Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Cuban national fled his home country after enduring years of persecution and briefly stayed in Mexico, where he also faced threats and extortion. Upon entering the United States, he sought asylum, describing his fears of returning to both Cuba and Mexico. An Immigration Judge granted him withholding of removal to Cuba, but did not designate Mexico or any other country as an alternative for removal. Neither party appealed this decision, making it final. Despite this, federal immigration officials removed him to Mexico, where he was threatened by gang members. He returned to the United States two days later, was detained, and was ultimately granted asylum.After these events, the individual filed a lawsuit for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that his removal to Mexico was improper and caused him harm. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g), which restrict judicial review of certain immigration actions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) did not bar the lawsuit because the plaintiff’s claims challenged the legal authority and process of his removal to Mexico, not the discretionary decision to execute a removal order. The court found that the claims were based on actions taken after the conclusion of removal proceedings and were not subject to the exclusive petition-for-review process. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the Federal Tort Claims Act suit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IBARRA-PEREZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A university revoked a student’s bachelor’s degree in social work after being informed by a state agency that, during her internship, she accessed confidential information in a state database without authorization. The university retroactively changed her grade for the internship course to failing, notified her that her degree and diploma were invalid, and initiated disciplinary proceedings. The student, who had already graduated and obtained a social work license, challenged the university’s actions, arguing that her procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the student’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that she did not have a protected property interest in her degree, grade, or the disciplinary process, and that, even if such an interest existed, the university provided adequate process. The court also concluded that she failed to plausibly allege that she was unable to pursue a career in social work, and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because any rights at issue were not clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the student’s university degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the university failed to provide adequate process before revoking it. Specifically, the court found that the student plausibly alleged she was denied sufficient time to present her defense and was not allowed to cross-examine university-affiliated witnesses at her conduct hearing. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural due process claim on these grounds and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the dismissal of the substantive due process claim and the grant of qualified immunity to the defendants for monetary relief. The appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot. View "DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

Environmental organizations challenged the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s approval of the Big Weekly Elk Forest Management Project in coastal Oregon, arguing that the project would harm the threatened marbled murrelet by allowing logging near its nesting habitat. The relevant Resource Management Plan (RMP) designates certain forest areas as Late-Successional Reserve (LSR) to protect murrelet and northern spotted owl habitat, and includes management directions for murrelet conservation. The project authorized thinning in LSRs adjacent to murrelet habitat and heavier harvesting in areas designated for timber production, with some voluntary protective measures.The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argued that the project violated the RMP and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) by failing to buffer all occupied murrelet sites and by not requiring surveys for murrelets in adjacent stands. They also claimed the Bureau failed to take a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the Bureau, finding its interpretation of the RMP reasonable and entitled to deference, and that its environmental review was sufficient.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Bureau’s narrow interpretation of “modifying nesting habitat” in the RMP was reasonable, genuinely ambiguous, and entitled to deference under Kisor v. Wilkie. The project conformed to the RMP and did not violate FLPMA. The court also found that the Bureau took the required “hard look” at environmental impacts under NEPA, adequately addressing potential effects on murrelets through tiered and incorporated analyses. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Bureau was affirmed. View "CASCADIA WILDLANDS V. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT" on Justia Law

A musician and songwriter alleged that another composer copied his liturgical song, “Emmanuel,” in creating her own work, “Christ Be Our Light.” The plaintiff had published and performed “Emmanuel” widely in the 1980s and early 1990s, including at conventions attended by both the defendant and her publisher. The defendant, a British musician, composed “Christ Be Our Light” in 1993, and her publisher had received copies of “Emmanuel” from the plaintiff in the mid-1980s. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had access to his work through these conventions, widespread dissemination, and her relationship with her publisher.The plaintiff initially filed suit in the Northern District of Indiana, but after a procedural dismissal and re-filing, the case was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. During discovery, the plaintiff disclosed, after the deadline, letters from the publisher acknowledging receipt of “Emmanuel.” The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, excluded these letters and the related access theory as a sanction for late disclosure, finding the failure to disclose was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The court then granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that, without the excluded evidence, the plaintiff could not show access or striking similarity, and thus could not proceed with his copyright claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the late-disclosed evidence and the related access theory, holding that the discovery sanction was not claim-dispositive and was within the district court’s discretion. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that, even without the excluded evidence, there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had access to “Emmanuel” and whether the two works were substantially or strikingly similar. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMBROSETTI V. OREGON CATHOLIC PRESS" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was shot five times in his apartment parking lot and, in the chaos, dropped his black iPhone and a satchel. His girlfriend took the satchel but left the phone, which was later recovered by police near some shrubs. The police also seized a different (white) iPhone from the defendant at the hospital. The black iPhone remained in police evidence for over two years, until it became relevant in a separate federal drug investigation. The government ultimately used data from the black iPhone, along with other evidence, to charge the defendant with drug trafficking, firearm offenses, and money laundering.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon presided over the trial. Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress evidence from the black iPhone, arguing that he retained a privacy interest in the device and its data, and also sought recusal of the district judge due to her prior service as U.S. Attorney when he was prosecuted for unrelated charges over fifteen years earlier. The district court denied both motions, finding that the defendant had abandoned the black iPhone and thus lacked standing to challenge its search, and that recusal was not warranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that the defendant had abandoned his privacy interest in the black iPhone, holding that the circumstances—dropping the phone while fleeing after being shot—did not show intent to abandon the device or its data. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion because federal agents obtained a warrant and searched the phone within a reasonable period. The court also affirmed the denial of the recusal motion, concluding that a reasonable person would not question the judge’s impartiality under these facts. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. HUNT" on Justia Law

A group of Latino voters from Washington State’s Yakima Valley challenged the state’s legislative district map, arguing that the configuration of one district diluted their votes and denied them an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The state’s bipartisan redistricting commission had drawn the map following the 2020 Census, but the plaintiffs contended that the map “cracked” their community, undermining their voting power. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed with the plaintiffs, enjoined the enacted map, and, when the commission declined to draw a new map, imposed its own remedial map.Three Yakima Valley voters, who had intervened in the district court, appealed. They challenged both the district court’s finding of a Section 2 violation and the remedial map, arguing that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause and Section 2, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction because a three-judge panel was not convened.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction, ruling that 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires a three-judge court only for constitutional, not statutory, challenges to legislative apportionment. The court found that the intervenors lacked standing to appeal the Section 2 liability finding and to challenge the remedial map under Section 2, as they failed to show traceable or redressable injuries or vote dilution. However, one intervenor had standing to bring an equal protection challenge to the remedial map.On the merits, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the remedial map did not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, as race was not the predominant factor in its design. The court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction except for the equal protection claim, which it affirmed, upholding the district court’s remedial map. View "PALMER V. TREVINO" on Justia Law

Ashley Popa visited a website operated by PSP Group LLC, which used a session-replay technology called “Clarity,” owned by Microsoft Corporation. This technology recorded users’ interactions with the website, including mouse movements, clicks, and some text inputs. Popa alleged that Clarity collected information such as her browsing activity and partial address details, and that this data was used to recreate her visit for analysis by PSP. She filed a putative class action, claiming violations of Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (WESCA) and intrusion upon seclusion.Popa initially filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, later amending it. The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Both defendants moved to dismiss; PSP argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, while Microsoft moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court found that Popa failed to establish Article III standing, concluding that the information collected did not constitute the type of private information historically protected by law. The court dismissed the action without prejudice and denied Microsoft’s motion as moot.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that Popa did not allege a “concrete” injury sufficient for Article III standing, as required by TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez. The court found that the alleged harm was not analogous to common-law privacy torts such as intrusion upon seclusion or public disclosure of private facts, as Popa did not identify any highly offensive or private information collected. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Popa v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

Oregon enacted a law requiring prescription drug manufacturers to report detailed information about certain drugs, including pricing, costs, and factors contributing to price increases, to the state’s Department of Consumer and Business Services. The law also directs the agency to post most of this information online, but prohibits public disclosure of information designated as a trade secret unless the agency determines that disclosure is in the public interest. Since the law’s enactment, manufacturers have claimed thousands of trade secrets, but the agency has not publicly disclosed any such information.A trade association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers sued the director of the Oregon agency in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, raising several facial constitutional challenges. The district court granted summary judgment for the association on two claims: that the reporting requirement violated the First Amendment by compelling speech, and that any use of the public-interest exception to disclose trade secrets would constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The court declared the entire reporting requirement unconstitutional and held that any disclosure of trade secrets under the public-interest exception would violate the Takings Clause unless just compensation was provided.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the association on both the First and Fifth Amendment claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the reporting requirement compels commercial speech and survives intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, as it directly advances substantial state interests in transparency and market efficiency and is not more extensive than necessary. On the takings claim, the court found the association’s challenge justiciable but concluded that, under the Penn Central regulatory takings framework, none of the factors supported a facial claim that every disclosure under the public-interest exception would constitute a taking. The court remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the state on these claims. View "Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Stolfi" on Justia Law

Two individuals alleged that the Arizona Department of Revenue, through its Unclaimed Property Act (UPA), unlawfully took possession of checks owed to them by various businesses. Under the UPA, property presumed abandoned is transferred from the holder to the state, which then lists it on a public website but does not provide direct notice to the apparent owners. The plaintiffs claimed that this process constituted an unlawful taking without just compensation and a deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the case. It found that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief, both for retrospective and prospective relief. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because they alleged a concrete injury: the state’s possession of their property without consent. The court also determined that sovereign immunity did not bar the claims, as the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and alleged unconstitutional conduct. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit held that the takings claim failed as a matter of law because property held in trust by the state is not considered “taken.” However, the court found that the plaintiffs stated a viable due process claim, as they plausibly alleged a property interest and that Arizona’s notice procedures were constitutionally inadequate under circuit precedent. The court affirmed the dismissal of the takings claim, reversed the dismissal of the due process claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "GARZA V. WOODS" on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law