Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) against JPMorgan Chase Bank, alleging that she was the victim of unauthorized electronic fund transfers from her checking account at Chase. Chase reimbursed plaintiff for some of those losses, but refused to repay $300,000 of the funds stolen from her account. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint at the pleading stage on the ground that her lengthy delay in reporting the unauthorized withdrawals to Chase barred her claims as a matter of law.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court misinterpreted the relevant provision of the EFTA and reversed the dismissal of plaintiff's EFTA claim. The panel concluded that, under 15 U.S.C. 1693g(a), a consumer may be held liable for unauthorized transfers occurring after the 60-day period only if the bank establishes that those transfers "would not have occurred but for the failure of the consumer" to timely report the earlier unauthorized transfer reflected on her bank statement. In this case, plaintiff met her pleading burden by alleging facts plausibly suggesting that even if she had reported an unauthorized transfer within the 60-day period, the subsequent unauthorized transfers for which she sought reimbursement would still have occurred. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's state law claims, concluding that plaintiff's claim for breach of contract failed because a Privacy Notice appended to her Deposit Account Agreement did not impose any substantive duties on Chase. Furthermore, plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed because the Deposit Account Agreement expressly permitted Chase to close plaintiff’s accounts. View "Widjaja v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging petitioner's Arizona conviction and death sentence for first-degree murder. Petitioner contends that his counsel did not investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, including evidence of diffuse brain damage, childhood abuse, and substance abuse.The panel applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluded that petitioner has not shown either that his trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient or that the deficiencies were prejudicial. In this case, there is no showing that the education records nor the incarceration records contain meaningful mitigation evidence; petitioner has not met his burden of showing that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his childhood abuse; petitioner's allegation that counsel erred by not investigating and presenting evidence of his substance abuse fails because counsel was not timely informed of his substance abuse; and petitioner has not shown that counsel erred by not seeking a psychological evaluation. View "Washington v. Shinn" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) case brought by landowners, seeking damages when their property was intentionally burned by a Type 2 Incident Management Team, convened by the U.S. Forest Service, during a controlled burnout performed as part of the fire suppression effort to combat the 2015 North Star Fire in Washington.The panel concluded that the government has met its burden of establishing that plaintiffs' claims fall within the scope of the discretionary function exception. Accepting as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, the panel concluded as a matter of law that a land management employee's communication with Plaintiff Willard was based upon the exercise or performance of choosing how to organize and conduct fire suppression operations, which undisputedly requires the exercise of judgment grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Furthermore, these claims regarding the employee's communication with Willard are independently barred by the FTCA's misrepresentation exception. The court also held that the district court did not make improper factual findings in resolving the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion and did not abuse its discretion by denying additional jurisdictional discovery. View "Cruz Esquivel v. United States" on Justia Law

In an order, the panel granted a petition for panel rehearing, withdrew the opinion filed September 16, 2021, and replaced it with a superseding opinion that granted a petition for review brought by environmental organizations challenging a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit issued by the EPA for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) in Idaho.In the superseding opinion, the panel wrote that, because the Permit does not require monitoring that would ensure compliance with its effluent limitations, the EPA’s issuance of the Permit was arbitrary, capricious, and a violation of law. The panel granted the petition and remanded the Permit to the EPA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Food & Water Watch v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The en banc court held that an individual's inadmissible status renders that individual's reentry illegal for purposes of reinstatement of a prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), regardless of the individual's manner of reentry. The en banc court reaffirmed the holdings of two of its prior published opinions, which are in turn consistent with the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) adopted by the two other circuits to have squarely addressed this issue. In this case, petitioner was a noncitizen subject to a previous removal order who illegally reentered the United States, and thus DHS did not err in reinstating his removal order.The en banc court found petitioner's contention, that the reinstatement of the removal order violates due process because it interferes with his right to remain in the United States with his wife, lacking in merit. The en banc court further concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's contention that insufficient evidence supported his original removal order. Accordingly, the en banc court denied in part and dismissed in part the petition for review. View "Tomczyk v. Garland" on Justia Law

The panel's order withdrew the opinion filed on September 16, 2021, on remand from the Supreme Court; replaced it with a superseding opinion; and unanimously voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing, and ordered that no further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc would be entertained.The panel granted in part and denied in part the petition for review of a decision of the BIA, and remanded, concluding that, in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine its declarants, the Board erred in relying on a probation report to conclude that petitioner had been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The panel also concluded that the Board did not err in denying petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Arroyo, who uses a wheelchair for mobility, sued the owner of a California liquor store under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The district court granted Arroyo summary judgment on his ADA claim. Any violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act, CAL. CIV. CODE 51(f), but the district court concluded that “compelling reasons” existed under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(4) to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Arroyo’s Unruh Act claim. Recent changes in California law had made it more difficult to file Unruh Act claims in state court, resulting in a wholesale shifting of such cases to the federal courts.The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The extraordinary situation created by the unique confluence of California rules involved here, which has led to systemic changes in where such cases are filed, presents “exceptional circumstances” that authorize consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of whether the “‘principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine’” warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction. However, because the district court effectively completed its adjudication of this entire case—including the Unruh Act claim—before it considered the question of supplemental jurisdiction, the interests in judicial economy, convenience, comity, and fairness at that point all overwhelmingly favored retaining jurisdiction and entering the foreordained judgment on the Unruh Act claim. View "Arroyo v. Rosas" on Justia Law

Orange County jail inmates brought 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal claims based on alleged failure to combat COVID-19. The district court granted provisional class certification and issued a preliminary injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which automatically expired 90 days after being issued.The Ninth Circuit dismissed an appeal as moot because the injunction and provisional class certification are no longer in effect. While the Supreme Court’s emergency stay of the preliminary injunction may have prevented the injunction from having any further effect, it did not toll the 90-day limit unambiguously detailed in the PLRA. The court rejected the County’s assertion that the appeal fell within an exception to mootness because the issue was capable of repetition but evading review, noting that circumstances had changed since the original injunction issued, Given the Supreme Court’s stay of the injunction, the chance that plaintiffs would successfully acquire another preliminary injunction, at least without significantly worse conditions than previously existed, is remote. The provisional class certification expired along with the preliminary injunction. View "Ahlman v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Spokane Public Library hosted a children’s event called “Drag Queen Story Hour.” Because the event proved controversial, police separated 150 protesters and 300 counterprotesters into separate zones near the library. Yaghtin arrived at the event wearing a press badge and identified himself as a member of the press. Yaghtin alleges he was assigned a police “detail” to accompany him through a crowd of counterprotesters out of concern that he was “fake press.” While walking through the counterprotest zone, Yaghtin began speaking with a counterprotester, who asked him whether he was the person that had advocated for the execution of gay people. Officer Doe interrupted the exchange, and escorted Yaghtin through the counterprotest zone. Affirming the dismissal of a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Ninth Circuit held that Doe was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs did not challenge the ordinance or permit scheme, nor the police department’s use of separate protest zones. No precedent would have alerted Doe that his enforcement would violate clearly established First Amendment law; it was not unreasonable for Doe to believe that it was lawful for him to examine the substance of Yaghtin’s speech to enforce the separate protest zone policy. The city cannot be held liable because nothing in the complaint plausibly alleged a policy, custom, or practice leading to any violation. Plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to only an “isolated or sporadic incident” that could not form the basis of liability under “Monell.” View "Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Department’" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may vote by mail during the last four weeks of an election. The voter must sign an affidavit that is printed on a specially provided, postage-paid envelope. A ballot with a missing signature cannot be counted. On September 10, 2020, weeks before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the enforcement of Ariz. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions and stayed the injunction, pending appeal.In 2021, the Ninth Circuit entered a permanent stay. The state has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Arizona's signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. The state made a strong showing that its deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests in reducing the burden on poll workers, especially during the days immediately following an election. The public interest is served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws. Although Arizona’s law implicated national interests, at least when the election included presidential candidates, that factor alone did not mean that strict scrutiny must apply. The court noted that the Arizona legislature “laudably amended its election code in 2019 to allow voters an extended period to correct mismatched signatures." Arizona’s decision not to grant the same extension to voters who neglect to sign the affidavit passed constitutional muster. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law