Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An individual whose nursing license was revoked in 2011 was subsequently excluded from participating in federally funded health care programs, a status that remains ongoing. When she later applied for a job involving health care consulting, the prospective employer requested a background check from a consumer reporting agency. The agency’s report disclosed both her current exclusion from federal health care programs and the fact that her license had been revoked in 2011. As a result, her job offer was rescinded. She disputed the report but was unsuccessful.She then filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the agency violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by including adverse information more than seven years old in its report. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency, holding that reporting the ongoing exclusion was permissible because it was a continuing event, and that reporting the reason for the exclusion (the license revocation) was also allowed. The court further found that, even if there was a violation, the agency’s interpretation of the FCRA was not objectively unreasonable, so there was no negligent or willful violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the agency did not violate the FCRA by reporting the ongoing exclusion, as such exclusions may be reported for their duration and for seven years after they end. However, the court found that reporting the underlying license revocation, which occurred more than seven years before the report, did violate the FCRA. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment because the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not objectively unreasonable, and thus its violation was neither negligent nor willful. View "Grijalva v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of a California corporation, who was represented by a union and covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), brought two lawsuits in state court against her employer. She alleged violations of various California labor and business statutes, including claims for unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, sick leave, wage statement inaccuracies, expense reimbursement, and retaliation. The CBAs included provisions regarding pay, leave, breaks, and a dispute resolution process for grievances.The employer removed both cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing that the employee’s claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which would create federal jurisdiction. The district court determined that only the claims related to untimely wage payments were preempted and thus converted to federal claims under § 301. These federal claims were dismissed because the employee had not exhausted the grievance procedures required by the CBAs. The court found that the remaining state law claims were not preempted, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and remanded those claims to state court. The employer appealed the remand orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because the district court’s remand was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining state law claims were not preempted by § 301, as they arose from California statutes rather than the CBAs and did not require interpretation of the CBAs. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the non-preempted claims to state court. The judgment was affirmed. View "RENTERIA-HINOJOSA V. SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC." on Justia Law

Three California churches sought to challenge the California Child Day Care Facilities Act and its regulations, which require child day care facilities to be licensed, ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their choice as decided by a child’s authorized representative, and provide notice to parents of this right. The churches, which either had their license revoked or had not yet applied for one, alleged that these requirements conflicted with their religious beliefs and practices, particularly their desire to operate preschools with mandatory religious curricula and without state licensure.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the churches’ Free Speech and Free Exercise claims for lack of standing, and their Establishment Clause and Due Process claims for failure to state a claim. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state officials after the churches declined to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the churches lacked standing to challenge the religious services provision under the Free Exercise Clause because there was no credible threat of enforcement against their intended conduct, given the state’s disavowal of such enforcement and the absence of any history of similar prosecutions. However, the court found that the churches had standing to challenge the licensure requirement under the Free Exercise Clause, but concluded that the requirement was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied. The court also rejected the Establishment Clause challenge, finding that the statutory exemptions were based on program type, not religion. The court found standing for the Free Speech challenge to the notice requirement but held that the compelled disclosure was factual, uncontroversial, and reasonably related to a substantial government interest. The Due Process challenge was also rejected. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded to amend the judgment so that the dismissal of the Free Exercise challenge to the religious services provision would be without prejudice. View "FOOTHILLS CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A group of foster children in Oregon, through their representatives, brought a class action lawsuit against the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) and state officials, alleging violations of their substantive due process rights due to serious abuses experienced while in ODHS’s legal custody. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all children for whom ODHS had or would have legal responsibility, including those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically placed with their parents, either because they had not been removed from their homes or because they were on a temporary “Trial Home Visit” after removal.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified a general class that included all children in ODHS’s legal or physical custody. After extensive litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, but disagreed on whether the term “Child in Care” in the agreement included children in ODHS’s legal custody who were physically with their parents (the “Disputed Children”). The district court concluded that these children were not covered by the settlement, reasoning that children living with their biological parents did not have substantive due process rights to be free from serious abuses while in ODHS’s legal custody.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and the scope of substantive due process protections. The Ninth Circuit held that the Disputed Children—those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically with their parents—are entitled to substantive due process protections. The court found that once the state assumes legal custody, it has an affirmative duty to provide reasonable safety and minimally adequate care, regardless of the child’s physical placement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "WYATT B. V. KOTEK" on Justia Law

Three California-based truck drivers who worked for a national transportation company challenged the legality of their employer’s compensation system. The drivers alleged that the company’s pay plan, which combined hourly wages with a bonus based on certain activities, violated California’s Labor Code by failing to properly compensate for nonproductive time and by not reimbursing necessary business expenses, such as personal cell phone use. They also claimed the company failed to provide accurate wage statements and sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) and California’s Unfair Competition Law.After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied class certification and granted summary judgment to the employer on most claims. The court found that the pay plan qualified for a statutory “safe harbor” because it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked, with additional bonuses for certain activities, and thus did not require separate compensation for nonproductive time. The court also found no evidence that the employer knew or should have known about any off-the-clock work. The only claims that proceeded to trial were for failure to reimburse business expenses. At trial, the jury found in favor of the employer, and the court entered judgment accordingly, also awarding costs to the employer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the employer’s pay plan met the requirements of California Labor Code § 226.2(a)(7)’s safe harbor, as it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked and provided additional bonuses. The court also found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding off-the-clock work or wage statement violations, and it upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and award of costs. View "WILLIAMS V. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC." on Justia Law

A Luxembourg-based investment fund and its former General Partner became embroiled in a complex dispute following a contentious split among the fund’s founders. The fund, originally managed by Novalpina Capital Partners I GP S.À.R.L. (Novalpina), saw its General Partner position transferred to Treo NOAL GP S.à.r.l. (Treo) after a vote by limited partners, including the Oregon Public Employees Retirement Fund (OPERF). The fund’s structure involved multiple entities and significant investments, with allegations of improper conduct and maneuvers by both sides during the transition. Novalpina and Treo subsequently initiated several lawsuits in Luxembourg, including actions over control of the fund and claims for financial entitlements.Novalpina filed an ex parte petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, seeking discovery from Oregon officials for use in foreign proceedings, specifically the Veto Right Litigation and a contemplated fraud claim. Treo, Langdon, and Read intervened, and the district court granted the petition, finding statutory and discretionary factors favored Novalpina. The parties negotiated a protective order, which allowed use of the documents in litigation related to the events described in the petition. After Novalpina used the documents in additional foreign proceedings, Treo moved for reconsideration of the discovery grant and to modify the protective order, arguing misuse and misrepresentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Treo’s motions. The Ninth Circuit held that documents produced under § 1782 for use in specified foreign proceedings may be used in other proceedings unless the district court orders otherwise. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Treo’s motion for reconsideration or its request to modify the protective order, affirming the district court’s rulings. View "NOVALPINA CAPITAL PARTNERS I GP S.A.R.L V. READ" on Justia Law

Peter Engilis, Jr. regularly used Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide manufactured by Monsanto, at his homes in Florida from 1990 to 2015. In 2014, he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukemia, a type of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Engilis and his wife filed a lawsuit against Monsanto, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to Roundup. To support their claim, they relied on the expert opinion of Dr. Andrew Schneider, who conducted a differential etiology to determine the cause of Engilis’s cancer.The case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California as part of multidistrict litigation involving similar claims against Monsanto. Monsanto moved to exclude Dr. Schneider’s specific causation opinion, arguing it was unreliable. The district court initially granted the motion without a hearing, but later vacated that order in part and held a Daubert hearing. During the hearing, Dr. Schneider was unable to reliably rule out obesity as a potential cause of Engilis’s cancer, conceding he could not determine whether Engilis was obese and failing to provide a reasoned basis for dismissing obesity as a risk factor. The district court found that Dr. Schneider’s methodology did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and excluded his testimony. With no admissible evidence of specific causation, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Monsanto.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion and its summary judgment order de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Schneider’s opinion because it was not based on sufficient facts or data, as required by Rule 702. The court also clarified that there is no presumption in favor of admitting expert testimony under Rule 702. The summary judgment in favor of Monsanto was affirmed. View "ENGILIS V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury of child molestation after he helped bathe young girls who were in his and his wife’s care through the foster system. The relevant Arizona statute defined child molestation as any direct or indirect touching of a child’s private parts, and, at the time, allowed a defendant to raise an affirmative defense by proving he was not motivated by sexual interest. The petitioner admitted to the touching but argued he lacked sexual motivation.After his first trial ended in a mistrial, the Arizona Supreme Court decided State v. Holle, which held that sexual motivation was not an element of the crime and that the lack of sexual interest was an affirmative defense the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. At the petitioner’s second trial, the court instructed the jury accordingly, and he was convicted on some counts. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Holle, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. The United States Supreme Court also denied certiorari. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the statutory scheme unconstitutionally shifted the burden of disproving an essential element of the crime to him. The district court denied relief, finding the state courts’ application of federal law was not objectively unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that Arizona’s statutory scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving sexual motivation, which is the critical fact distinguishing criminal from innocent conduct. The court concluded that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the conviction was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to grant the writ of habeas corpus. View "BIEGANSKI V. SHINN" on Justia Law

Quintara Biosciences, Inc. and Ruifeng Biztech, Inc. are both DNA-sequencing-analysis companies that had a business relationship from 2013 to 2019. In 2019, the relationship deteriorated, with Quintara alleging that Ruifeng locked it out of its office, took its equipment, and hired away its employees. Quintara then filed suit, asserting a claim under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), alleging misappropriation of nine specific trade secrets, including customer and vendor databases, marketing plans, and proprietary technology.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, referencing a California state law rule, ordered Quintara to disclose its alleged trade secrets with “reasonable particularity” at the outset of discovery. Dissatisfied with the specificity of Quintara’s disclosures, Ruifeng moved to strike most of the trade secrets under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). The district court granted the motion, striking all but two of the trade secrets and effectively dismissing Quintara’s claims as to the others. The case proceeded to trial on the remaining trade secrets, and a jury found in favor of Ruifeng.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s actions. The appellate court held that the district court abused its discretion by striking Quintara’s trade secrets at the discovery stage. The Ninth Circuit clarified that, under the DTSA, whether a trade secret is identified with sufficient particularity is a question of fact to be resolved at summary judgment or trial, not at the outset of discovery. The court reversed the district court’s order striking the trade secrets, affirmed the denial of a mistrial, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The main holding is that DTSA claims should not be dismissed at the discovery stage for lack of particularity except in extreme circumstances, and Rule 12(f) does not authorize striking trade secrets in this context. View "QUINTARA BIOSCIENCES, INC. V. RUIFENG BIZTECH, INC." on Justia Law

Three individuals served as sales agents for a California company that marketed and sold fractional interests in life settlements, which are transactions where investors purchase life insurance policies from insured individuals, pay the ongoing premiums, and receive the death benefit when the insured passes away. The company selected which policies to purchase, determined the purchase price, and managed a complex premium reserve system to fund ongoing premium payments. Investors relied on the company’s expertise in selecting policies and managing the reserve system, and their interests in each policy were fractionalized among multiple investors. When the reserve system failed due to insureds living longer than projected, the company made additional premium calls to investors, and some investors lost their investments if they did not pay.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the three sales agents. The court found that the fractional interests in life settlements were securities under the Securities Act of 1933, that no exemption from registration applied, and that the sales agents had not registered as broker-dealers. The court ordered disgorgement of a portion of the agents’ commissions, imposed civil penalties, and enjoined one agent from future violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the fractional interests in life settlements were investment contracts and thus securities, because investors’ profits depended on the company’s selection of policies, management of the premium reserve system, and the structure of the fractionalized interests. The court also held that the offerings were not exempt from registration as intrastate offerings, as they were integrated and included at least one out-of-state investor. The court affirmed the remedies, finding that investors suffered pecuniary harm through the loss of the time value of their money. View "UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. BARRY" on Justia Law