Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Prasad owned and operated Maremarks, through which he filed petitions seeking H-1B status for nonimmigrant, foreign workers in specialty occupations to come to the U.S. as Maremarks’ employees performing work for Maremarks’ clients. Prasad falsely represented in the H-1B petitions that there were specific, bona fide positions available for the H-1B beneficiaries. Prasad was convicted of 21 counts of visa fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a), and two counts of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court ordered forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(6)(A)(ii): $1,193,440.87.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Prasad’s argument that he did not “obtain” the entire $1,193,440.87 because he eventually paid portions of the money to the H1B beneficiaries. Prasad possessed the full $1,193,440.87 paid by the end-clients and had control over the money before he paid a percentage of it to employees. Considering the term “proceeds” in the context of the forfeiture statute, the statute’s punitive purpose, and its prior construction of virtually identical criminal forfeiture provisions, the court concluded that the term extends to receipts and is not limited to profit. Although the H-1B beneficiary employees performed legitimate work for end-clients, the portions of the money that Maremarks received for that work and subsequently paid to the beneficiary employees was, nonetheless, “obtained directly or indirectly from” Prasad’s unlawful conduct. View "United States v. Prasad" on Justia Law

A Montana political party shall hold a primary to nominate its candidates if, for any statewide office in one of the last two elections, it received votes totaling five percent or more of the total votes for the last successful gubernatorial candidate. A party may also qualify for a primary if it submits a petition, signed by a number of registered voters equal to five percent or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor at the last general election or 5,000 electors, whichever is less. The number must include the registered voters in at least one-third of Montana's 100 legislative districts equal to five percent or more of the total votes cast for the successful candidate for governor at the last general election in those districts or 150 electors in those districts, whichever is less.The Ninth Circuit first held that recent amendments that did not fundamentally change the law did not render the appeal moot. The court rejected First and Fourteenth Amendment claims of right of association and right to cast an effective vote; the plaintiffs had not shown that the burden imposed by Montana’s law was severe. The filing deadline and the geographic distribution requirement similarly imposed relatively minor burdens. The law served the interest of ensuring that only nonfrivolous parties appear on the ballot.The court held that the part of the distribution requirement indexed to five percent of the votes for the previous gubernatorial winner in each district violated the Equal Protection Clause “one person, one vote” principle, arbitrarily diluting the value of voters' signatures in districts with a large number of supporters of the most recent gubernatorial winner. The resulting variation from district to district was significant. View "Montana Green Party v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

Blue Lake, a federally-recognized Tribal Nation, sued Acres and his company in Tribal Court over a business dispute involving a casino gaming system. Acres prevailed in tribal court. Acres then brought suit in federal court against the tribal judge, tribal officials, employees, and casino executives and lawyers who assisted the tribal court, and Blue Lake’s outside lawyers, alleging malicious prosecution, with allegations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961. According to the complaint, “Blue Lake and its confederates sought ruinous judgments, within a court they controlled, before a judge they suborned, on conjured claims of fraud and breach of contract.” The district court concluded that tribal sovereign immunity shielded all of the defendants.The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply because Acres sought damages from the defendants in their individual capacities; the Tribe was not the real party in interest. Some of the defendants were entitled to absolute personal immunity; the district court properly dismissed Acres’s claims against them on that basis. The Blue Lake judge, law clerks, and the tribal court clerk were entitled to absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings as to the remaining defendants not entitled to absolute personal immunity. View "Acres Bonusing, Inc. v. Marston" on Justia Law

Quebrado entered the U.S. in 2006. In 2011, he was served a notice to appear lacking the time or place of his removal hearing. He later was served notice with the date, time, and place of his hearing. His final order of removal issued in 2014. In 2018, the Supreme Court (Pereira) held that the stop-time rule, which sets out the circumstances under which a period of continuous physical presence is deemed to end for cancellation of removal, is triggered by a notice to appear only if it includes the “time and place” of removal proceedings. Quebrado then moved to reopen before the BIA, arguing he was statutorily eligible for cancellation. The BIA denied the motion.The Ninth Circuit remanded. A final order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule. Under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1) a period of continuous physical presence ends upon the earlier of two events: Under subsection (A), upon the service of the notice to appear, and under subsection (B), upon the commission of certain offenses. Neither subsection applied here. Quebrado’s presence was not deemed to end, so his claim for cancellation facially satisfied the 10-year presence requirement. Quebrado’s improbable situation is entirely of the government’s own making: “If men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.” View "Quebrado-Cantor v. Garland" on Justia Law

Elkhorn is a farm labor contractor for a California-based vegetable grower. As part of Elkhorn’s orientation for incoming employees, Martinez-Gonzalez signed employment paperwork that included arbitration agreements. The district court held that the arbitration agreements resulted from undue influence and economic duress and were invalid and unenforceable.The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of whether Martinez-Gonzalez’s allegation of federal and state labor and wage law violations fell within the scope of the arbitration agreements. Under California law, the doctrine of economic duress did not render the arbitration agreements unenforceable because Elkhorn did not commit a wrongful act and reasonable alternatives were available to Martinez-Gonzalez. Martinez-Gonzalez made the journey from Mexico to California, where he was dependent on Elkhorn housing and had already started work but, while “not ideal,” those circumstances did not constitute a “wrongful act” under California law. No one at Elkhorn told Martinez-Gonzalez that refusing to sign the agreements was a cause for termination. It was clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that MartinezGonzalez lacked a reasonable alternative. The timing and place of the orientation did not show that Martinez-Gonzalez’s will was overborne; the lack of time to consult with attorneys or read the agreements did not improperly induce his signatures. Elkhorn’s representatives’ instructions to sign the agreements quickly were not insistent demands. View "Martinez-Gonzalez v. Elkhorn Packing Co. LLC" on Justia Law

Tan operates businesses that import agricultural merchandise. The director of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection section that specializes in agricultural imports served Tan with an administrative summons to compel him to provide testimony. Tan refused to appear. The government filed an enforcement petition in the district court, 19 U.S.C. 1510. Tan argued that the statute's requirement that the government must provide “reasonable notice” when issuing an administrative summons for testimony required the government to provide a notice that described with “reasonable probability” the subjects about which it intended to question the summoned person.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the enforcement order. The statute's requirement that records be described “with reasonable specificity” only applies when the summons required the production of records. The court distinguished Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), which allows a party to notice the deposition of a corporation and to list proposed areas of inquiry with “reasonable particularity.” Customs supported its position with a sworn declaration, on personal knowledge, from the director of the Customs section that covers agricultural imports and complied with all statutory criteria, including personal service, and details concerning the date, time, and location of the interview. The court rejected Tan’s argument that the declaration contained too little detail to permit the district court to assess compliance. View "United States v. Tan" on Justia Law

Detained, separated from his family, speaking no English, and having diligently pursued representation, asylum applicant Usubakunov finally connected with a pro bono attorney at Catholic Charities who agreed to represent him. When that attorney was unavailable on the date of his merits hearing, Usubakunov requested his first continuance of that hearing. The IJ denied a continuance, leaving Usubakunov unassisted.The Ninth Circuit remanded. Under these circumstances, the IJ’s refusal to grant a continuance of Usubakunov’s merits hearing deprived him of his right to counsel and was an abuse of discretion because it was tantamount to a denial of counsel. The immigrant illustrated diligence, not bad faith, coupled with very difficult barriers. This was not a case of indefinite continuances, nor was it a case where Usubakunov was trying to game the system. View "Usubakunov v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ochoa was convicted in a 1988 trial for violent crimes against three female victims, including murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with a deadly weapon. The California state court imposed the death penalty.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas petition, first rejecting Ochoa’s “Brady” claim the prosecutor failed to disclose that jailhouse informants told officers that Ramage had implicated himself in the murder. Ochoa argued ineffective assistance during the penalty phase for failure to further investigate the conditions in which Ochoa lived as a child and his family’s history of mental health issues and violence. The court rejected a separate Eighth Amendment argument based on that failure to present additional mitigation evidence.Rejecting “cruel and unusual punishment arguments,” the court stated that no clearly established federal law required the court to instruct the jury as to family sympathy; nothing precluded the jury from considering family sympathy evidence, and the court did not prohibit Ochoa from arguing family sympathy. Precedent barring the admission of a defendant’s suppression hearing testimony as evidence at trial on the issue of guilt does not dictate that suppression hearing statements cannot be considered in proceedings outside the guilt phase or for purposes other than establishing substantive guilt. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include the fact that the penalty phase jury instructions failed to direct the jury that it was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating circumstances existed and outweighed the mitigating circumstances. View "Ochoa v. Davis" on Justia Law

A border patrol agent found and stopped Rizo-Rizo near the U.S./Mexico border. Rizo-Rizo admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico without appropriate immigration documents. The agent arrested him. Rizo-Rizo was then questioned again, waived his Miranda rights, and confirmed that he was a citizen of Mexico who had just “illegally entered.” Rizo-Rizo was charged with the misdemeanor of attempted illegal entry, 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1), and chose to plead guilty without a plea agreement. The magistrate listed these elements of attempted illegal entry. Defense counsel objected, claiming that “the Defendant ha[d] to know he was an alien” and that the magistrate had improperly omitted an element of the offense. The magistrate overruled the objection. Rizo-Rizo pled guilty and was sentenced to time served.The district court and Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that knowledge of alienage was not an element of 8 U.S.C. 1325(a)(1). The statute describes a regulatory offense and no presumption in favor of scienter applies. View "United States v. Rizo-Rizo" on Justia Law

In 1993, the County and the Orange County Employee Retirement System (OCERS) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), allowing the County to access surplus investment earnings controlled by OCERS and depositing a portion of the surplus into an account to pay for county retirees' health insurance. The county adopted the Retiree Medical Plan, funded by those investment earnings and mandatory employee deductions. The Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested rights. The labor unions then entered into MOUs, requiring the county to administer the Plan and that retirees receive a Medical Insurance Grant. In 1993-2007, retired employees received a monthly grant benefit to defray the cost of health insurance. In 2004, the county negotiated with its unions to restructure the underfunded program, reducing benefits for retirees.Plaintiffs filed suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The 1993 Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested right to benefits. The Plan was adopted by resolution and became law with respect to Grant Benefits, part of the MOUs. The MOUs expired on their own terms by a specific date. Absent express language providing that the Grant Benefits vested, the right to the benefits expired when the MOUs expired. The Plan was not unilaterally imposed on the unions and their employees without collective bargaining; the unions executed MOUs adopting the Plan. The court rejected an assertion that the Grant Benefit was deferred compensation and vested upon retirement, similar to pension benefits. View "Harris v. County of Orange" on Justia Law