Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was found guilty of kidnapping and first-degree felony murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that his 1975 California conviction could not be used as an aggravating circumstance under section 13–703(F)(1) of the later-revised Arizona Revised Statutes. He also argued that the use of section 13–703(F)(1) violated his Eighth Amendment rights (this is referred to as the “Eighth Amendment claim”). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected these claims and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s March 2012 opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the district court allowed Petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of its prior dismissal of his ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim as procedurally barred. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s motion to seek leave to file a second or successive habeas motion. The court held that Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed petition meets the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(B). The court reasoned that because Sawyer provides no equitable exception to Section 2244(b)(2)(B)’s requirements, and because Petitioner does not assert that his first claim otherwise meets those requirements, Petitioner’s first claim does not make a prima facie showing that it meets the requirements for an exception to the bar on second or successive petitions. Finally, Petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing in support of his freestanding actual innocence claim. View "FRANK ATWOOD V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his lawsuit alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing and maintaining him in the Terrorist Screening Database and on its constituent No Fly List. After the government removed Plaintiff from the No-Fly List and submitted a declaration stating that he would “not be placed on the No-Fly List in the future” based on “currently available information,” the district court dismissed as moot Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to his inclusion on the No-Fly List and inclusion in the broader Terrorist Screening Database.   The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred by dismissing as moot Plaintiff’s No Fly List claims because the government failed to follow the instructions given by the Ninth Circuit the last time Plaintiff’s case was before the court. The court further held that 49 U.S.C. Section 46110(a) did not divest the district court of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s No Fly List claims. Section 46110 concerns judicial review of orders issued by the TSA Administrator. The court held that Plaintiff was not challenging the TSA Administrator’s decision refusing to remove him from the No-Fly List, he was challenging the Screening Center’s decision to place him on the No-Fly List in the first place. The court held that that both Plaintiff’s substantive due process and non-stigma-related procedural due process claims pertaining to his placement by the Screening Center on the No-Fly List, and his alleged placement in the Database, will be before the district court on remand. View "YONAS FIKRE V. FBI" on Justia Law

In denying Plaintiff’s request for Social Security disability benefits, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to conclude that a person with Plaintiff’s limitations, age, education, and work experience could still perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the ALJ erred in not addressing competing job numbers that her counsel provided using his own methodology.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of a claimant’s application. The court held in the context of similar challenges to ALJ decisions that an ALJ need only explain his rejection of significant probative evidence. The court reasoned that in accordance with Social Security Act regulations, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is entitled to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony to support a finding that the claimant can perform occupations that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.     The court reasoned that to engage in a meaningful review of a disability claim, an ALJ may not ignore significant probative evidence that bears on the disability analysis, but an ALJ need not discuss all evidence that was presented.  Here, Plaintiff’s attorney did not replicate the VE’s methodology, and Plaintiff’s different approach led to different numbers. There is no basis to conclude that these results qualified as significant probative evidence that the ALJ was required to address. View "SARAHROSE KILPATRICK V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his state medical malpractice claim for failing to file a declaration declining to submit the case to arbitration pursuant to RCW 7.70A.020. At issue is: does a Washington state law requiring a claimant to file a declaration declining to submit the case to arbitration when filing a medical malpractice suit apply in federal court?   The Ninth Circuit held that Washington’s declaration requirement conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court held that under Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the state rule did not apply in federal court and the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s malpractice claim because RCW 7.70A.020 does not apply in federal court.   The court reasoned that Washington state law requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit to elect or decline to submit a claim to arbitration at the time suit is commenced. RCW 7.70A.020. If the plaintiff elects not to submit the dispute to arbitration, the plaintiff must meet certain requirements, including filing a declaration at the time of commencing the action that the claimant elected not to submit the dispute to arbitration. The court held that Washington’s state law declaration requirement conflicts Rule 8’s requirements of a short and plain statement of plaintiff’s claim, jurisdictional statement and explanation of the relief sought, and Rule 3, which requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action—and nothing more. View "JEFFERY MARTIN V. PIERCE COUNTY" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging state law claims arising from SelectHealth’s administration of her deceased husband’s MA plan and his death. Under Part C of the Medicare Act, beneficiaries can enroll in an MA plan and receive Medicare benefits through private MA organizations instead of the government. SelectHealth removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of SelectHealth, Inc. because the Medicare Act’s express preemption provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 1395w-26(b)(3), barred Plaintiff’s state law claims.   The court held that Section 1872 of Title XVIII of the SSA provides that Section 205(h) is applicable to cases under the Medicare Act to the same extent as in cases under Title II. The court concluded that enrollees in an MA plan must likewise first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of a claim for benefits.   Next, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were not subject to the SSA’s exhaustion requirement because the dispute was not whether Plaintiff’s husband received a favorable outcome from the internal benefits determination process but rather whether he should have received the services earlier.   Further, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim that SelectHealth breached a duty to process timely her husband’s October 7, 2016, appeal was expressly preempted. Because the standards established under Part C supersede any state law duty that would impose obligations of MA plans on the same subject. View "NAOMI AYLWARD V. SELECTHEALTH, INC." on Justia Law

The FBI issued three national security letters ("NSLs") with indefinite nondisclosure requirements to the appellant communications service provider (“Provider”). Provider complied and took no action until 2018 when it requested that the government initiate judicial review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3511(b)(1)(A)–(B). The district court then reviewed in camera confidential declarations pertaining to the three NSLs and found continued nondisclosure statutorily authorized.   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the nondisclosure requirements in the district court’s order are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security. The court affirmed the district court’s order requiring the recipient of three national security letters to comply with the nondisclosure requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 2709(c) “unless and until the Government informs it otherwise.” The court explained that here, the district court reviewed the three NSLs and related materials in camera and found that, given the important government interests at stake, nondisclosure remained authorized for an indefinite period and court scheduled review was unnecessary to ensure that nondisclosure continued no longer than justified. The communication service provider did not contest the government’s compelling interest or the necessity of continued nondisclosure. The court rejected the provider’s assertion that a district court is constitutionally required on its own accord to schedule future judicial review once it finds a nondisclosure order to be statutorily authorized for the foreseeable future. Finally, the court found no constitutional infirmity in the order of the district court. View "MERRICK GARLAND V. UNDER SEAL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was civilly confined by court order pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”), after a probable cause hearing, but before a full civil commitment trial. While confined by court order in a state hospital, Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability benefits. The Social Security Administration (SSA) approved his application, and he received benefits.   In May 2014, the SSA notified Plaintiff that these benefits had been issued in error, and required him to refund the benefits previously paid. Plaintiff challenged that determination and requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ determined that Section 402(x)(1)(A)(iii) made Plaintiff ineligible for benefits, and ordered him to repay the benefits to the SSA. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the ALJ’s decision and the district court concluded that Plaintiff was not eligible for disability benefits   The Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that the Commissioner did not err in concluding that Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits. The court reasoned the Social Security Act provides that no monthly benefits shall be paid to individuals who are confined at public expense, including someone who “immediately upon completion of confinement” for a criminal sexual offense “is confined in an institution at public expense pursuant to a finding that the individual is a sexually dangerous person or a sexual predator or a similar finding.”  Here, the state trial court’s confinement order in Plaintiff’s case was pursuant to a finding that he was a sexually dangerous person or a sexual predator or a similar finding. View "GEORGE ALLEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged excessive force after being shot by a correctional officer during an incident that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at California’s San Quentin State Prison. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint against Defendant Clawson for failure to state a claim and because Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) before he filed his original complaint. The district court agreed that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim against Defendant at the time he filed his original complaint and dismissed the third amended complaint for lack of exhaustion under the PLRA.   The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred and reversed the district court’s dismissal.  The court clarified the underlying principle in Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017). Jackson made clear that the PLRA does not supplant or modify Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Rule 15 allows plaintiffs, regardless of their incarceration status, to supplement pleadings with leave of court “even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” A prisoner who has fully complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement need not file an entirely new federal case simply because he had not exhausted when he filed his original federal complaint. The parties agreed that Plaintiff had fully exhausted by the time he filed his third amended complaint, which the district court deemed the “operative complaint.” Plaintiff’s operative third amended complaint was the only relevant pleading for purposes of the PLRA exhaustion analysis. View "SHIKEB SADDOZAI V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

As a condition of getting a permit, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Plaintiff, an e-scooter user, filed a complaint alleging that the location disclosure requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur.   Next, the court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court reasoned that Plaintiff could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy because Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily disclosed location data to the e-scooter operators.   Further, the court determined that the nature of MDS location data indicated a diminished expectation of privacy. The data only discloses the location of an e-scooter owned by the operator and typically re-rented to a new user after each individual trip. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the detectives and the City of Henderson (collectively, Defendants) under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case arose following an incident where Defendants believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a series of armed robberies and forcibly tackled him as he was leaving a Nevada state courthouse.   The detectives moved for summary judgment arguing that they are protected by qualified immunity, and the City moved for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. The district court denied the detectives’ motion and denied the City’s motion except as to Plaintiff’s ratification theory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of force was substantial. Although Plaintiff was suspected of a serious crime, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the courthouse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the degree of force used against Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and the detectives were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether they committed a constitutional violation.   The court held that Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) clearly established, that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a relatively calm, non-resisting suspect who posed little threat of safety without any prior warning and without attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest. View "DANIEL ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON" on Justia Law