Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Falck is the parent company of subsidiaries that provide emergency medical care. A Falck subsidiary contracted with Griffith for consulting services. Griffith authorized the subsidiary to use Griffith’s proprietary information to support its bids. Years later, Griffith sent a cease-and-desist letter, claiming that Falck had used Griffith’s proprietary information without consent. Griffith shared its cease-and-desist letter with Falck’s competitor, who sent the letter to local media.Griffith sued Falck for intellectual property infringement and unfair competition in California, hours before Falck sued Griffith for defamation and breach of contract in Texas. The Texas court transferred Falck’s suit. The cases were consolidated in California, where Griffith moved to strike and dismiss the defamation claims in Falck’s First Amended Complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP rule. Falck was allowed to amend its complaint. Griffith moved to dismiss Falck’s Second Amended Complaint and appealed the order denying its anti-SLAPP motion to strike the original complaint.The Ninth Circuit dismissed Griffith’s appeal as moot because it could no longer grant any effective relief on the original complaint. Griffith has not appealed the decision to allow the Second Amended Complaint. Griffith did not appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the original complaint until the Second Amended Complaint had been filed. The Second Amended Complaint made the original complaint no longer operative. View "Falck Northern California Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Solutions, LLC," on Justia Law

Hansen operated AHA, which ran a program that purported to help undocumented immigrants become U.S. citizens through adult adoption. Hansen falsely told victims that many immigrants had become U.S. citizens through the Program. No one had achieved U.S. citizenship through the Program; it is not possible to become a U.S. citizen through adult adoption. At least 471 victims participated in the Program; each paid between $550 and $10,000. Hansen was convicted of 12 counts of mail fraud, three counts of wire fraud, and two counts of encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for private financial gain.The Ninth Circuit vacated Hansen's convictions for encouraging or inducing an alien to reside in the U.S. for private financial gain, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Subsection (iv) is overbroad and unconstitutional. Subsection (iv) prohibits someone from inspiring, helping, persuading, or influencing, through speech or conduct, one or more specified aliens to come to or reside in the United States in violation of civil or criminal law. The court rejected an argument that subsection (iv) is limited to speech integral to criminal conduct--solicitation and aiding and abetting. Subsection (iv) covers a substantial amount of speech protected by the First Amendment, given that many commonplace statements and actions could be construed as encouraging or inducing an undocumented immigrant to come to or reside in the U.S. Subsection (iv)’s narrow legitimate sweep pales in comparison to the protected expression encompassed by the subsection. View "United States v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Ruiz-Colmenares, a Mexican citizen, has illegally entered the U.S. multiple times, wherein he was convicted for multiple felonies. He has been deported three times. During his fourth deportation, Ruiz-Colmenares expressed for the first time a fear of returning to Mexico and that he had been robbed and assaulted by police officers in Mexico. After finding Ruiz-Colmenares not credible, an IJ rejected his claim for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting an argument that the agency lacked jurisdiction because his charging document omitted the time and date of his hearing, That argument was not presented before the IJ or BIA. The adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, based on inconsistencies and omissions in Ruiz-Colmenares’s written, verbal, and documentary evidence regarding what happened in Mexico. Even minor inconsistencies that have a bearing on a petitioner’s veracity may constitute the basis for an adverse credibility determination; “this type of evolving story is precisely what one would expect if a petitioner is fabricating or embellishing past harms.” The agency properly considered Ruiz-Colmenares’ failure to mention fear of returning to Mexico, or the robberies, during previous deportation proceedings. Even if the record compelled reversal of the adverse credibility determination, substantial evidence supports the finding that Ruiz-Colmenares did not suffer past torture and does not face a particularized risk of future torture if returned to Mexico. View "Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland" on Justia Law

Tzompantzi-Salazar unsuccessfully sought to reopen his removal proceedings arguing that his Notice to Appear (NTA) did not include the time and date of his hearing. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review.Tzompantzi-Salazar’s current proceeding was initiated with a different charging document, a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, so the Supreme Court’s “Pereira” holding is inapplicable. When hearing details are later provided, as they were here, there is no jurisdictional defect.Substantial evidence supported the Board’s denial of Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. Tzompantzi-Salazar could avoid any risk of future torture by relocating to his home state in central Mexico, Tlaxcala—thousands of miles from the border where his two kidnappings allegedly occurred. For CAT applications, the agency must consider the possibility of relocation without regard for the reasonableness of relocation that is considered in other types of applications. The remaining CAT factors did not change the result. Although past torture can be relevant in assessing an applicant’s risk of future torture, CAT relief is “forward-looking.” Tzompantzi-Salazar’s previous kidnappings, even assuming they occurred as described, do not establish that he continues to face a risk of torture more than 10 years later. Nor did the record compel the conclusion that the kidnappings rose to the level of torture. Country conditions evidence and context also undercut Tzompantzi-Salazar’s belief that he faces the extremely high threshold of future torture. View "Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) prohibits credit reporting agencies from disclosing in a credit report “[a]ny . . . adverse item of information . . . which antedates the report by more than seven years,” 15 U.S.C. 1681c(a)(5). The Ninth Circuit previously held that Screening Pros, a credit reporting agency, violated FCRA when, in 2010, it issued a tenant screening report that disclosed a criminal charge that was filed against Moran in 2000 (beyond the seven-year window) but dismissed in 2004 (within the seven-year window).On remand, the district court granted Screening Pros summary judgment, holding that Moran failed to present evidence that Screening Pros violated the FCRA willfully or negligently, as required for liability. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. To prove a negligent violation of the FCRA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted pursuant to an objectively unreasonable interpretation of the statute. A plaintiff can prove a willful violation by showing a knowing or a reckless violation of a standard. Screening Pros’ interpretation of the FCRA was not objectively unreasonable. Screening Pros presented evidence that its interpretation was consistent with industry norms; the FTC’s only guidance at the time appeared to permit reporting the criminal charge. View "Moran v. The Screening Pros, LLC" on Justia Law

At age 15, Mendoza joined the Canta Ranas Organization (CRO), a Californian gang known for violent extortion and drug distribution. The government alleged that Mendoza continued as an active gang member until 2016, when he was arrested during federal law enforcement’s takedown of the CRO, citing incidents in 2013 and 2016 when police caught Mendoza with a handgun and methamphetamine and text message conversations in which Mendoza asked CRO members for methamphetamine. Mendoza admitted to methamphetamine addiction but denied continued CRO membership, claiming that the methamphetamine with which he was found was for his own consumption.The Ninth Circuit vacated his convictions for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846; RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” or “in furtherance of” a crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Even making all reasonable inferences in the prosecution’s favor, the government did not establish the “prolonged and actively pursued course of drug sales” for which the court looks when deciding, absent direct evidence of an agreement, whether there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to distribute drugs. No reasonable jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza was part of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Because the RICO conspiracy case turned on the same evidence, there is likewise insufficient evidence to support that conviction. Mendoza’s firearm conviction is unsupported by sufficient evidence. View "United States v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without leave to amend of a complaint brought by plaintiffs, a group of elected local government officials, asserting a pre-enforcement challenge to California Government Code section 3550, which states in part that a public employer shall not deter or discourage public employees from becoming or remaining members of an employee organization.The panel concluded that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish their standing to pursue their preenforcement challenge. The panel explained that section 3550 does not regulate plaintiffs' individual speech, and any restrictions the statute does impose on plaintiffs' ability to speak on behalf of their employers do not injure plaintiffs' constitutionally protected individual interests. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they have a well-founded fear that PERB will impute these statements to plaintiffs' public employers, particularly in light of concessions made by PERB in this litigation.However, dismissals for lack of Article III jurisdiction must be entered without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction is powerless to reach the merits. In this case, the district court erred by dismissing the case with prejudice. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court to enter judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. View "Barke v. Banks" on Justia Law

Singh, a citizen of India, entered the U.S. without inspection. DHS served him with a Notice to Appear that did not provide a date or time for Singh’s removal hearing, instead stating that the date and time were “TBD.” DHS released Singh after he posted a bond. Singh then traveled to Indiana to live with a friend but provided the immigration court with the address of the friend’s other residence because it was the more reliable mailing address. The immigration court sent multiple hearing notices to the address, but his friend did not promptly forward them to Singh. An IJ ordered him removed in absentia.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh’s petition for review. Noncitizens must receive a Notice to Appear in a single document specifying the time and date of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings, otherwise, any in absentia removal order directed at the noncitizen is subject to rescission. 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The omission of the time or date of a removal hearing cannot be cured by a subsequent hearing notice; such an interpretation would contravene the unambiguous statutory text and the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Niz-Chavez" decision. The government must provide all statutorily required information in a single Notice to Appear, not only to trigger the stop-time rule but for all removal proceedings that require notice pursuant to section 1229(a). View "Singh v. Garland" on Justia Law

The "borrower defense" cancellation of federal student loans is allowed in certain cases of school misconduct, 20 U.S.C. 1087e(h). After DeVos became the Secretary of the Department of Education, the Department used a new methodology to decide borrower defense claims. The Department was preliminarily enjoined from using that methodology. From June 2018-December 2019, the Department issued no borrower defense decisions. Individuals with pending applications sued. The parties negotiated a proposed settlement that included an 18-month deadline to resolve outstanding claims. Before the class fairness hearing, the Department sent out form letters denying borrower defense applications at a rate of 89.8%. The district court denied final approval of the settlement and ordered updated written discovery. Plaintiffs took four depositions of Department officials and received about 2,500 documents. In 2021, after DeVos resigned as secretary, the district court authorized class counsel to take her deposition. Plaintiffs then served a subpoena for a nonparty deposition on DeVos under FRCP 45.The Ninth Circuit quashed the subpoena. Compelling the testimony of a cabinet secretary about the actions she took as a leader in the executive branch is allowable only in extraordinary circumstances. The party seeking the deposition must demonstrate agency bad faith and that the information sought from the secretary is essential to the case and cannot be obtained in any other way. There was no indication that DeVos held information that was essential to the case or that it was otherwise unobtainable. View "In re: United States Department of Education" on Justia Law

Tecuya Ridge, within the Los Padres National Forest, is home to densely populated forest stands that the Forest Service determined to be at risk of destruction by wildfire. The Tecuya Ridge Shaded Fuelbreak Project authorized thinning 1,626 acres of forest, including approximately 1,100 acres within the protected Antimony Inventoried Roadless Area. The Roadless Area Conservation Rule generally prohibits timber cutting, sale, or removal in areas like Antimony, with some exceptions.The Ninth Circuit vacated the approval. The Service’s conclusion that the Project was consistent with the Rule was arbitrary and capricious as was its determination that 21-inch diameter trees were “generally small timber.” The Service’s determination that the Project will “maintain or improve” Antimony’s characteristics was not arbitrary; the Service articulated a satisfactory explanation. The decision to “categorically exclude” the Project from review in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, under the National Environmental Policy Act was not arbitrary and capricious. The court agreed that Categorical Exclusion 6 (CE-6) applied and that no extraordinary circumstances prevented CE-6's application to the Project. Consistent with 36 C.F.R. 220.6, the Service analyzed each resource condition that should be considered in determining whether there were extraordinary circumstances related to the proposed action and determined that the Project would have “no significant impact” on each. The decision to locate the Project in the “wildland zone” instead of the “threat zone” was not arbitrary. View "Los Padres ForestWatch v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law