Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jackson violently attacked his girlfriend. The entire attack lasted six-seven minutes. Jackson was convicted of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6), and kidnapping, section 1201(a)(2).The Ninth Circuit reversed the kidnapping conviction. In kidnapping prosecutions under section 1201(a)(2), courts should consider the factors set forth in precedent to evaluate whether the charged conduct constitutes kidnapping. Applying those factors, the court concluded that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a kidnapping occurred. The first factor, the duration of the holding, weighs against kidnapping, as a seven-minute holding would be quite brief on the spectrum of possible kidnappings. The second and third factors—the presence of a separate offense and the degree to which the holding was inherent in the other offense—strongly indicate that there was no kidnapping. The primary conduct here was an assault causing serious bodily injury, which inherently requires the defendant to keep the victim in close enough proximity to inflict the injuries. The fourth factor, whether the holding created significant danger independent of the separate offense, also weighs against classifying the conduct as kidnapping. To the extent that there was any confinement separate from the assault, it was not an independent source of danger. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Schlenker pled guilty to second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111 and 1153(a), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A). In his plea agreement, he waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, except for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After his sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the residual clause of section 924(c)(3), definition of a “crime of violence,” was unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth Circuit then held that second-degree murder is not a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of section 924(c)(3). Schlenker sought to challenge the validity of his section 924(c) sentence in a habeas proceeding but prosecutors responded that the government would consider the filing of such an action to be a breach of the plea agreement.Schlenker then filed a civil action seeking a declaration that filing a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion would not breach the plea agreement and to clarify the terms of the plea agreement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. The district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no “case or controversy” as required under Article III. Schlenker’s declaratory action and motion to clarify improperly sought to carve out a collateral legal issue—the validity and scope of the collateral attack waiver—from a potential section 2255 motion, and to use the Declaratory Judgment Act as a substitute to challenge his sentence. View "United States v. Schlenker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Oakland’s Uniform Residential Tenant Relocation Ordinance, which requires landlords re-taking occupancy of their homes upon the expiration of a lease to pay tenants a relocation payment. Plaintiffs alleged that the relocation fee is an unconstitutional physical taking of their money for a private rather than public purpose, without just compensation. Alternatively, they claimed that the fee constitutes an unconstitutional exaction of their Oakland home and an unconstitutional seizure of their money under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Although in certain circumstances money can be the subject of a physical (per se) taking, the relocation fee required by the Ordinance was a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship, not an unconstitutional taking of a specific and identifiable property interest. Because there was no taking, the court did not address whether the relocation fee was required for a public purpose or what just compensation would be. The court rejected an assertion that Oakland placed an unconstitutional condition (an exaction), on their preferred use of their Oakland home. The plaintiffs did not establish a cognizable theory of state action; Oakland did not participate in the monetary exchange between plaintiffs and their tenants. View "Ballinger v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, when an employer withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan, the employer is required to pay for its share of unfunded benefits. Withdrawal liability may be paid in annual installments, calculated in part based on the “highest contribution rate” the employer was required to pay into the plan during a specified time period. When a multiemployer plan is underfunded and in critical status, the employer must pay a surcharge of five or 10 percent of the total amount of contributions the employer was required to make to the plan each year.The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant in an action brought by a multiemployer pension plan, seeking a recalculation of the defendant’s annual withdrawal liability payments. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. For purposes of determining an employer’s annual withdrawal payment, a surcharge paid by the employer when a plan is in critical status is not included in the calculation of the “highest contribution rate.” The surcharge automatically imposed on an employer when a plan is in critical status does not increase the applicable contribution rate, which in this case is the dollar amount per compensable hours. View "Western States Office and Professional Employees Pension Fund v. Welfare & Pension Administration Service, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court dismissed a suit alleging that a price plan adopted by Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District (SRP) unlawfully discriminated against customers with solar-energy systems and was designed to stifle competition in the electricity market.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, applying Arizona’s notice-of-claim statute, which provides that persons who have claims against a public entity, such as SRP, must file with the entity a claim containing a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ equal protection claim as barred by Arizona’s two-year statute of limitations. The claim did not accrue when SRP approved the price plan, but rather when plaintiffs received a bill under the new rate structure. The plaintiffs alleged a series of violations, each of which gave rise to a new claim and began a new limitations period.Monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under the Sherman Act were not barred by the filed-rate doctrine, which bars individuals from asserting civil antitrust challenges to an entity’s agency-approved rates. SRP was not entitled to state-action immunity because Arizona had not articulated a policy to displace competition.The Local Government Antitrust Act shielded SRP from federal antitrust damages because SRP is a special functioning governmental unit but the Act does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief. The district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege antitrust injury based on the court’s finding that the price plan actually encouraged competition in alternative energy investment. View "Ellis v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District" on Justia Law

An attorney sought guidance on how a physician could administer psilocybin to a terminally ill patient without incurring liability under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), specifically asking the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) how the CSA would accommodate the Right to Try Act (amending the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) to give patients the possibility of access to new investigational drugs under certain circumstances. The DEA responded by identifying the available exemptions in the CSA and indicating that the Right to Try Act did not create any additional exemptions.The Ninth Circuit dismissed a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that DEA’s response was not a final decision of the Attorney General under 21 U.S.C. 877. To be considered final, the agency action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process and must be one where rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences flow. The DEA’s response was the sort of advice letter that agencies prepare multiple times a year. There was no indication that the letter represented the consummation of a decision-making process. The letter did not lead to legal consequences for the prescribing physician but only provided guidance about the interaction of the Right to Try Act and the CSA. View "Advanced Integrative Medical Science Institute v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

In 2018, the FCC stopped treating broadband internet services as “telecommunications services” subject to relatively comprehensive, common-carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act, and classified them under Title I as lightly regulated “information services,” with the result of terminating federal net neutrality rules. Trade associations sought an injunction to prevent the California Attorney General from enforcing SB-822, which essentially codified the rescinded federal net neutrality rules, limited to broadband internet services provided to California customers.The district court concluded there was no federal preemption. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the California law. The court cited a 2019 D.C. Circuit decision, upholding the FCC’s 2018 reclassification but striking an order preempting state net neutrality rules. The court rejected arguments that SB-822 nevertheless was preempted because it conflicted with the policy underlying the reclassification and with the Communications Act or because federal law occupies the field of interstate services. Only the invocation of federal regulatory authority can preempt state regulatory authority; by classifying broadband internet services as information services, the FCC no longer had the authority to regulate in the same manner that it did when these services were classified as telecommunications services. The FCC, therefore, could not preempt state action, like SB-822, that protects net neutrality. SB-822 did not conflict with the Communications Act, which only limits the FCC’s regulatory authority. The field preemption argument was foreclosed by case law. View "ACA Connects v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ceja’s conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least 50 grams, distribution of methamphetamine in the amount of at least five grams, and distribution of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school.Ceja’s oral jury trial waiver was valid, although the district court did not inform him that he could take part in jury selection or that the jurors would be members of his community. The colloquy was adequate to ensure that Ceja knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his trial. Because the jury trial waiver was conducted orally through a court interpreter, Ceja’s language skills were not a barrier; there is no evidence that Ceja suffers from emotional or cognitive disabilities.Upholding the denial of Ceja’s motion for substitute counsel, the court held that, given the colloquy's subject matter (dissatisfaction with Ceja's counsel’s suggested outcomes), the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarizing its ruling using the language of “inadequacy” rather than “conflict.” The court’s inquiry, though brief, was adequate to discern Ceja’s complaints. A rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government could find that Ceja distributed 50 grams of methamphetamine in one distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. Upholding the application of the career offender sentencing enhancement, the court reasoned that California’s definition of methamphetamine is a categorical match to the definition under federal law. View "United States v. Ceja" on Justia Law

In an action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the district court entered an injunction, requiring Nevada prison officials to allow the plaintiff to possess no more than a half-ounce of scented oil in his cell for personal use with his prayers.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Noting RLUIPA's expansive protections for religious liberty, the court concluded that Nevada’s regulation banning personal possession of scented oil substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise and that Nevada failed to show that the regulation was the least restrictive means of serving compelling interests in general prison security and minimizing contraband. The plain language of RLUIPA prohibits courts from evaluating the centrality of a religious practice or belief, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-5(7)(A); a court can only scrutinize the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs. The court, therefore, rejected assertions that scented oil was not “really that important” to the plaintiff’s worship practice or that plaintiff needed to point to textual support or oral history proving that the Prophet Mohammad used scented oil in prayer. The court noted that the regulation prohibited the plaintiff from using scented oil for prayer—the way the plaintiff believes the Prophet Muhammed prayed—for 34 out of his 35 prayers per week. View "Johnson v. Baker" on Justia Law

The government accused Orrock of tax evasion for concealing income he received from the sale of a vacant lot that he controlled. Rather than report the sale proceeds on his personal tax return, Orrock belatedly disclosed the sale in the tax return for a partnership that he also controlled. In that return, he significantly underreported the sale proceeds.The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction for evading the assessment of taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7201, rejecting Orrock’s argument that the statute of limitations barred his conviction because it ran from the date he filed his false personal tax return, not from the later act of filing the partnership return. Acknowledging that some language in precedent may seemingly support that argument, the court clarified that the statute of limitations for evasion of assessment cases under section 7201 runs from the last act necessary to complete the offense, either a tax deficiency or the last affirmative act of evasion, whichever is later. The court aligned evasion of assessment cases with evasion of payment cases and joined all the other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. The indictment was filed within six years of Orrock’s last affirmative act of evasion, the filing of the partnership tax return, and was timely. View "United States v. Orrock" on Justia Law