Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between the owners of the Las Vegas Review-Journal and the Las Vegas Sun regarding a 2005 joint operating arrangement (JOA). The 2005 JOA amended a 1989 JOA, which had been approved by the U.S. Attorney General under the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA). The NPA allows failing newspapers to combine operations with another newspaper while maintaining editorial independence, provided they receive prior written consent from the Attorney General. The 2005 JOA was not approved by the Attorney General.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the defendants' motion to dissolve a stipulated injunction that required them to continue performing under the 2005 JOA. The district court concluded that the Attorney General's approval was not necessary for the 2005 JOA to be enforceable, interpreting the NPA as only denying antitrust exemption without invalidating the JOA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 2005 JOA is unlawful and unenforceable under the NPA because it did not receive the required prior written consent from the Attorney General. The court clarified that the language of the NPA is clear and unequivocal, declaring unapproved JOAs to be unlawful to enter into, perform, or enforce. The court also rejected the district court's interpretation that the lack of approval merely meant the parties lacked antitrust exemption. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "LAS VEGAS SUN, INC. V. ADELSON" on Justia Law

Robert Platt, an employee of Sodexo, Inc., sued his employer, claiming that a monthly tobacco surcharge on his employee health insurance premiums violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Platt brought claims on behalf of himself and other plan participants to recover losses under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3), and a breach of fiduciary duty claim on behalf of the employer-sponsored health insurance plan (the Plan) for losses under ERISA § 502(a)(2). Sodexo sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision it unilaterally added to the Plan after Platt joined.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Sodexo’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that there was no enforceable arbitration agreement because Sodexo unilaterally modified the Plan to add the arbitration provision without Platt’s consent. The court found that Platt did not agree to arbitrate his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that an employer cannot create a valid arbitration agreement by unilaterally modifying an ERISA-governed plan to add an arbitration provision without obtaining consent from the relevant party. The court held that Platt is the relevant consenting party for claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3) and that he did not consent to arbitration because he did not receive sufficient notice of the arbitration provision. However, the court held that the Plan is the relevant consenting party for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and that the Plan consented to arbitration.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sodexo’s motion to compel arbitration for Platt’s claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3). It reversed in part the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and remanded for the district court to consider Platt’s unconscionability defenses and the severability of the representative action waiver and any other arbitration clauses found unconscionable. View "PLATT V. SODEXO, S.A." on Justia Law

The case involves an executive order issued by President Trump, which excluded over 40 federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements, citing national security concerns. The plaintiffs, six unions representing federal employees, argued that the executive order constituted First Amendment retaliation, was ultra vires, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process, abrogated contractual property rights, and violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.The Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction against the executive order, focusing on the First Amendment retaliation claim. The district court found that the plaintiffs had raised serious questions about whether the order was retaliatory, citing statements from a White House Fact Sheet that criticized federal unions. The court concluded that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs, as the order threatened union operations and collective bargaining rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the government's request for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay, finding that the government was likely to succeed on the merits of the retaliation claim. The court concluded that the executive order and the accompanying Fact Sheet demonstrated a focus on national security, and that the President would have issued the order regardless of the plaintiffs' protected conduct. The court also found that the government would suffer irreparable harm without a stay, as the injunction impeded the government's ability to manage national security-related functions. The court determined that the public interest favored granting the stay to preserve the President's authority in national security matters. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump" on Justia Law

During a protest in Seattle on June 7-8, 2020, Taylor Cheairs was filming the event when Officer Anderson of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) threw a blast ball grenade that exploded and struck Cheairs in the groin, causing serious injury. Cheairs sued the City of Seattle, the SPD, and unnamed officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because Cheairs was not seized, and no First Amendment violation because there was no evidence of retaliation. The court also ruled that without a constitutional violation, there could be no municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that although a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Cheairs was seized when Officer Anderson struck him with the blast ball, the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court noted that the protesters near Cheairs posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers, citizens, and property. The court also held that Cheairs failed to establish a viable First Amendment retaliation claim because he did not provide evidence that his filming was a substantial or motivating factor in the use of force against him. Consequently, without a viable constitutional claim, Cheairs could not establish a claim for municipal liability. View "CHEAIRS V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Andrew King, a customer of Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU), was charged a $15 returned-check fee despite not being at fault for the check's failure to clear. King argued that this fee constituted an "unfair" and "unlawful" business practice under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and violated the federal Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA). He filed a lawsuit in state court, which NFCU removed to federal court.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed King's state law claims, ruling that they were preempted by federal law. Specifically, the court found that 12 C.F.R. § 701.35(c), which governs federal credit unions, expressly preempted King's UCL claim. The court concluded that state laws regulating account fees are not applicable to federal credit unions, and thus, King's claim was preempted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plain language of 12 C.F.R. § 701.35(c) expressly preempts state laws regulating account fees for federal credit unions. The court rejected King's arguments that the UCL transcends the preemption clause, stating that all state laws regulating account fees, whether general or specific, have no application to federal credit unions. The court emphasized that the regulation's preemption clause operates independently of whether a fee complies with federal law. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss King's UCL claim on preemption grounds. View "KING V. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION" on Justia Law

Two minor boys, referred to as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2, were coerced by a trafficker into producing pornographic content, which was later posted on Twitter. Despite reporting the content to Twitter, the platform did not immediately remove it, leading to significant views and retweets. The boys and their mother made multiple attempts to have the content removed, but Twitter only acted after being prompted by the Department of Homeland Security.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, primarily based on the immunity provided under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The court found that Twitter was immune from liability for most of the claims, including those under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and California product-defect claims, as these claims treated Twitter as a publisher of third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Twitter is immune from liability under § 230 for the TVPRA claim and the California product-defect claim related to the failure to remove posts and the creation of search features that amplify child-pornography posts. However, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims for negligence per se and their product-liability theory based on defective reporting-infrastructure design are not barred by § 230 immunity, as these claims do not arise from Twitter's role as a publisher. Consequently, the court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPRA and certain product-defect claims, reversed the dismissal of the negligence per se and defective reporting-infrastructure design claims, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "DOE 1 V. TWITTER, INC." on Justia Law

Epic Games, Inc. filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google after Google removed Epic's Fortnite video game from the Google Play Store for noncompliance with its terms of service. Epic had embedded secret code into Fortnite’s software to bypass Google’s required payment-processing systems, which charged a 30% commission on in-app purchases. The jury found that Epic had proven the relevant product markets for Android app distribution and Android in-app billing services and that Google violated both federal and California antitrust laws by willfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power in those markets, unreasonably restraining trade, and unlawfully tying the use of the Play Store to Google Play Billing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California entered a three-year injunction against Google, prohibiting it from providing certain benefits to app distributors, developers, OEMs, or carriers in exchange for advantaging the Play Store. The injunction also required Google to allow developers to provide users with information about and access to alternative app billing, pricing, and distribution channels. Google appealed the liability verdict and the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict and upheld the district court’s injunction. The court rejected Google’s claim that a decision in Apple’s favor in a similar lawsuit precluded Epic from defining the market differently in this case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding with a jury trial on Epic’s equitable claims and Google’s damages counterclaims. The court also found that the injunction was supported by the jury’s verdict and the district court’s own findings, and that the district court had broad discretion to craft the antitrust injunction. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

The Center for Investigative Reporting and Will Evans requested several years of workforce composition reports from the U.S. Department of Labor under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These reports, filed by federal contractors, detail the job categories and demographics of their employees. The Center intended to use this information to report on the diversity of these contractors' workforces. The Department of Labor withheld many of the requested reports, citing FOIA’s Exemption 4, which protects confidential commercial information.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and ordered the Department to disclose the reports. The court found that the information in the reports did not qualify as "commercial" under Exemption 4 because it did not reveal commercially significant insights about the contractors' operations. The Department of Labor appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the workforce-composition information in the reports did not constitute "commercial" information under Exemption 4. The court reasoned that the data on the number of employees in various job categories and their demographics did not directly describe the exchange of goods or services or the making of a profit. The court concluded that the Department of Labor failed to demonstrate that the information in the reports was commercial in nature, and therefore, the reports must be disclosed. The court did not address other elements of Exemption 4 or the FOIA Improvement Act, as the determination on the commercial nature of the information was sufficient to resolve the case. View "CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR" on Justia Law

Kyle Handley was convicted of two counts of kidnapping for ransom under California Penal Code section 209(a). This statute mandates life imprisonment without parole if the victim suffers death or bodily harm, or is confined in a manner exposing them to a substantial likelihood of death. The information filed against Handley did not specifically allege these circumstances. However, during the trial, Handley consented to jury instructions and a verdict form requiring special findings on these allegations. Following his conviction, the state trial court sentenced him to life without parole.On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal rejected Handley’s claim that the jury’s findings and his sentence should be reversed because he was not formally charged with the special allegations. The court held that the Constitution does not require an information to charge punishment-enhancing facts. Alternatively, it found that Handley received constitutionally sufficient notice of the special allegations through informal amendment of the information during a jury instruction conference at trial.Handley then filed a federal habeas petition, alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. He argued that he lacked adequate notice of the special allegations because they were omitted from the written information. The district court denied the petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Handley’s habeas petition. The panel held that it was not clearly established that the Sixth Amendment requires state charging documents to allege punishment-enhancing facts. Nor was it clearly established that the notice required by the Sixth Amendment must be provided by the written information itself and cannot be provided through informal amendment. The court also found that the state court’s factual findings regarding informal amendment were reasonable. The decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and Handley was not entitled to de novo review of his Sixth Amendment claim. View "HANDLEY V. MOORE" on Justia Law

Charley Johnson, trustee of the Charley E. Johnson Revocable Living Trust, purchased approximately 21 acres of land bordering the Tonto National Forest in Gila County, Arizona. Johnson later discovered that many of the improvements on the land, including a house, barn, well, and corrals, were actually on National Forest Service (NFS) land due to an erroneous survey. To resolve this, Johnson filed an application under the Small Tracts Act (STA) to purchase the encroached land. The U.S. Forest Service eventually sold Johnson a 0.59-acre parcel that included the house, barn, and well but excluded the corrals, claiming they were authorized range improvements owned by the United States.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals was not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it was committed to agency discretion by law. The court also found that the Forest Service's reliance on an appraisal valuing the 0.59-acre parcel at $27,000 was not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the APA's narrow exception for actions committed to agency discretion did not apply to discretionary conveyances under the STA. The court found that the STA and its regulations provide meaningful standards for evaluating the Forest Service's decisions, making them subject to judicial review. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the Forest Service's decision to exclude the corrals from the STA sale was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law