Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hiscox sold Ernst a commercial crime insurance policy in 2012. In 2019, an Ernst clerk, in response to a fraudulent email, wired payments to a fraudulent actor she believed to be Ernst's founder and managing broker. In 2019, Ernst submitted a $200,000 claim under the policy. Hiscox denied Ernst’s claim, stating that Ernst’s policy did not cover the fraud because an employee had taken action to initiate the wire transfer. Two provisions of the parties’ 2012 insurance policy were disputed: the “Computer Fraud” and “Funds Transfer Fraud” provisions.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Ernst’s suit. The district court incorrectly interpreted the Computer Fraud provision by wrongly relying on precedent with dispositively different facts and improperly relying on an embezzlement-based analysis. Here, Ernst immediately lost its funds when the funds were transferred as directed by the fraudulent email, and there was no intervening event. Taking the pleaded facts as true, Ernst suffered a loss resulting “directly” from the fraud, arguably entitling Ernst to coverage under the policy. The Funds Transfer provision also covered Ernst’s loss resulting directly from the fraudulent email instruction. The district court erred when it reasoned that Ernst’s alleged loss did not result directly from fraudulent instructions. View "Ernst & Haas Management Co., Inc.. v. Hiscox, Inc." on Justia Law

King ran a heroin distribution ring focusing on San Francisco housing projects in 1976-1980. King was convicted of first-degree murder and firearms crimes in California state court in 1981 and was sentenced to serve 27 years to life in prison. Later that year, King was convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes and was sentenced to 45 years of incarceration in 1982. King began serving his federal sentence in 2019 after completing his separate California sentence.Shortly thereafter, King directly filed a motion for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1), arguing that compassionate release was appropriate because he is 77 years old, highly vulnerable to COVID-19 while incarcerated, and has a wife who is struggling with cancer. The district court denied this motion as procedurally improper because it had been filed by King. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Inmates who committed crimes before November 1, 1987, cannot move for compassionate release under section 3582(c)(1) but are instead subject to the Sentencing Reform Act and can gain compassionate release only if the Bureau of Prisons requests it on the prisoner’s behalf under 18 U.S.C. 4205(g). View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure action, holding that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action to the state court from which it had been removed to federal court by a party not named in the complaint. Constrained by the text of 28 U.S.C. 1441(a), the panel declined to follow the Second Circuit's La Russo rule, but instead held that only the actual named defendant or the defendants may remove a case under that removal provision. In this case, DBNTC was not a defendant when it removed this case, and thus the district court should have remanded the case. Accordingly, the court remanded to the state court. View "Sharma v. HSI Asset Loan Obligation Trust 2007-1" on Justia Law

Brown, who suffered physical abuse at the hands of her former boyfriend and fellow University of Arizona student at his off-campus residence, brought a Title IX action, 20 U.S.C. 1681, against the University.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University. Title IX liability exists for student-on-student harassment when an educational institution exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. The control-over-context requirement was not met based on Brown’s theory that the university had substantial control over the context of Brown’s former boyfriend’s abuse of other victims and failed to take proper action. The court rejected a theory that the boyfriend, a university football player, had to have university approval to live off-campus and his housing was paid for with scholarship funds that he received from the university. View "Brown v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for possession of device making equipment (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4)), possession of at least fifteen unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3)), aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1)), and possession of stolen mail (18 U.S.C. 1708). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his involvement in an identity theft and mail fraud scheme.The panel agreed with defendant that "intent to defraud" is an intent to deceive and cheat—an intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. The panel explained that the plain and ordinary meaning of "intent to defraud" under section 1029(a)(3) and (4) is the intent to deprive the victim of money or property by deception. However, given the overwhelming evidence that defendant had the intent to cheat his victims, the panel concluded that the instructional error was harmless. The panel also concluded that defendant's remaining contentions are either meritless or unsupported. View "United States v. Saini" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion for qualified immunity in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law, alleging that police officers used excessive force when they removed plaintiff from a city council meeting where she and others were protesting. When the protest prevented the meeting from continuing, the officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or would be arrested. After the protestors refused and passively resisted, the officers handcuffed them and carried or pulled them by their arms from the meeting room.The panel concluded that the officers did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment where the type and amount of force used by the officers was minimal. In this case, the officers did not strike plaintiff, throw her to the ground, or use any compliance techniques or weapons for the purpose of inflicting pain on her. Rather, they held her by her arms and lifted her so they could pull her out of the meeting room after she went limp and refused to leave on her own or cooperate in being removed. Furthermore, the inherent risk of two officers pulling someone who has gone limp and refuses to move by her own power is not significant. The panel also concluded that although the City's interest in forcibly removing plaintiff was low, it was not nonexistent, and the balance of interests favors defendants. Consequently, plaintiff's Bane Act claims also failed. View "Williamson v. City of National City" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of prison officials in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the confiscation of his mail violated his rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The panel concluded that genuine issues of material fact exist both as to whether the Arizona Department of Corrections applied its order inconsistently as to the CDs, in violation of plaintiff's free speech rights, and whether the exclusion of his Nation of Islam texts substantially burdened his religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly, the panel remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Slade" on Justia Law

Flucas sexually abused his daughters and other minors in his household over several years and was the father of numerous children from his own daughters. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his convictions for transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and transportation of an individual with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity Section 2421(a). The court rejected Flucas’s arguments that the district court erroneously instructed the jury that he could be convicted of transporting an individual for criminal sexual activity if criminal sexual activity was a motivating purpose of the transportation and that the court was required to instruct the jury that criminal sexual activity must be the dominant purpose in order to establish the requisite intent. The district court properly stated that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a dominant, significant, or motivating purpose of the transportation of the defendant’s victims was to engage in criminal sexual activity. A non-retroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), a statute under which Flucas was not charged, does not undermine the consistent precedent throughout the circuits rejecting the “dominant purpose” mens rea. View "United States v. Flucas" on Justia Law

Under California law, citizens can only obtain firearms and ammunition in person at government-approved gun and ammunition shops. After purchasing a firearm, they must wait a minimum of 10 days to obtain it. Ventura County issued COVID-19 pandemic public health orders that mandated a 48-day closure of gun shops, ammunition shops, and firing ranges, while allowing other businesses like bike shops to remain open. The Orders also prohibited everyone from leaving their homes other than for preapproved reasons, which did not include traveling to gun or ammunition shops or firing ranges outside Ventura County.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a challenge to the Orders. The Orders “burdened conduct protected by the Second Amendment, based on a historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment right” and failed to satisfy any level of heightened scrutiny. They were not the least restrictive means to further the governmental interest, especially when compared to businesses that had no bearing on fundamental rights, yet were allowed to remain open. The County failed to provide any explanation suggesting that gun shops, ammunition shops, and firing ranges posed a greater risk of spreading COVID-19 than other businesses and activities nor any evidence that it considered less restrictive alternatives. The Orders imposed a far greater burden than California’s 10-day waiting period. View "McDougall v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Castellanos-Avalos arrived in the United States as a child in 1989. He was placed in removal proceedings in 2005 after being convicted for possession of stolen property and reckless endangerment. He retained then-attorney Mahr. While Castellanos-Avalos’s appeal of his removal order was under consideration, his family hired attorney Rios to pursue a state-bar complaint against Mahr based on Mahr’s failure to request the only relief he was arguably entitled to, voluntary departure. The Ninth Circuit denied Castellanos-Avalos’s appeal of the removal order. Castellanos-Avalos was removed to Mexico in 2008 but returned to the United States.In 2019, he was indicted for being found in the United States after having been ordered removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment by collaterally attacking his removal order. The Ninth Circuit reversed an order granting that motion. In a criminal proceeding under section 1326, an alien may not challenge the validity of a removal order unless the alien demonstrates exhaustion of available administrative remedies; that the removal proceedings improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and that entry of the order was fundamentally unfair. Each of the statutory requirements is mandatory. Castellanos-Avalos did, in fact, seek and receive judicial review. View "United States v. Castellanos-Avalos" on Justia Law