Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) awarded “incentive adders,” upward adjustments to utilities’ rate of return on equity, to three California-based public utilities. FERC regulations allow for incentive adders to induce voluntary membership in independent system operators. The Ninth Circuit previously concluded that FERC improperly awarded incentive adders to PG&E without considering the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) assertion that PG&E’s membership in the California independent system operator (CAISO) is mandated. The court directed FERC to “inquire into PG&E’s specific circumstances, i.e., whether it could unilaterally leave the C[AISO].” On remand, FERC concluded that membership in CAISO is voluntary.The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision, holding that its previous decision did not resolve whether California law prevented the utilities from leaving CAISO without approval. FERC did not deviate from the mandate on remand. There was no error in FERC’s conclusion that membership in CAISO was voluntary despite a contrary suggestion in a CPUC 1998 Decision. FERC was not required to apply the Erie doctrine and defer to California’s interpretation. The incentive adder and its requirements arose from federal law. The California Supreme Court has not decided whether membership in CAISO is voluntary; no California Code provision mandates CAISO membership, and no case law discusses whether CAISO members must remain such. California courts would not defer to the CPUC’s 1998 Decision because it was inconsistent with the statute. View "California Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied Munoz-Gonzalez’s application to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)) was invalid because his predicate crime (racketeering) is no longer a categorical “crime of violence” under a new rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court in “Davis” (2019).The new “Davis” argument was not “previously unavailable,” as required for authorization of a second or successive 2255 motion. A prisoner must show that real-world circumstances prevented him, as a practical matter, from asserting his "new rule of law" claim in his initial habeas proceeding. While pro se prisoners face unique difficulties and language barriers add to those difficulties, the limited exception to the broad prohibition on successive habeas proceedings should not be applied subjectively. Focusing on external barriers, the court noted “Davis” was issued before Muñoz-Gonzalez filed his reply brief for his initial habeas motion. He had the facts that he needed for his claim; no systemic or external barrier prevented him from presenting his claim; Muñoz-Gonzalez was clearly aware of Davis because he cited it in his reply brief in his initial habeas proceeding. View "Gonzalez v. United States" on Justia Law

CalChamber filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, to “vindicate its members’ First Amendment rights to not be compelled to place false and misleading acrylamide warnings on their food products.” The district court entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the Attorney General and related entities, including private enforcers from pursuing new lawsuits to enforce Proposition 65's requirement that “[n]o person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause cancer . . . without first giving clear and reasonable warning.”The Ninth Circuit affirmed. CalChamber was likely to succeed on the merits of its compelled speech claim. Given the robust disagreement by reputable scientific sources over whether acrylamide in food causes cancer in humans, the warning was controversial and misleading. Proposition 65’s enforcement regime created a heavy litigation burden on manufacturers who use alternative warnings rather than the regulatory safe harbor warning. The serious constitutional issue provided sufficient reason to enjoin Proposition 65 acrylamide litigation until the case was finally decided; the injunction was not an impermissible prior restraint. CalChambers established irreparable harm, and the scope of the injunction was not impermissible; and the balance of hardships weighed in CalChamber’s favor. The injunction was in the public interest. View "California Chamber of Commerce v. Council for Education and Research on Toxics" on Justia Law

Food manufacturer B&G sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Embry and her attorney violated B&G’s constitutional rights by suing B&G to enforce California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Proposition 65. Proposition 65 requires businesses to notify customers if their products contain chemicals known to the state to cause cancer. Acrylamide, the chemical allegedly found in B&G’s Cookie Cakes, is on a state list of such chemicals based solely on laboratory studies in which pure acrylamide was given to rats or mice.The district court dismissed B&G’s complaint based on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which provides that those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. B&G’s section 1983 suit burdened Embry's petition activities; Embry's prelitigation communications and suit to enforce Proposition 65 were protected by the Petition Clause. B&G failed to show that any of the Noerr-Pennington sham exceptions applied. Even if Embry and her attorney were state actors, the suit was barred. The court remanded to allow B&G to amend its complaint. B&G proposed additional allegations concerning a sham exception that examines the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s suit and the defendant’s subjective motivation. View "B&G Foods North America, Inc. v. Embry" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the EPA’s conditional registrations for three dicamba-based herbicides as violating the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136n(b). The court found that the EPA substantially understated risks that it acknowledged and failed entirely to acknowledge other risks. In a subsequent petition, seeking attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412(d)(1)(A), the plaintiffs in the underlying action argued that their requested attorneys’ fees should be calculated based on the market rates in San Francisco, where their petition for review was calendared for oral argument. Only one of their four attorneys is located in San Francisco. The other three are located in Portland.The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Where, as here, attorneys’ fees are incurred in connection with a petition for review in a court of appeals under FIFRA, the presumptive relevant community for calculating market rates is the legal community where counsel are located and where they do the bulk of their work. View "National Family Farm Coalition v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment setting aside a land-exchange agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and King Cove, an Alaska Native village corporation. King Cove seeks to use the land it will obtain in the exchange to build a road through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge to allow access to the city of Cold Bay.The panel explained that one of the purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) is to address the economic and social needs of Alaskans. The panel concluded that the Secretary appropriately weighed those needs against the other statutory purposes in deciding whether to enter the land-exchange agreement. The panel disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the Secretary violated the Administrative Procedure Act by departing from his predecessor's position on the land exchange without adequate explanation. Rather, the panel concluded that the Secretary acknowledged the competing policy considerations and that the prior findings that keeping the area roadless would best protect the habitat and wildlife of the Izembek Refuge. Finally, the panel concluded that the land-exchange agreement is not subject to the special procedures that ANILCA requires for the approval of transportation systems. The panel agreed with the government that the Secretary need not follow the process because 16 U.S.C. 3192(h), the land-exchange provision that he invoked, was not an "applicable law" for purposes of Title XI of ANILCA. View "Friends of Alaska National Wildlife Refuges v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of California the following question: Does California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent of an employer,” Cal. Gov’t Code 12926(d), permit a business entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable for employment discrimination? View "Raines v. U.S. Healthworks Medical Group" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Nevada the following question: Under Nevada law, must a series LLC created pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 86.296 be sued in its own name for a court to obtain jurisdiction over it, or may the master LLC under which the series is created be sued instead? View "Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Saticoy Bay, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) and affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment to DePuy and Plaintiff Waber. Waber was hired by HOC and signed an employment contract with HOC's parent company, Stryker, which included restrictive one-year non-compete clause and forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring adjudication of contract disputes in New Jersey.The panel concluded that, as the actual employer that participated in the proceedings to enforce its parent corporation’s forum-selection clause, HOC has a right to appeal the adverse decision of the district court on that issue. Furthermore, HOC properly became a party to this litigation in the district court case, albeit after the district court denied the motion to transfer. Accordingly, the panel has jurisdiction to hear HOC's appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1201. The panel held that the state law applicable here, Cal. Labor Code 925(b), which grants employees the option to void a forum-selection clause under a limited set of circumstances, determined the threshold question of whether Waber's contract contained a valid forum-selection clause. In this case, Waber satisfied all the prerequisites of section 925 and effectively voided the forum-selection clause under section 925(b). Finally, HOC presents no persuasive reason for the panel to overturn the district court's ruling of partial summary judgment in favor of DePuy and Waber that the forum-selection, non-compete and non-solicitation clauses were void under California law. View "DePuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal as untimely of a complaint brought by plaintiff, a former university student, alleging civil rights claims arising from on-campus incidents where he was issued a disciplinary warning, which was later removed. Citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), plaintiff argues that his claims did not accrue until the university withdrew its disciplinary warning against him. However, the panel held that neither Heck nor a Heck-like rule of delayed accrual applies here. The court explained that there was no conviction or confinement here, and plaintiff's claims were not properly analogized to the tort of malicious prosecution, either factually or legally. In this case, plaintiff had complete and present causes of action by August 24, 2017, at the latest. But plaintiff did not file his complaint until January 20, 2020, more than two years later. Therefore, under traditional accrual principles, his action is untimely. View "Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University" on Justia Law