post-judgment discovery, Black Gold engaged in misconduct, leading the district court to sanction Black Gold and add Lorenzo and Sofia Napoleoni, Black Gold’s owners, as judgment debtors on the grounds that they were Black Gold’s alter egos. Black Gold’s petition for recognition of its Monaco bankruptcy proceedings was initially denied by the bankruptcy court, but this decision was later reversed by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which mandated recognition of the Monaco proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the automatic bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 1520 did not retroactively apply to the date of the bankruptcy court’s initial denial of Black Gold’s petition. The court also held that the automatic stay did not extend to IPAC’s alter ego claim against the Napoleonis. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in favor of IPAC, concluding that the alter ego claim was not the property of Black Gold’s estate under California law. View "International Petroleum Products and Additives Co, Inc. v. Black Gold S.A.R.L." on Justia Law

Gasoline consumers alleged that various oil producers colluded with the U.S. government, including then-President Trump, to negotiate with Russia and Saudi Arabia to cut oil production, limit future oil exploration, and end a price war on oil. Plaintiffs claimed this agreement fixed gas prices in violation of Sherman Act § 1, suppressed competition in violation of Sherman Act § 2, and involved anticompetitive mergers in violation of Clayton Act § 7.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the political question and act of state doctrines. The court also found that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an antitrust conspiracy. Additionally, the court dismissed Defendant Energy Transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, as well as requests for additional discovery and oral argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the political question doctrine barred judicial review of the President’s foreign policy decisions, as these decisions are committed to the political branches of government. The court also found no judicially manageable standards to resolve the claims under antitrust laws. Additionally, the act of state doctrine barred the claims because they involved evaluating the petroleum policies of foreign nations. The court further held that Plaintiffs failed to state a plausible antitrust conspiracy claim regarding Defendants’ private conduct. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s procedural rulings. View "D'Augusta v. American Petroleum Institute" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who alleged that four law enforcement officers used excessive force during his arrest. The incident occurred on March 21, 2018, in Mesa, Arizona. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for an unsafe traffic maneuver. During the stop, the plaintiff provided a false name and was asked to step out of the vehicle. When he did, he pushed one of the officers, leading to a struggle during which he was repeatedly punched, kicked, and tasered. The officers eventually handcuffed him using two linked sets of handcuffs. After being handcuffed, the plaintiff claimed that one officer continued to kneel on his upper back and neck, making it difficult for him to breathe.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' use of force was not clearly established as unlawful under existing precedent. The court also noted that one of the officers did not use any force and was focused on another individual, thus granting summary judgment on the merits for that officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity for the officers concerning the force used up to the point of handcuffing, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting their actions. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the officer who continued to kneel on the plaintiff's back and neck after he was handcuffed, finding that this conduct violated clearly established law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding this officer and affirmed the summary judgment for the other officers. View "Spencer v. Pew" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by local governments and municipal organizations to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2020 Ruling, which interprets and clarifies existing legislative rules from the 2014 Order. These rules implement section 6409(a) of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, requiring state and local governments to approve certain wireless network modifications that do not substantially change existing facilities.The petitioners challenged several provisions of the FCC’s 2020 Ruling: the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, the Equipment Cabinet Provision Clarification, the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions, and the Express Evidence Requirement. They argued that these clarifications were either arbitrary and capricious or improperly issued without following the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment procedures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Shot Clock Rule, the Separation Clause, and the Equipment Cabinet Provision were consistent with the 2014 Order, were interpretive rules, and were not arbitrary or capricious. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review regarding these provisions.However, the court found that the 2020 Ruling’s clarifications of the Concealment and Siting Approval Conditions Provisions were inconsistent with the 2014 Order, making them legislative rules. The FCC’s failure to follow the APA’s procedural requirements in issuing these legislative rules was not harmless. Consequently, the court granted the petition for review concerning these provisions.Finally, the court denied the petition for review regarding the Express Evidence Requirement, concluding that its application would not have a retroactive effect. The court’s decision was to grant the petition in part and deny it in part, affirming some of the FCC’s clarifications while invalidating others. View "League of California Cities v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Cenious Brewster led officers on a high-speed chase, which was recorded on the officers’ dashcam. Brewster crashed into a building shortly after the chase began. He was arrested, and a firearm was found in his vehicle. Brewster pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the district court sentenced him to 46 months’ imprisonment. Brewster challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying the reckless endangerment during flight enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, misunderstood his request for a downward departure based on circumstances that allegedly justified his flight, and violated his due process rights by finding that data from the Sentencing Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing INformation (JSIN) online tool was sufficiently reliable to consider at sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Brewster’s objections to the reckless endangerment enhancement, finding that his flight created a substantial risk of injury to at least one specific person. The court also rejected Brewster’s request for a downward departure or variance, characterizing it as a request for a variance only, which Brewster’s counsel confirmed. Additionally, the court found the JSIN data reliable and used it to determine Brewster’s sentence, noting that the data was consistent with information from another Sentencing Commission tool, the Interactive Data Analyzer (IDA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Brewster’s flight put at least one motorist at substantial risk of serious bodily injury. The court also found that Brewster forfeited his argument regarding the downward departure and failed to show plain error. Finally, the appellate court held that the district court did not err in finding the JSIN data reliable, as it came from a reliable source and was corroborated by other unchallenged evidence. The court denied Brewster’s motion for supplemental briefing on a Second Amendment challenge, as he could have raised it in the district court but did not. The sentence was affirmed. View "United States v. Brewster" on Justia Law