Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing a putative class action complaint and granting defendant's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreement upon which DHIM relies was not properly formed.The panel agreed with its sister circuits and held that parties cannot delegate issues of formation to the arbitrator. In this case, where plaintiff challenged the very existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the district court was required to address his challenge and determine whether an agreement existed. If no agreement to arbitrate was formed, then there is no basis upon which to compel arbitration. The panel also concluded that the mutual arbitration agreement, as drafted, describes and governs a relationship between plaintiff and D.R. Horton that does not exist, and thus does not constitute a properly formed agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Ahlstrom v. DHI Mortgage Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order withdrawing the opinion and dissent filed on June 23, 2021, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion denying the petition for review of a decision of the BIA.In the amended opinion, the panel held that, in determining whether a conviction satisfies the thirty-gram limit of the personal-use exception to the ground of removability based on drug convictions, the circumstance-specific approach applies to determining the amount of marijuana involved in the conviction. In this case, the circumstance specific to petitioner clearly established that the amount of marijuana in his possession exceeded thirty grams. View "Bogle v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial, as untimely, Volkswagen's motion to intervene in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit regarding millions of VW's documents. This case stems from the so-called "Dieselgate" emissions scandal.The panel considered whether VW's motion to intervene as of right was timely and applied the timeliness factors, concluding that the short delay and reasons for the delay weigh in favor of timeliness, rather than against it. Furthermore, the court identified no prejudice stemming from the timing of VW's motion and the district court failed to adequately explain why a motion to intervene filed at this stage was unreasonably late. Therefore, the panel held that VW's motion to intervene was timely. The panel also concluded that VW has also met all the requirements to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Accordingly, the court ordered the district court on remand to grant the motion and permit the immediate intervention of VW into these proceedings. View "Kalbers v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged, in this consolidated class action, that Google illegally collected their Wi-Fi data through its Street View program. After the parties reached a settlement agreement that provided for injunctive relief, cy pres payments to nine Internet privacy advocacy groups, fees for the attorneys, and service awards to class representatives—but no payments to absent class members, David Lowery, one of two objectors to the settlement proposal, appealed the district court's approval of the settlement and grant of attorneys' fees.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement, certifying the class, or in its award of attorneys' fees, and it did not commit legal error by rejecting Lowery's First Amendment argument. The panel rejected the suggestion that a district court may not approve a class-action settlement that provides monetary relief only in the form of cy pres payments to third parties; Lowery has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in approving the use of cy pres payments in the settlement; the infeasibility of distributing settlement funds directly to class members does not preclude class certification; and viewing the modest injunctive relief together with the indirect benefits the class members enjoy through the cy pres provision, the panel affirmed the district court’s finding that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.The panel also concluded that the settlement agreement does not compel class members to subsidize third-party speech because any class member who does not wish to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not wish to support, can simply opt out of the class. The panel has never held that merely having previously received cy pres funds from a defendant, let alone other defendants in unrelated cases, disqualifies a proposed recipient for all future cases. Furthermore, the panel affirmed cy pres provisions involving much closer relationships between recipients and parties than anything Lowery alleges here. The court further concluded that the district court properly considered all relevant circumstances, including the value to the class members, and concluded that a 25% benchmark was appropriate. Finally, the panel concluded that class counsel and class representatives did not breach their fiduciary duties by entering the settlement. View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

In a putative class action by Domino’s drivers, asserting violations of various California labor laws, the district court denied a motion to compel arbitration based on its finding that the drivers were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” and were exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), notwithstanding their contracts with Domino’s, which provided claims between the parties be submitted to arbitration under the FAA. The exemption applies if the class of workers is engaged in a “single, unbroken stream of interstate commerce” that renders interstate commerce a “central part” of their job description.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Domino’s argument that the drivers who delivered goods to individual Domino’s franchisees in California were not engaged in interstate commerce because the franchisees, all located in California, placed orders with the supply center in the state, and the goods delivered were not in the same form in which they arrived at the supply center. Domino’s was directly involved in the procurement and delivery of interstate goods, was involved in the process from the beginning to the ultimate delivery of the goods, and its business included not just the selling of goods, but also the delivery of those goods. The transportation of interstate goods on the final leg of their journey by the Domino’s drivers satisfied the requirements of the residual clause. View "Carmona v. Domino's Pizza, LLC" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision agreeing with the IJ that petitioner's convictions were crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and that she was not entitled to cancellation of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner's convictions are not CIMTs and therefore she was not removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).In 2010, petitioner was convicted of solicitation to possess for sale less than two pounds of marijuana, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-1002 (solicitation), 13-3405(A)(2) (possession for sale), and (B)(4) (less than two pounds). Shortly thereafter, petitioner was convicted of offering to transport less than two pounds of marijuana for sale, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-3405(A)(4) (offer to transport) and (B)(10) (less than two pounds). The panel concluded that Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4), which prohibits certain conduct relating to marijuana, is overbroad and divisible; petitioner's section 13-3505(A) convictions, which involved categories in the statute involving the smallest quantity of marijuana, were not CIMTs; and petitioner was therefore not removable. View "Walcott v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's orders denying defendants' motion to set aside a default judgment and awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs in an action concerning governance of Newtok Village, a federally recognized Alaskan Native tribe. The panel held that subject matter jurisdiction has not been shown where plaintiffs' claims as pleaded simply do not arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Nor is a substantial question of federal law present. The panel concluded that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), which confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear disputes regarding self-determination contracts, applies only to suits by Indian tribes or tribal organizations against the United States, and does not authorize an action by a tribe against tribal members. The panel explained that, as currently framed, this case does not arise under federal law and must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to permit amendment under a proper basis of federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, the district court did not have the power to award plaintiffs its attorney fees in the first instance. View "Newtok Village v. Patrick" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Oregon the following question: Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on the employer's premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings compensable? View "Buero v. Amazon.com Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the IJ's order pretermitting his application for cancellation. The BIA held that petitioner failed to establish that he had not been convicted of offenses with an aggregate sentence of at least 5 years.The panel concluded that the phrase "an offense" in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the multiple criminal convictions described in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(B) that render an alien inadmissible. The panel rejected petitioner's contention that because the statutory disqualification is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses do not trigger ineligibility. The panel also rejected petitioner's contention that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on the 2013 judgment, a record not clearly related to petitioner. Rather, substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that petitioner did not satisfy his burden to show that he had not been convicted of the qualifying offenses. View "Ramirez-Medina v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review, concluding that the BIA sufficiently considered the evidence relevant to petitioner's claim of future torture and announced its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted to petitioner's claims. The panel explained that this is all that is required; the agency need not provide a detailed explanation of every argument or piece of evidence in its decision. The panel also concluded that petitioner's due process claim fails for lack of prejudice because substantial evidence supports the BIA's rejection of his Convention Against Torture claim, irrespective of any testimonial inconsistencies. View "Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland" on Justia Law