Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, the petitioner was sentenced to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. While incarcerated, he participated in recidivism reduction programs and earned time credits under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). He continued to accrue these credits while on home confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Upon nearing the end of his custodial sentence, he sought to have his earned time credits applied to reduce both his remaining time in custody and the length of his supervised release. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) applied some credits to end his custody early but refused to apply the remaining credits to reduce his supervised release, arguing that the FSA did not permit such use.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed his habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the government that the FSA time credits could not be used to shorten the term of supervised release. The court found that the credits could only be applied to reduce time in custody, not supervised release, and thus denied the petitioner’s request for relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of the FSA, as well as relevant canons of statutory construction, demonstrate that Congress intended for earned time credits to be applied toward reducing the length of supervised release, not just custodial time. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded with instructions to grant the petition in part, direct the government to recalculate the petitioner’s earned time credits, and provide the recalculation to his probation officer. The main holding is that, under the FSA, earned time credits may be used to reduce the term of supervised release. View "GONZALEZ V. HERRERA" on Justia Law

A nonprofit Christian ministry that provides youth programs in Oregon applied for state grant funding from the Oregon Department of Education’s Youth Development Division. The Division had recently added a rule requiring all grant applicants to certify that they do not discriminate based on religion in employment, vendor selection, subcontracting, or service delivery. The ministry, whose mission is to share Christian teachings, requires all employees and volunteers to affirm a Christian Statement of Faith and be involved in a local church. After initially awarding the ministry a conditional grant, the Division withdrew the award upon discovering the ministry’s religious hiring requirements.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the ministry’s request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the grant and enjoin enforcement of the rule, finding the ministry unlikely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed all claims, including those for damages, based on qualified immunity, even though the defendants had only moved to dismiss the damages claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the rule, as applied to grant-funded initiatives, is likely neutral and generally applicable, thus not violating the Free Exercise Clause, and is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition for participation in the grant program. The court also found that the ministry’s religious autonomy claims were unlikely to succeed, as the relevant doctrines are affirmative defenses, not standalone claims. However, the court held that applying the rule to the ministry’s non-grant-funded initiatives likely imposes an unconstitutional condition on expressive association. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to enjoin enforcement of the rule as to non-grant-funded initiatives, affirmed the dismissal of damages claims due to qualified immunity, and reversed the dismissal of claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "YOUTH 71FIVE MINISTRIES V. WILLIAMS" on Justia Law

A medical school graduate, age 36 at the time of graduation, applied to the neurological surgery residency program at a university medical center but was not ranked or accepted by the program in two consecutive years. The applicant alleged that the refusal to rank him was due to age-based discrimination and retaliation for prior complaints about age-related harassment and discrimination during medical school. The university maintained that the decision was based on the applicant’s mediocre academic performance and poor evaluations during sub-internships, emphasizing the highly competitive nature of the residency program.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the university. The court determined that the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Act) did not apply to the residency selection process because it constituted an “employment practice” of an “employer,” which is expressly exempted from the Act’s coverage. The court also found that, even if the Age Act were applicable, there was no genuine dispute of material fact supporting the applicant’s claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the university’s decision not to rank or admit the applicant to its residency program was an “employment practice of an employer” and therefore not subject to the Age Act. The court further concluded that, to the extent any other allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory acts were identified, the applicant failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SPATZ V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

Capstone Studios Corp., a copyright holder, sought to identify 29 subscribers of CoxCom LLC, an Internet service provider, whose IP addresses were allegedly used to share pirated copies of Capstone’s movie via the BitTorrent peer-to-peer protocol. Capstone petitioned the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii to issue a subpoena under § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to compel Cox to disclose the subscribers’ identities. Cox notified its subscribers, and one, identified as “John Doe,” objected, claiming he had not downloaded the movie and that his Wi-Fi had been unsecured.A magistrate judge treated John Doe’s letter as a motion to quash the subpoena. The magistrate judge found that Cox’s involvement was limited to providing Internet access, qualifying it for the safe harbor under 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), which covers service providers acting solely as conduits for data transmission. The magistrate judge concluded that, as a matter of law, a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue to a § 512(a) service provider. The district court adopted these findings and quashed the subpoena. Capstone’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Capstone appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the DMCA does not permit a § 512(h) subpoena to issue to a service provider whose role is limited to that described in § 512(a), because such providers cannot remove or disable access to infringing content and thus cannot receive a valid notification under § 512(c)(3)(A), which is a prerequisite for a § 512(h) subpoena. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s factual finding that Cox acted only as a § 512(a) service provider. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order quashing the subpoena. View "In re Subpoena Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC" on Justia Law

Two individuals who frequently rented hotel rooms on the Las Vegas Strip brought a class action lawsuit, alleging that several major hotel operators and related entities caused them to pay artificially high prices for hotel rooms. The plaintiffs claimed that these hotels each entered into agreements to license revenue-management software from a single provider, Cendyn, whose products generated pricing recommendations based on proprietary algorithms. The software did not require hotels to follow its recommendations, nor did it share confidential information among the hotels. Plaintiffs alleged that, after the hotels adopted this software, room prices increased.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the complaint, which asserted two claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The first claim alleged a “hub-and-spoke” conspiracy among the hotels to adopt and follow the software’s pricing recommendations, but the district court dismissed this claim for failure to plausibly allege an agreement among the hotels. The plaintiffs later abandoned their appeal of this claim. The second claim alleged that the aggregate effect of the individual licensing agreements between each hotel and Cendyn resulted in anticompetitive effects, specifically higher prices. The district court dismissed this claim as well, finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a restraint of trade in the relevant market.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the independent decisions by competing hotels to license the same pricing software, without an agreement among them or a restraint imposed by the software provider, did not constitute a restraint of trade. The court concluded that neither the terms nor the operation of the licensing agreements imposed anticompetitive restraints in the market for hotel-room rentals on the Las Vegas Strip. View "Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC" on Justia Law

An individual whose nursing license was revoked in 2011 was subsequently excluded from participating in federally funded health care programs, a status that remains ongoing. When she later applied for a job involving health care consulting, the prospective employer requested a background check from a consumer reporting agency. The agency’s report disclosed both her current exclusion from federal health care programs and the fact that her license had been revoked in 2011. As a result, her job offer was rescinded. She disputed the report but was unsuccessful.She then filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the agency violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by including adverse information more than seven years old in its report. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency, holding that reporting the ongoing exclusion was permissible because it was a continuing event, and that reporting the reason for the exclusion (the license revocation) was also allowed. The court further found that, even if there was a violation, the agency’s interpretation of the FCRA was not objectively unreasonable, so there was no negligent or willful violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the agency did not violate the FCRA by reporting the ongoing exclusion, as such exclusions may be reported for their duration and for seven years after they end. However, the court found that reporting the underlying license revocation, which occurred more than seven years before the report, did violate the FCRA. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment because the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not objectively unreasonable, and thus its violation was neither negligent nor willful. View "Grijalva v. ADP Screening and Selection Services, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee of a California corporation, who was represented by a union and covered by two successive collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), brought two lawsuits in state court against her employer. She alleged violations of various California labor and business statutes, including claims for unpaid wages, overtime, meal and rest breaks, sick leave, wage statement inaccuracies, expense reimbursement, and retaliation. The CBAs included provisions regarding pay, leave, breaks, and a dispute resolution process for grievances.The employer removed both cases to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing that the employee’s claims were preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which would create federal jurisdiction. The district court determined that only the claims related to untimely wage payments were preempted and thus converted to federal claims under § 301. These federal claims were dismissed because the employee had not exhausted the grievance procedures required by the CBAs. The court found that the remaining state law claims were not preempted, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and remanded those claims to state court. The employer appealed the remand orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because the district court’s remand was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining state law claims were not preempted by § 301, as they arose from California statutes rather than the CBAs and did not require interpretation of the CBAs. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding the non-preempted claims to state court. The judgment was affirmed. View "RENTERIA-HINOJOSA V. SUNSWEET GROWERS, INC." on Justia Law

Three California churches sought to challenge the California Child Day Care Facilities Act and its regulations, which require child day care facilities to be licensed, ensure that children are free to attend religious services or activities of their choice as decided by a child’s authorized representative, and provide notice to parents of this right. The churches, which either had their license revoked or had not yet applied for one, alleged that these requirements conflicted with their religious beliefs and practices, particularly their desire to operate preschools with mandatory religious curricula and without state licensure.Previously, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the churches’ Free Speech and Free Exercise claims for lack of standing, and their Establishment Clause and Due Process claims for failure to state a claim. The district court entered judgment in favor of the state officials after the churches declined to amend their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the churches lacked standing to challenge the religious services provision under the Free Exercise Clause because there was no credible threat of enforcement against their intended conduct, given the state’s disavowal of such enforcement and the absence of any history of similar prosecutions. However, the court found that the churches had standing to challenge the licensure requirement under the Free Exercise Clause, but concluded that the requirement was neutral and generally applicable, thus subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied. The court also rejected the Establishment Clause challenge, finding that the statutory exemptions were based on program type, not religion. The court found standing for the Free Speech challenge to the notice requirement but held that the compelled disclosure was factual, uncontroversial, and reasonably related to a substantial government interest. The Due Process challenge was also rejected. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment but remanded to amend the judgment so that the dismissal of the Free Exercise challenge to the religious services provision would be without prejudice. View "FOOTHILLS CHRISTIAN MINISTRIES V. JOHNSON" on Justia Law

A group of foster children in Oregon, through their representatives, brought a class action lawsuit against the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) and state officials, alleging violations of their substantive due process rights due to serious abuses experienced while in ODHS’s legal custody. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all children for whom ODHS had or would have legal responsibility, including those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically placed with their parents, either because they had not been removed from their homes or because they were on a temporary “Trial Home Visit” after removal.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon certified a general class that included all children in ODHS’s legal or physical custody. After extensive litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement, but disagreed on whether the term “Child in Care” in the agreement included children in ODHS’s legal custody who were physically with their parents (the “Disputed Children”). The district court concluded that these children were not covered by the settlement, reasoning that children living with their biological parents did not have substantive due process rights to be free from serious abuses while in ODHS’s legal custody.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and the scope of substantive due process protections. The Ninth Circuit held that the Disputed Children—those in ODHS’s legal custody but physically with their parents—are entitled to substantive due process protections. The court found that once the state assumes legal custody, it has an affirmative duty to provide reasonable safety and minimally adequate care, regardless of the child’s physical placement. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "WYATT B. V. KOTEK" on Justia Law

Three California-based truck drivers who worked for a national transportation company challenged the legality of their employer’s compensation system. The drivers alleged that the company’s pay plan, which combined hourly wages with a bonus based on certain activities, violated California’s Labor Code by failing to properly compensate for nonproductive time and by not reimbursing necessary business expenses, such as personal cell phone use. They also claimed the company failed to provide accurate wage statements and sought penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) and California’s Unfair Competition Law.After the case was removed from state court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied class certification and granted summary judgment to the employer on most claims. The court found that the pay plan qualified for a statutory “safe harbor” because it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked, with additional bonuses for certain activities, and thus did not require separate compensation for nonproductive time. The court also found no evidence that the employer knew or should have known about any off-the-clock work. The only claims that proceeded to trial were for failure to reimburse business expenses. At trial, the jury found in favor of the employer, and the court entered judgment accordingly, also awarding costs to the employer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the employer’s pay plan met the requirements of California Labor Code § 226.2(a)(7)’s safe harbor, as it paid at least minimum wage for all hours worked and provided additional bonuses. The court also found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding off-the-clock work or wage statement violations, and it upheld the district court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and award of costs. View "WILLIAMS V. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC." on Justia Law