Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff American Savings Bank, F.S.B (“ASB”) sent text messages to his mobile phone without the consent required by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Affirming the district court’s summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit held that under Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017), messages sent by Plaintiff’s phone to ASB’s “short code” number provided the required prior express consent for ASB’s responsive messages.   The district court granted ASB’s motion for an award of costs under Rule 41(d) for costs, including attorney’s fees, that ASB incurred in defending identical litigation commenced and later voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff in the District of Connecticut. Joining other circuits, and reversing in part, the court held that Rule 41(d) “costs” do not include attorney’s fees as a matter of right. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in including attorney’s fees in its award of costs under Rule 41(d).   The court explained that it did not decide if bad faith is sufficient to allow a party to recover attorney’s fees as “costs” under Rule 41(b), as bad faith was not alleged, much less proven, by ASB in the district court. The court did not address whether attorney’s fees are available under Rule 41(b) if the underlying statute so provides because, here, it was undisputed that the TCPA does not provide for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. View "CRAIG MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK" on Justia Law

The California Insurance Commissioner filed an ex parte conservation application to place the California Insurance Company (“CIC I”) in a conservatorship after CIC I’s president attempted to consummate a purchase transaction with Berkshire Hathaway without the Commissioner’s approval, and then attempted to bypass the California insurance regulatory scheme by merging CIC I with the California Insurance Company (“CIC II”), a New Mexico-domesticated shell company formed by the president. The Superior Court granted the Commissioner’s conservatorship application and appointed the Commissioner as Conservator of CIC I. Applied Underwriters, of which the president is the Chief Executive Officer, and CIC II filed separate actions in federal court asserting causes of actions under Section 1983.   The district court dismissed both actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that because important considerations of federalism were at stake, the district court’s reliance on Younger abstention as a ground for dismissal was in error. The court held that an insurance conservatorship is not sufficiently akin to criminal prosecution to bring it within the purview of what constitutes a similar, Younger-eligible “civil enforcement proceeding.”   The court held that dismissal of Appellants’ claims was warranted on account of the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. Further, Appellants’ interests were well represented in the conservatorship action; they had an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges; they failed to sufficiently allege that the conservatorship action was brought in bad faith; they failed to demonstrate irreparable injury arising from extraordinary circumstances which might justify an exception to the prior exclusive jurisdiction rule. View "APPLIED UNDERWRITERS, INC. V. RICARDO LARA" on Justia Law

Denying Petitioner’s motion to recall a mandate, the Ninth Circuit wrote (1) motions that assert a judgment is void because of a jurisdictional defect generally must show that the court lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction, (2) Petitioner has not met that standard in arguing that the statutory “in-custody” requirement was satisfied, and (3) the additional details provided in the motion and accompanying exhibits do not demonstrate the Ninth Circuit’s holding on mootness lacked an arguable basis. View "STEPHEN MAY V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

In Petitioner’s first Section 2255 motion, which the district court denied, Petitioner, argued that his Section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction and sentence were invalid under United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). In the second or successive Section 2255 motion he later sought to file, he again raised a claim that his Section 924(c)(1) conviction and sentence are unlawful under Davis; and he added a claim that under Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), his conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 113(a)(6) and 1153, cannot serve as a predicate crime of violence for his Section 924(c) conviction, because a violation of Section 113(a)(6) can be committed recklessly.   The court held that Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to applications for leave to file second or successive motions under Section 2255. Instead, when faced with an application such as that presented by Jones, the court must ask whether it makes a prima facie showing that the second or successive motion relies on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. Section 2255(h)(2). The court explained here, that Petitioner does not make a prima facie showing that either his Davis claim or his Borden claim satisfies this test. Davis was not “previously unavailable,” and Borden did not state a constitutional rule, but rather a statutory one. View "WILLIE JONES, SR. V. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioner brought suit pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and Arizona state law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in an action brought by Petitioner, a Muslim inmate who alleged that he is unable to pray five times a day, as the Qur’an requires because he is housed with people who harass him as he prays; and who had asked the prison to accommodate his religious practice by housing him exclusively with other prisoners based on their religious beliefs and practices.   The court held that Petitioner’s RLUIPA claim failed because denying his request to be housed only with Muslims was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. The court held that Defendants did not violate Petitioner’s First Amendment free exercise rights because denying Petitioner’s request was also reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest—avoiding the potential legal liability of housing inmates based on their religious beliefs and practices. Denying the request was rationally related to avoiding liability because by denying Petitioner’s requested accommodation, the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry completely eliminated its risk of litigation from other prisoners based on that claim. View "SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL SAUD V. PANNAN DAYS" on Justia Law

Appellants, Medicaid providers and former members of public-sector unions, challenge the district courts’ dismissals of two cases, consolidated on appeal. When Appellants joined the unions, they authorized the California State Controller to deduct union dues from their Medicaid reimbursements. Appellants now contend that, when the Controller made these deductions, she violated the “anti-reassignment” provision of the Medicaid Act, which prohibits state Medicaid programs from paying anyone other than the providers or recipients of covered services.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that California uses some of its Medicaid funding to provide assistance with daily activities to elderly and disabled beneficiaries under a program called In-Home Support Services (IHSS). The recipients of these services are responsible for employing and overseeing the work of their IHSS providers, who are often family members. The Controller makes a variety of standard payroll deductions, including for federal and state income tax, unemployment compensation, and retirement savings. California law also authorizes the Controller to deduct union dues from the paychecks of IHSS providers.   Thus, the court held that the Medicaid Act’s anti-reassignment provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(32), does not confer a right on Medicaid providers enforceable under Section 1983. The text and legislative history of the anti-reassignment provision make clear that Congress was focused on preventing fraud and abuse in state Medicaid programs rather than on serving the needs of Medicaid providers. Because Congress did not intend to benefit Medicaid providers, the anti-reassignment provision did not confer a right as enforceable under Section 1983. View "DELORES POLK V. BETTY YEE" on Justia Law

Appellant defaulted under her Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan by refusing to pay Appellee Bank of New York Mellon (Bank of NYM) after she lost her adversary proceeding challenging the bank’s secured claim. As a result, the bankruptcy court granted Bank of NYM’s motion to convert the bankruptcy case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 and ordered Appellant to turn over undistributed assets in her possession to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Appellant challenged these two decisions in separate appeals.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s orders converting Appellant’s bankruptcy case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 and ordering her to turn over undistributed assets in her possession to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. The court held the bankruptcy court properly exercised its discretion in converting the case to Chapter 7 for cause under 11 U.S.C. Section 1112(b)(1). The court held that the party seeking relief under Section 1112(b)(1) has the initial burden of persuasion to establish that cause exists for granting such relief. The court held that failing to make required payments can be a material default of a Chapter 11 plan, even if the debtor has made payments for an extended period before the default or taken other significant steps to perform the plan. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Appellant’s default in paying Bank of New York Mellon’s secured claim was cause for conversion because both the amount and duration of this default were significant. View "ALLANA BARONI V. DAVID SEROR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, a deputy sergeant with the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force by pepper-spraying her without adequate justification. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for qualified immunity, and Defendant filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit denied a motion for attorney’s fees sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 following the court's decision, in an unpublished disposition, affirming the denial of qualified immunity to a deputy sergeant who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free of excessive force.   The court denied fees because Plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Section 1988(b). The court published this order to reaffirm that a plaintiff who accomplishes no more than to defeat a defendant’s motion for qualified immunity is not entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 1988(b), because the plaintiff has not yet prevailed on any claim. Although the Supreme Court later overruled Cooper in part, on a different issue, the holding in Cooper as to attorney’s fees remained good law. Independently, the court noted its agreement with the rule announced in Cooper, which comports with Supreme Court precedent and accords with holdings by sister circuits in the identical procedural posture. View "LINDA SENN V. KYLE SMITH" on Justia Law

Defendant, who placed Wi-Fi cameras in the eye of a stuffed animal and surreptitiously filmed a teenage girl masturbating, argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he taped the minor surreptitiously and did not cause her “to engage in” sexually explicit conduct. The appeal centered on whether the defendant “used” his minor victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct by taping her in her bedroom, without her knowledge or participation.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a), which criminalizes the conduct of any person who “employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” a minor “to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.”   Applying the broad interpretation of Section 2251(a) adopted in United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2017), the court wrote that the active conduct that is required is that of the perpetrator, not the target of the visual depiction; that the defendant’s placement of hidden cameras in a teenage girl’s bedroom is active conduct in the heartland of a statute criminalizing the production of child pornography; and that the “use” element is satisfied whenever a minor is the subject of the photography. The court concluded that the evidence was, therefore, sufficient under 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and (e) to support the conviction for attempting to “use” a minor “to engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct” for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of that conduct. View "USA V. LORENZO MENDEZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought promotion to the position he claimed he likely would have attained had he not served in the military. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in an action brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act by a longshore worker who returned to employment following service in the U.S. Air Force, and remanded.   The court held that certain hours credits and elevation in longshore worker status, as set forth in a collective bargaining agreement, qualified as “benefits of employment” under USERRA. The court further held that, under the “escalator principle,” Plaintiff could pursue a USERRA discrimination claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to reinstate him to the “Class B” position he was reasonably certain to have attained absent his military service. The court left to the district court to decide in the first instance whether a five-year statutory limitation based on the duration of Plaintiff’s military service applied. View "LEON BELAUSTEGUI V. ILWU" on Justia Law