Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a securities fraud lawsuit against Twitter under sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, alleging that Twitter misled investors by hiding the scope of software bugs that hampered its advertisement customization. The panel concluded that securities laws do not require real-time business updates or complete disclosure of all material information whenever a company speaks on a particular topic. Rather, a company can speak selectively about its business so long as its statements do not paint a misleading picture. In this case, Twitter's statements about its advertising program were not false or misleading because they were qualified and factually true, and the company had no duty to disclose any more than it did under federal securities law. View "Weston Family Partnership LLLP v. Twitter, Inc." on Justia Law

Wells pled guilty to the receipt of child pornography. He was sentenced to 76 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release, with 16 special conditions.The Ninth Circuit dismissed, in part, his appeal. Wells signed an unambiguous agreement that knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal. The waiver contained an “illegal sentence” exception and does not apply to a challenge that the sentence violates the Constitution if the constitutional claim directly challenges the sentence itself and is not based on any underlying constitutional right that was expressly waived. The court, therefore, addressed only three constitutional challenges to the supervised release conditions. The court vacated Special Condition 3, a computer ban; its definition of “computer” potentially could be understood to encompass household objects and is unconstitutionally vague. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to delineate explicitly that the prohibition only covers computers and computer-related devices that can access sexually explicit conduct. Because the use of the internet was integral to the offense of conviction, the court rejected a First Amendment challenges to Special Condition 5, an internet ban. Wells argued that Conditions 3 and 5 unconstitutionally delegated authority to the probation officer; the court declined to address that issue because the conditions are not manifestly unjust. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

In 1981, Balla, incarcerated at ISCI, brought a class action suit alleging unconstitutional prison conditions. In 1984, the district court granted injunctive relief related mostly to medical care and physical safety. Since then, the district court has ordered many forms of prospective relief. The district court ultimately held a hearing, found that ISCI had complied with agreed-upon standards and was not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of patients, and terminated all prospective relief, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3626(b).The Ninth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an assertion that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of ISCI's failure to adequately treat the Hepatitis C virus. That evidence did not necessarily answer whether there was an ongoing constitutional violation related to the general provision of healthcare that was required by prior orders. The district court did not clearly err in finding no evidence that ISCI medical staff made choices in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the plaintiffs’ health; the conditions at the Medical Annex did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation because there was no deliberate indifference. There was no evidence there were ongoing problems of the sort that motivated previous population caps and security staffing orders. View "Balla v. Idaho" on Justia Law

New Harvest challenged a Salinas ordinance prohibiting religious and other assemblies from operating on the ground floor of buildings facing Main Street within the downtown area. The ordinance prohibited it from hosting worship services on the ground floor of its newly-purchased building. New Harvest claimed the ordinance substantially burdened its religious exercise and treated New Harvest on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The district court granted the city summary judgment. New Harvest sold the building; the Ninth Circuit treated claims for declaratory and injunctive relief as moot.Addressing claims for damages, the court reversed in part. The ordinance facially violated RLUIPA's equal terms provision. Other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Restricted Area and are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the provision’s stated purpose and criterion. New Harvest failed to demonstrate a substantial burden on its religious exercise; it could have conducted services on the second floor or by reconfiguring the first floor and was not precluded from using other available sites within Salinas. When it purchased the building, New Harvest was on notice that the ordinance prohibited services on the first floor. View "New Harvest Christian Fellowship v. City of Salinas" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought against tobacco companies, alleging that the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) preempts the County of Los Angeles's ban on the sale of all flavored tobacco products. The panel explained that the TCA's unique tripartite preemption structure governs its analysis of these issues. The TCA's text, framework, and historical context reveal that it carefully balances federal and local power by carving out the federal government's sole authority to establish the standards for tobacco products, while preserving state, local, and tribal authority to regulate or ban altogether sales of some or all tobacco products.The panel held that the TCA does not expressly preempt the County's sales ban. In this case, the preemption clause does not cover the County's sales ban, and in the alternative, the savings clause saves the County's sales ban from preemption. Furthermore, given that Congress explicitly preserved local authority to enact the very type of sales ban at issue here, the panel concluded that the TCA does not impliedly preempt the sales ban. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination suit as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Plaintiff's claims stemmed from allegations that UtiliQuest promised him that if he convinced all of his fellow employees to "sign away" their union rights, they would each receive a ten percent raise. However, plaintiff ended up being the only one with the raise. After confronting UtiliQuest of the breach in promise, he was terminated. Plaintiff alleged several California state law claims relating to his termination.The panel concluded that plaintiff's arguments are subject to Garmen preemption, concluding that the risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction was sufficient to outweigh the state's interest in plaintiff's claims; the Board could consider plaintiff's advocacy for his fellow coworkers as concerted activity; and the Board could arguably consider plaintiff as an employee, rather than a supervisor. The panel also concluded that plaintiff's wage and hour claims were subject to claim preclusion in light of the California Superior Court's settlement judgment, which was entitled to full faith and credit. View "Moreno v. UtiliQuest, LLC" on Justia Law

Riley’s Farm provides historical reenactments and hosts apple picking. In 2001-2017, schools within the District took field trips to Riley’s. In 2018, Riley used his personal Twitter account to comment on controversial topics. Parents complained; a local newspaper published an article about Riley and his postings. The District severed the business relationship. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging retaliation for protected speech, the district court granted the District defendants summary judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed as to injunctive relief but affirmed as to damages. Riley made a prima facie case of retaliation; he engaged in expressive conduct, some of the District defendants took an adverse action that caused Riley to lose a valuable government benefit, and those defendants were motivated by Riley’s expressive conduct. There was sufficient evidence that Board members had the requisite mental state to be liable for damages. The defendants failed to establish that the District’s asserted interests in preventing disruption to their operations and curricular design because of parental complaints outweighed Riley’s free speech interests. Even assuming that the selection of a field trip venue was protected government speech, the pedagogical concerns underlying the government-speech doctrine did not apply because Riley was not speaking for the District. Nonetheless, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the damages claim. There was no case directly on point that would have clearly established that the defendants’ reaction to parental complaints and media attention was unconstitutional. View "Riley’s American Heritage Farms v. Elsasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Syrian national living in California as a legal permanent resident and is now a U.S. citizen. She is not and has never been a Kuwaiti national. In 2014, Plaintiff entered into a written employment contract with the Consulate to work as a secretary. Plaintiff alleges that the Consulate created a hostile work environment by harassing, discriminating, and retaliating against her on the basis of her gender, religion, and Syrian national origin, violated various wage and hour laws, and breached her employment contract. Claiming that she was constructively terminated from her employment, she filed suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Consulate’s motion to dismiss. The commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applied. The employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial unless the foreign state shows that the employee’s duties included “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” The district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Plaintiff, who was employed as an administrative assistant, was not a civil servant and that her duties did not include “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” View "Mohammad v. General Consulate of the State of Kuwait in Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law

A putative class action against Roadrunner on behalf of all of Roadrunner’s California current and former hourly workers, alleged violations of California wage and hour laws. Roadrunner removed the case to federal court, invoking the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1711. The district court found that Roadrunner failed to establish the requisite $5 million minimum amount in controversy, and remanded the case to state court.The Ninth Circuit reversed The district court erred in imposing a presumption against CAFA jurisdiction, imposing “an inappropriate demand of certitude from Roadrunner.” Because the plaintiff contested removal, Roadrunner was required to show the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Roadrunner offered substantial evidence and identified assumptions to support its valuation of each claim. The district court erred in assigning a $0 value to five claims where it disagreed with Roadrunner’s calculations. Nothing in CAFA or caselaw “compels such a draconian response when the district court disagrees with a single assumption underlying the claim valuation.” The CAFA amount in controversy requirement was met; using the lowest hourly wage rate identified by the court, the minimum wage claim was reasonably valued at $4.5 million, plus the $2.1 million for two claims accepted by the district court. View "Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transportation Services, Inc." on Justia Law