Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought five claims arising under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”), all concerning alleged wage and hour violations, against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (collectively, “Walmart”). The district court dismissed some of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims on the ground that they were unmanageable and dismissed her remaining PAGA claims as a discovery sanction.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained California’s Labor Code allows employees to sue an employer for violating provisions designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of workers. Following the enactment of PAGA in 2004, employees may stand in the shoes of the Labor Commissioner and recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations. Sections 2699 9(a) and 2699.3 of PAGA contain requirements for such actions.   The court held that the recently decided Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, — S. Ct. —, 2022 WL 2135491, at *3 (2022), case expressly foreclosed Walmart’s argument that Plaintiff was barred from pursuing her PAGA claims because she did not seek class certification under Rule 23. In addition, given their differing coverage, PAGA and Rule 23 are fully compatible and do not conflict for purposes of the first step of an Erie analysis. The court also rejected Walmart’s argument that the district court correctly rejected some of Plaintiff's PAGA claims as unmanageable under its inherent authority. The court held that Rule 26(a) applied to claims for damages. Plaintiff's PAGA claims seek civil penalties, not damages, so Rule 26(a) does not apply to her PAGA claims. View "CHELSEA HAMILTON V. WAL-MART STORES, INC." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. (2022). View "KELLY ANN MCDOUGALL V. COUNTY OF VENTURA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought the action against her former employer Brookdale Senior Living Communities, Inc. (“Brookdale”), pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) Cal. Lab. Code sections 2698-2699.5, allow aggrieved employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of themselves, the state, or other employees. Plaintiff and Brookdale agreed to a settlement. Appellant who was a plaintiff in an overlapping PAGA case against Brookdale, filed a motion to intervene in Plaintiff’s action to object to the PAGA settlement.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to intervene, and dismissed her appeal of the district court’s approval of the PAGA settlement between Plaintiff and Brookdale. The court held that Appellant was not a party to Plaintiff’s case and could not appeal the approval of the PAGA settlement.   The court first considered whether Appellant was entitled to intervene in Plaintiff’s case as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The court held that Appellant’s motion for intervention as a matter of right failed at the fourth and final prong of the Wilderness Society v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011), test, which requires that an applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. Appellant needed to make a compelling showing to demonstrate inadequate representation. The court concluded she failed to make this required showing. As a non-party to this action, Appellant had no right to appeal the district court’s approval of the PAGA settlement. View "CAROLYN CALLAHAN V. BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING CMTY." on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that PeopleConnect used her name and likeness in its Classmates.com school yearbook database without her consent. Plaintiff retained an attorney, who created a Classmates.com account and searched for Plaintiff on the site. In creating the account, the attorney agreed to the Terms of Service, which contained an arbitration provision. Applying Ohio law, the district court denied PeopleConnect’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no evidence that Plaintiff gave her counsel authority to bind her to the Terms of Service containing the arbitration provision.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration in an action involving a right of publicity claim against PeopleConnect, LLC under Ohio law. The panel held that the district court erred in applying Ohio law because Washington law governed the threshold question of arbitrability. Here, because no conflict was shown to exist between the law of Washington (the forum state) and Ohio law, Washington law applied. The court held that on the record before the district court, questions of fact precluded ruling on the motion to compel arbitration.   These questions of fact included: whether Plaintiff and her attorney had an agency relationship when her attorney agreed to the Terms of Service; if they did have an agency relationship, whether and how Plaintiff limited her attorney’s authority as her agent; and whether Plaintiff ratified her attorney’s agreement to arbitrate. The court held further that PeopleConnect had a right to conduct discovery on these and related arbitrability issues before the district court decides the motion to compel arbitration. View "BARBARA KNAPKE V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied Petitioner’s cancellation of removal concluding that his receipt of temporary protected status (“TPS”) was not an admission and, therefore, he could not meet the statutory requirement that he has seven years of continuous residence in the United States after admission. The BIA also denied Petitioner’s application for asylum concluding that his 2016 domestic-violence conviction was a “particularly serious crime” that barred him from relief. Petitioner challenged the BIA’s decision raising two primary arguments: (1) under the court’s precedent, his TPS does constitute an admission “in any status” under the cancellation statute, 8 U.S.C. Section 1229b(a), and (2) the BIA applied an improper legal standard in deciding that his 2016 conviction was for a particularly serious crime.   The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review. The court explained that considering the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 1809 (2021), and the plain language of the TPS statute, 8 U.S.C. Section 1254a(c)(5), the court concluded that the granting of TPS does not constitute being “admitted in any status” under the cancellation statute. The court held that Sanchez effectively overruled circuit precedent requiring consideration of the benefits conferred by an alien’s immigration status in determining whether the alien had been admitted. The court wrote that Sanchez is clear that TPS does not constitute an admission to the United States no matter how great its benefits. The court further rejected Petitioner’s argument that the BIA legally erred in its PSC determination by considering the cumulative effect of his three domestic-violence convictions. View "JOSE HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor daughter, alleged that Defendant, an employee of the Kauai County Police Department, deceived the Hawaii family court when she assisted the non-custodial father of Plaintiff’s daughter in obtaining a temporary restraining order that prevented Plaintiff, the sole custodial parent, from having any contact with her daughter. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant conspired with the noncustodial father and state officials to extract the daughter from her school and place her in the father’s custody without Plaintiff’s knowledge or court order.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of qualified immunity, an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging violations of Plaintiff’s right to familial association.The court stated that although Defendant may ultimately prove that Plaintiff’s allegations were false, at the pleading stage, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. When the alleged events in this case occurred, the law clearly established that a parent and child’s constitutional right to familial association is violated when a state official interferes with a parent’s lawful custody through judicial deception. The law also clearly established that a state official cannot remove a child from a lawful custodial parent without consent or court order unless the official has reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger and, even then, the scope and duration of the removal must be reasonable. Here, Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendant violated these rights by deliberately failing to inform the family court of a custody order. View "HANNAH DAVID V. GINA KAULUKUKUI" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit after the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")dismissed his appeal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1229b(a). Previoulsy, Petitioner had been granted special rule cancellation of removal and adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). However, in 2015, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner after he was convicted of a state-law drug offense. The Immigration Judge found Petitioner was removable because he was ineligible for a second grant of cancellation of a removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1229b(a).The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA, finding that a plain reading of the relevant statutory law supports the Immigration Judge's and the BIA's position. View "MANUEL HERNANDEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the County of San Bernardino and County investigator in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during his murder investigation and prosecution, resulting in his erroneous conviction for the murder of his wife.   Plaintiff alleged that County of San Bernardino investigator fabricated evidence against him by planting. Plaintiff further alleged claims for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the County, arguing that the County’s customs and policies, and the absence of better customs and policies, resulted in the alleged constitutional violations.   The court held that because the district court erred by failing to find potential civil rights liability as to the investigator, its derivative ruling as to potential County liability under Monell should also be reversed. The court further held that the district court erred by not addressing whether Plaintiff could show that he suffered a constitutional injury by the County unrelated to the individual officers’ liability under Section 1983.   Plaintiff put forth at least two Monell claims that were not premised on a theory of liability: (1) that the County’s policy of prohibiting coroner investigators from entering a crime scene until cleared by homicide detectives resulted in the loss of exculpatory time-of-death evidence, and (2) that the lack of any training or policy on Brady by the Sheriff’s Department resulted in critical exculpatory evidence being withheld by the prosecution. The court, therefore, remanded to the district court to consider these claims. View "WILLIAM RICHARDS V. COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO" on Justia Law

Petitioner asserted that, if he were removed to his native country of El Salvador, he would be identified as a gang member based on his gang tattoos and face a significant risk of being killed or tortured. Relying on Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006), the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a clear probability of torture because he did not establish that every step in a hypothetical chain of events was more likely than not to happen.   The Ninth Circuit, in granting Petitioner’s petition for review the court held that the Board erred by failing to adequately consider Petitioner’s aggregate risk of torture from multiple sources, and erred in rejecting Petitioner’s expert’s credible testimony solely because it was not corroborated by additional country conditions evidence.   The court concluded that the Board erred by failing to assess Petitioner’s aggregate risk of torture. Discussing Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011), the court explained that when an applicant posits multiple theories for why he might be tortured, the relevant inquiry is whether the total probability that the applicant will be tortured exceeds 50 percent.   Here, the Board considered Petitioner’s two separate theories of torture as a single hypothetical chain of events and denied his CAT claim because the probability of that hypothetical chain occurring was not high enough. The court concluded that in doing so, the Board misapplied Cole and Matter of J-F-F-.  By requiring Petitioner to show that every step in two hypothetical chains was more likely than not to occur, the Board increased his CAT burden. View "MIGUEL VELASQUEZ-SAMAYOA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

A 2014 act of Congress requires the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to convey Oak Flat to a mining company. In exchange, the mining company was to convey a series of nearby plots of land to the United States (the “Land Exchange”).Plaintiff, a nonprofit organization advocating on behalf of Apache American Indians, sued the government, alleging that the Land Exchange violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), the Free Exercise Clause, and the 1852 Treaty of Santa Fe. The district court denied Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and Plainitff appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that, although the government's action was burdensome, it did not create a "substantial burden" under the RFRA. Next, the court held that the Plaintiff's Free-Exercise claim failed because the Land Exchange was neutral in that its object was not to infringe upon the Apache’s religious practices. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff could not establish that the Treaty of Santa Fe imposes an enforceable trust obligation on the United States. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order denying Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. View "APACHE STRONGHOLD V. USA" on Justia Law