Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While serving two life sentences for multiple convictions for first-degree murder, Petitioner beat a fellow inmate to death. After pleading guilty, he was sentenced to death in Idaho state court. Petitioner obtained federal habeas relief with respect to his sentence and was resentenced to death in 1995. In a second petition, Petitioner thereafter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief in the district court. The district court granted certificates of appealability (COAs) as to two issues.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s second amended habeas corpus petition challenging his death sentence. The court denied a COA as to Petitioner’s claims (1) that the district court erred in summarily denying his motion for reconsideration of its denial of his second habeas petition, (2) that the Idaho Supreme Court violated the Due Process Clause by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to his first resentencing, and (3) that the duration of Petitioner’s confinement for his murder constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.   The court granted a COA as to Petitioner’s argument under Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), that claims in his second federal habeas petition attacking his guilty plea are not “second or successive” under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b) and should be decided on the merits. The court concluded that because Petitioner’s original sentence was vacated and a new sentence was imposed, the claims are not barred as second or successive. View "THOMAS CREECH V. TIM RICHARDSON" on Justia Law

Petitioner was ordered excluded in 1996 and then unlawfully re-entered the United States. In 2007, DHS served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (NTA) in immigration court but later moved to dismiss the NTA as improvidently issued. DHS sought dismissal because it could reinstate Petitioner’s 1996 removal order through the more streamlined reinstatement process. The immigration judge denied DHS’s motions and granted Petitioner’s cancellation of removal, but the BIA granted DHS’s motion to dismiss and terminated removal proceedings. DHS later issued an order reinstating Petitioner’s 1996 order, and he filed a petition for review but did not challenge the reinstatement decision itself. Instead, he challenged the BIA’s earlier decision terminating his removal proceedings.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petitioner for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that an immigration petitioner who is subject to a reinstated order of removal may not challenge an earlier decision terminating separate removal proceedings. Because Petitioner’s petition challenged only the BIA’s decision terminating his removal proceedings, which did not result in a final removal order, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his petition.   The court relied on Alcala v. Holder, 563 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2009), and Galindo-Romero v. Holder, 640 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2011), where petitioners sought review of BIA decisions terminating removal proceedings, and this court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a) limits the court’s jurisdiction to review of “final orders of removal,” and no such orders existed in those cases. View "MIGUEL LOPEZ LUVIAN V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s dismissal of her claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that a sheriff’s deputy used excessive force in arresting her. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Plaintiff was convicted of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing the deputy during the same interaction in violation of Cal. Penal Code section 148(a)(1).   The en banc Ninth Circuit court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court held that because the record did not show that Plaintiff’s section 1983 action necessarily rested on the same event as her criminal conviction, success in the former would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the latter.   Heck would bar Plaintiff from bringing an excessive force claim under section 1983 if that claim were based on force used during the conduct that was the basis for her section 148(a)(1) conviction. Crucially, the criminal jury was told that it could find Plaintiff guilty based on any one of four acts she committed during the course of her interaction with the Deputy. Because the jury returned a general verdict, it is not known which act it thought constituted an offense. Although any of the four acts could be the basis for the guilty verdict, Plaintiff’s section 1983 action was based on an allegation that the Deputy used excessive force during only the last one. The court held that if Plaintiff were to prevail in her civil action, it would not necessarily mean that her conviction was invalid; and the action was therefore not barred by Heck. View "GABBI LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA" on Justia Law

Defendants in three consolidated cases were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine on board a vessel, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel, and aiding and abetting. They challenged the district court’s denial of their pre-trial motions to dismiss the indictment. Defendants also argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument. The Defendants made individual claims as well.   Defendants argued that even if outrageous government conduct does not require dismissal of the indictment, the district court should have used its supervisory powers to provide the same remedy, asserting that the government should tread lightly in international waters, and the court should not condone mistreatment of foreigners with no connection to the United States. The Ninth Circuit wrote that pursuant to United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995), that is not a sufficient reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the indictment. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment.   Further, the court held that a court has the power to dismiss an indictment for egregious violations of Rule 5, and that the proper inquiry is whether transportation to the United States as a whole was unnecessarily delayed, rather than whether there was some other district in the United States in which the defendant could have been brought before a magistrate judge more quickly. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in its determination that 23 days was not an unreasonable delay. View "USA V. SEGUNDO DOMINGUEZ-CAICEDO" on Justia Law

Tulelake Irrigation District and associated agricultural groups (collectively “TID”) alleged that, in imposing restrictions on the agricultural uses of lease land in the Tule Lake and Lower Klamath Refuges in the Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge Complex in southern Oregon and northern California, the Service violated environmental laws.   On appeal, TID argued that the Service violated the Kuchel Act of 1964 and the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act as amended by the Refuge Improvement Act (“Refuge Act”). TID argued that in approving the combined Environmental Impact Statement and Comprehensive Conservation Plan (“EIS/CCP”) for five of the six wildlife refuges in the Klamath Refuge Complex, the Service misconstrued the Kuchel Act to require the Service to regulate uses of leased agricultural land in the two refuges to ensure that the uses were “consistent” with “proper wildfowl management.” 16 U.S.C. Section 695n.   The Ninth Circuit rejected TID’s interpretation of Section 695n. The court held that with respect to the textual argument made by TID, the language of Section 695n, whether considered in isolation or in the context of the rest of the Kuchel Act, was unambiguous. The court held that it did not, therefore, need to proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis. The court concluded that the Kuchel Act required the Service to regulate the pattern of lease land agriculture in the refuges to ensure consistency with proper waterfowl management. The court further held that the regulation in the EIS/CCP of agricultural uses of lease land was a proper exercise of the Service’s authority under the Kuchel and Refuge Acts. View "TULELAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USFWS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, became a lawful permanent resident in 1997. Subsequently, he was convicted of four separate crimes in Washington state, including the delivery of a controlled substance. At the time, this offense was an "aggravated felony." and therefore, Petitioner became removable. Petitioner was removed; however, he subsequently re-entered the United States. In 2016, the government detained Petitioner and reinstated his previous removal order.In January 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the reinstatement order, which was ultimately denied. While it was still pending, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen with the immigration judge. The immigration judge denied the motion, Petitioner unsuccessfully filed an administrative appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1231(a)(5), generally bars reopening reinstated orders of removal and that Petitioner did not establish a "gross miscarriage of justice." The Ninth Circuit also held that the agency lacked authority to sua sponte reopen such reinstated removal orders. View "RICARDO BRAVO-BRAVO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Center for Biological Diversity (“CBD”) challenged the Conservation Plan’s pest management approach for the Lower Klamath and Tule Lake Refuges. Western Watersheds challenged the Plan’s limited allowance of livestock grazing on portions of Clear Lake Refuge. Appellants brought their challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, and the Kuchel Act.   The Ninth Circuit considered, and rejected, CBD’s three challenges to the Conservation Plan. First, CBD argued that FWS failed to consider reduced-pesticide alternatives for Lower Klamath and Tule Lake Refuges. The panel concluded that CBD’s arguments were unavailing. FWS adequately explained that some amount of pesticide use was necessary on the Refuges to ensure sufficient crop production, on which Refuge waterfowl now depend. Also, FWS could conclude that reduced-pesticide alternatives would not have been reasonable given the uses and purposes of the Refuges. Thus, NEPA did not obligate FWS to consider reduced-pesticide alternatives.   The court concluded that FWS did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law by continuing to use the PUP process to evaluate potential pesticide applications on the Refuges, and by allowing for pesticide use as a last resort. View "AUDUBON SOCIETY OF PORTLAND V. DEB HAALAND" on Justia Law

The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) adopting a combined Environmental Impact Statement and Comprehensive Conservation Plan (“EIS/CCP”) for five of the six refuges in the Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge Complex (“Klamath Refuge Complex” or “Complex”) in southern Oregon and northern California. challenges to the Service’s action.   The Audubon Society of Portland (“ASP”) brought suit against the Service in the district court, arguing that the EIS/CCP violates the Kuchel Act of 1964 (“Kuchel Act”), the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act as amended by the Refuge Improvement Act (“Refuge Act”), the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) with respect to the Tule Lake and Lower Klamath Refuges in the Complex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Service.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary with respect to the Tule Lake and Lower Klamath Refuges in the Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuge Complex violated various laws. The court explained that two key statutes: the Kuchel Act of 1964, and the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, as amended by the Refuge Improvement Act, govern the Service’s management.   The court concluded that to the degree the present pattern of agricultural leasing in the Tule Lake and Lower Klamath Refuges was consistent with proper waterfowl management in those refuges, the Kuchel and Refuge Acts directed the Service to continue that present pattern of leasing. In reviewing the EIS/CCP, the panel recognized constraints on the Service and deferred to reasoned explanations provided by the Service in support of its decisions. View "AUDUBON SOCIETY OF PORTLAND V. DEB HAALAND" on Justia Law

Starz Entertainment LLC (Starz) entered into two licensing agreements with MGM Domestic Television Distribution LLC (MGM). Starz sued MGM in May 2020, asserting 340 claims of direct copyright infringement, 340 claims of contributory copyright infringement, 340 claims of vicarious copyright infringement, one claim of breach of contract, and one claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MGM moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that many of Starz’s copyright infringement claims are barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Petrella.   The district court concluded that Petrella left unaffected the discovery rule—that under the Copyright Act there exists “a three-year damages bar [under Section 507(b)] except when the plaintiff reasonably was not aware of the infringements at the time they occurred.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.   The court wrote that generally, a copyright claim accrues when the infringement occurs. The court held that Petrella did not do away with the discovery rule, under which a claim alternatively accrues when the copyright holder knows or reasonably should know that an infringement occurred. The court held that the discovery rule allows copyright holders to recover damages for all infringing acts that occurred before they knew or reasonably should have known of the infringing incidents, and the three-year limitations period runs from the date the claim accrued. The court held that the district court correctly applied the discovery rule, thus Plaintiff was not barred from seeking damages for all acts of infringement. View "STARZ ENTERTAINMENT, LLC V. MGM DOMESTIC TELEVISION DISTR." on Justia Law

Google sent an email to users, such as Plaintiff, who had contributed photos to Google maps but had not yet joined the company’s Local Guides Program, inviting them to join the program. Plaintiff joined the Local Guides program and claimed his terabyte of free Google Drive storage. Google advised him the benefit was for two years, and Plaintiff contended that when he read the initial email, he assumed Google was offering a lifetime benefit. In ruling on Google’s summary judgment motion, the district court considered three documents – the photo impact email, the enrollment page, and the Program Rules - and concluded that they did not constitute a unilateral contract offer for one terabyte of free Google Drive storage for life.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court explained that advertisements are not typically understood as offers, but that rule includes an exception for offers of a reward. The operative question under California law is “whether the advertiser, in clear and positive terms, promised to render performance in exchange for something requested by the advertiser, and whether the recipient of the advertisement reasonably might have concluded that by acting in accordance with the request a contract would be formed.”   The court reasoned that the Google documents at issue neither informed users how they might conclude the bargain, nor invited the performance of a specific act, leaving nothing for negotiation. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Google on Plaintiff’s conversion and breach of contract claims. View "ANDREW ROLEY V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law