Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In July 2019, the Appeals Council denied Claimant’s appeal without elaboration. Claimant challenged, among other rulings, the ALJ’s analysis of her testimony. Claimant did not assert any constitutional challenges to the district court. The district court entered a judgment reversing the ALJ’s denial of benefits and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. The Commissioner filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to amend or alter the judgment, arguing that the court had clearly erred by overlooking the ALJ’s explanation for rejecting Claimant’s testimony. The district court agreed with the Commissioner and entered an order granting the Rule 59(e) motion   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the amended judgment in favor of the Commissioner.  The court upheld the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for benefits because claimant did not show that the removal provision caused her any actual harm. Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a district court to alter or amend a judgment if the court determines that its original judgment was clearly erroneous. Because the district court properly concluded that it had clearly erred in its original ruling in favor of Claimant, the court’s granting of the Commissioner’s Rule 59(e) motion fell within the court’s considerable discretion View "JODY KAUFMANN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the National Association of Realtors’ ("NAR") Clear Cooperation Policy, which required members of a NAR-affiliated multiple listing service who chose to list properties on the Plaintiff’s real estate database also to list those properties on an MLS. The district court dismissed on the ground that Plaintiff did not, and could not, adequately allege antitrust injury under Section 1 of the Sherman Act or California’s Cartwright Act because it did not allege harm to home buyers and sellers.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought by Plaintiff alleging that its competitors in the real estate network services market violated antitrust laws because they conspired to take anti-competitive measures to prevent Plaintiffs from gaining a foothold in the market. The court held that Plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of Sherman Act Section 1, which prohibits a contract, combination, or conspiracy that unreasonably restrains trade. The court held that Plaintiff adequately alleged that the Clear Cooperation Policy was an unreasonable restraint of trade because it was a per se group boycott, but the court left it to the district court to determine in the first instance whether it should apply per se or rule of reason analysis at later stages in the litigation. View "THE PLS.COM, LLC V. NAR" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings over sixteen years after the statutory deadline for doing so had passed. He argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled because he allegedly received ineffective assistance of counsel when his prior lawyers did not file earlier motions to reopen on his behalf, even though those motions would also have been untimely.The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial. The court held that Petitioner has not shown that his prior counsel acted deficiently in not filing untimely motions to reopen, nor has he demonstrated prejudice. The court further held that the Board did not err in declining to allow Petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen based on allegedly changed country conditions in Mexico. Further, the court found that even if Petitioner could show deficient performance, he still cannot show prejudice. Finally, although Petitioner submitted articles reporting violence against law enforcement in Mexico, those reports do not suffice to establish changed country conditions because they do not show that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim” now does. View "JUAN HERNANDEZ-ORTIZ V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appeared in ten photoshoots organized by Walmart for a total of fifteen days, in non-consecutive periods of one or two days. Plaintiff sued Walmart for its failure to pay her immediately after each photoshoot ended, seeking more than $540,000 in penalties. The district court denied summary judgment on Walmart’s defense that Plaintiff was an independent contractor outside the protection of the relevant Labor Code provisions due to disputes of material fact. However, it granted summary judgment on Walmart’s good-faith defense. The district court concluded that there was a good faith dispute about whether Plaintiff was an independent contractor that made it objectively reasonable for Walmart to believe Plaintiff was not an employee.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Walmart. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that Walmart was foreclosed from raising a good faith defense based on mistakenly classifying an employee as an independent contractor. The court held that Walmart’s argument that Plaintiff was an independent contractor was a good-faith dispute that any wages are due. The court further held that nothing in the record indicated bad faith on Walmart’s part and that there were some reasonable grounds for Walmart to believe that Plaintiff was an independent contractor. View "BIJON HILL V. WALMART INC." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his untimely motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Although the BIA denied relief on the merits, the BIA lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion to reopen because he was subject to a reinstated prior removal order.   The Ninth Circuit held that it can deny Petitioner’s petition for review based on the BIA’s lack of jurisdiction. The court held that under the Chenery doctrine, the court’s review is typically limited to the grounds upon which the agency relied and that the court should generally remand to the agency. However, the court concluded that the considerations underlying the Chenery doctrine did not apply because the BIA was required to deny Petitioner’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the court concluded that it need not remand for the agency to reach the same conclusion on the BIA’s jurisdiction. Finally, the court noted that denying the petition was consistent with the court’s precedents. View "JOSE GUTIERREZ-ZAVALA V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought benefits under the Social Security Act based on various physical and mental impairments. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that she was not disabled and denied her claim. The district court affirmed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of claimant’s application for benefits under the Social Security Act based on various physical and mental impairments.The court decided that recent changes to the Social Security Administration’s regulations displaced case law requiring an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to provide “specific and legitimate” reasons for rejecting an examining doctor’s opinion. The “relationship factors”, such as length and purpose of the treatment relationship, frequency of visits, and extent of examinations the medical source has performed are still relevant. However, the ALJ no longer needs to make specific findings regarding those factors. Under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.In this case, the ALJ acknowledged the doctor’s opinion that the claimant had marked and extreme limitations in various cognitive areas; but the ALJ found this opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with the overall notes in the record. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding. View "LESLIE WOODS V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the life sentence that an Arizona court imposed on Petitioner for a crime he committed when he was 17-years-old. The state post-conviction court rejected Petitioner’s Miller claim, finding that unlike the individuals sentenced in Miller, Petitioner received an individualized sentencing hearing. The district judge held that the state court’s denial of post-conviction relief was an unreasonable application of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment granting habeas corpus relief to Petitioner. The court held that the state court’s application of Miller was reasonable. Here, the sentencing judge considered Petitioner’s youth and characteristics and concluded that Petitioner warranted a life sentence without the possibility of release. Petitioner argued that there was no practical difference between a sentence of life with the possibility of release and a sentence of natural life. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that despite the practical result, Miller does not mandate resentencing. View "MICHAEL JESSUP V. DAVID SHINN" on Justia Law

After Bacardi began an advertising campaign in November 2013 using the phrase “Bacardi Untameable” to promote its rum products, Lodestar filed suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Bacardi, and held that Plaintiff failed to meet the elements of a trademark infringement action. Plaintiff alleged “reverse confusion”, which occurs when a person who knows of a well-known junior user comes into contact with a lesser-known senior user, and the similarity of the marks causes the individual to believe that the senior user is affiliated or the same as the junior user.   The court found that Plaintiff’s Untamed Revolutionary Rum product should be excluded from the likelihood-of-confusion analysis because it did not reflect a bona fide use of the mark. In applying the Sleekcraft factors, the court found that Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to show a likelihood of confusion. Further, while the district court erred in certain aspects in its consideration, the errors did not alter the ultimate conclusion. View "LODESTAR ANSTALT V. BACARDI & COMPANY LTD." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that law enforcement officers used excessive force in apprehending him after he escaped from a County Jail highway work crew and lived on the lam for three weeks.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of law enforcement officials. The court held that the bodycam footage and audio did not blatantly contradict all of Plaintiff’s testimony. The court viewed the facts blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage in the light depicted by the videotape and its audio to conclude that Plaintiff did not attempt to surrender to the officers. However, the court viewed all other facts, including Plaintiff’s allegation of the post-handcuff beating, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff on summary judgment.   The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged post-handcuff beating and dog-biting were proportional to the threat the officer reasonably perceived by Plaintiff while handcuffed. The court also found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity under Sec. 1983 as to the claimed post-handcuff beating and dog-biting because it was clearly established law that beating a handcuffed convict violates the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court found that the excessive force claims based on failure to intervene and failure to intercede against the other defendants failed. View "COREY HUGHES V. MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of California to decide the certified questions:1.) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at his workplace and brings the virus home to his spouse, does California’s derivative injury doctrine bar the spouse’s claim against the employer?2.) Under California law, does an employer owe a duty to the households of its employees to exercise ordinary care to prevent the spread of COVID-19?A married couple alleged that the husband’s employer negligently allowed COVID-19 to spread from its worksite into the couple’s household. The Plaintiffs contend that the employer knowingly disobeyed the San Francisco Health Order (the “Health Order”) by transferring workers from an infected site to the husband’s job site in disregard of the Health Order’s policies. According to Plaintiffs, the husband was forced to work in close contact with employees from the infected job site and developed COVID-19 which he brought back home. His wife contracted COVID-10 and was hospitalized for a month and kept alive on a respirator.The employer claimed that California law does not recognize the couple’s cause of action. Specifically, the employer argued that the wife’s matter is barred by the derivative injury doctrine, and even if the doctrine does not apply, the employer did not owe her a duty of care. The court concluded that the case presents questions for the California Supreme Court to address. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law