Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

Dr. Fares Jeries Rabadi, a licensed physician in California, had his certificate of registration to dispense controlled substances revoked by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA initiated an investigation into Rabadi in April 2018 due to his high-risk prescribing practices. In March 2020, the DEA issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, alleging that Rabadi issued numerous prescriptions for controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose to seven individuals. Rabadi requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), which took place in September 2020. The ALJ found Rabadi's testimony not credible and recommended revoking his registration. The DEA Administrator adopted the ALJ's recommendations with minor modifications and revoked Rabadi's registration.Rabadi petitioned for review, arguing that the DEA's revocation was invalid because DEA ALJs are unconstitutionally insulated from removal by two layers of "for-cause" protections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rabadi's argument failed under Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, which found similar ALJ removal protections constitutional. The court noted that DEA ALJs perform purely adjudicatory functions, Congress does not mandate the use of ALJs for DEA hearings, and DEA ALJ decisions are reviewed de novo by the DEA Administrator, who is removable at will by the President.Rabadi also argued that the DEA Administrator's order was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected this argument, finding that the Administrator properly ignored Rabadi's unsupported defense regarding high dosages of prescribed drugs and appropriately analyzed the public interest factors, including Rabadi's lack of a conviction record. The Ninth Circuit denied Rabadi's petition for review, upholding the DEA Administrator's order. View "RABADI V. USDEA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Hawai‘i Disability Rights Center (HDRC), which represents individuals with developmental disabilities, including children with autism. HDRC alleges that the Hawai‘i Departments of Education (DOE) and Human Services (DHS) unlawfully deny students with autism access to Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy during school hours, even when medically necessary. DOE provides ABA services only if deemed educationally relevant, and DHS does not provide ABA services during school hours, even if medically necessary and covered by Medicaid or private insurance.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of DOE and DHS, holding that HDRC's failure to exhaust administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was fatal to all its claims, including those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC, as a protection and advocacy organization, must ensure that parents of its constituents exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that HDRC, as Hawai‘i’s designated protection and advocacy system, can pursue administrative remedies under the IDEA and is therefore bound by the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement for its own claim. However, HDRC need not ensure that parents of individual children with autism exhaust their individual IDEA claims. The court found that HDRC did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and no exceptions to IDEA exhaustion applied.The Ninth Circuit also held that HDRC was not required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before bringing its claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC’s non-IDEA claims do not allege the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and therefore do not require exhaustion under the IDEA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. View "HAWAI'I DISABILITY RIGHTS CRT. V. KISHIMOTO" on Justia Law

Jorden Marie Saldana voluntarily filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to reorganize her finances and seek relief from unpaid taxes and other unsecured debts. In calculating her disposable income, she excluded her voluntary contributions to employer-managed retirement plans. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected to Saldana’s plan, arguing that these contributions should be included in her disposable income. Saldana filed several amended plans, but the Trustee continued to object, leading to a confirmation hearing.The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California sustained the Trustee’s objection, finding that voluntary retirement contributions are disposable income in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, based on the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Parks v. Drummond. Saldana then filed an amended plan excluding only her retirement loan repayments, which the bankruptcy court confirmed. Saldana appealed the confirmation order and the earlier order sustaining the Trustee’s objection to the district court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, agreeing that voluntary retirement contributions are disposable income. Saldana then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, holding that voluntary contributions to employer-managed retirement plans do not constitute disposable income in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The court concluded that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7) allows debtors to exclude any amount of their voluntary retirement contributions from their disposable income calculation. The court found this interpretation consistent with the canons of statutory construction and the conclusions of the majority of bankruptcy courts that have considered this issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "SALDANA V. BRONITSKY" on Justia Law

Mariusz Klin, the lead plaintiff, purchased Cloudera stock between its initial public offering (IPO) and a subsequent price drop following the company's announcement of negative quarterly earnings. Klin alleged that Cloudera, Inc. and its officers and directors made materially false and misleading statements and omissions about the technical capabilities of its products, particularly regarding their "cloud-native" nature.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Klin's first amended complaint for failure to state a claim, noting that Klin did not adequately explain what "cloud-native" meant at the time the statements were made. The court allowed Klin to file a second amended complaint, instructing him to provide a contemporaneous definition of "cloud-native" and explain why Cloudera's statements were false when made. Klin's second amended complaint was also dismissed for failing to meet the heightened pleading standards required for fraud claims, as it did not provide sufficient factual support for the definitions of the cloud-related terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Klin did not adequately plead the falsity of Cloudera's statements with the particularity required under Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). The court noted that Klin's definitions of cloud-related terms lacked evidentiary support and that the cited blog post did not substantiate his claims. Additionally, the court found that Klin's reliance on later statements and product developments did not establish the falsity of the earlier statements.The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court's decision to deny further leave to amend, concluding that additional amendments would be futile. Klin had not identified specific facts that could remedy the deficiencies in his complaint, and the court saw no reason to believe that another amendment would succeed. The court's decision to dismiss the case with prejudice was upheld. View "IN RE: MARIUSZ KLIN V. CLOUDERA, INC." on Justia Law

Charles Porter, a Yosemite National Park employee, was charged with various sexual assault offenses after attempting to anally rape T.D., another male park employee, in April 2020. T.D. testified that Porter, heavily intoxicated, forced himself on T.D. in his cabin. Neighbors corroborated T.D.'s account. Porter claimed T.D. was the aggressor. The district court allowed testimony from Porter’s ex-girlfriend, A.H., under Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which permits evidence of prior sexual assaults. A.H. testified that Porter had previously engaged in nonconsensual sex with her.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California admitted A.H.'s testimony after evaluating its probative value against potential prejudice under Rule 403. The jury found Porter guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 148 months in prison. Porter appealed, arguing that Rule 413 violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by allowing propensity evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Rule 413 is constitutional, referencing its decision in United States v. Lemay, which upheld the analogous Rule 414 for child molestation cases. The court emphasized that Rule 413, like Rule 414, is subject to Rule 403, which allows district courts to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence. The court found that the district court had properly applied Rule 403 and provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding A.H.'s testimony.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Porter’s conviction, concluding that the admission of A.H.'s testimony under Rule 413 did not violate due process. View "U.S. v. Porter" on Justia Law

The case involves a child-pornography investigation initiated by two CyberTipline Reports forwarded to the FBI by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). Special Agent Emily Steele viewed two images from Facebook without a warrant, one of which matched a previously reported child exploitation image. This led to a search warrant for Aaron Holmes's residence, where incriminating statements and numerous illicit images were found on his cellphone. Holmes moved to suppress this evidence, arguing it was obtained unlawfully.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Holmes's motion to suppress, concluding that the good-faith exception applied to Agent Steele’s viewing of the hash-matched image and that the inevitable-discovery exception applied because Agent Rose would have inevitably discovered the same evidence through routine procedures.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the existing precedent was contradictory and only plausibly supported Agent Steele’s warrantless viewing of the images. The court also rejected the inevitable-discovery exception, finding that the Government failed to prove that Agent Rose would have inevitably discovered the same evidence through lawful means. The court noted that Agent Rose’s investigation was not as urgent or thorough as Agent Steele’s, and there was no certainty that Holmes would have been present during a hypothetical search by Agent Rose. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Holmes’s motion to suppress and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Holmes" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Jose Ernesto Aleman-Belloso, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that upheld an Immigration Judge's (IJ) denial of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Aleman, an influential lay minister in his church, was approached by members of the FMLN, a political party in El Salvador, to use his influence to garner support for the party. After refusing their proposition, Aleman was attacked by masked gunmen who threatened him and demanded he leave town. Aleman fled to the United States shortly after.The IJ found Aleman’s testimony credible and acknowledged that he was tortured by the FMLN. However, the IJ concluded that Aleman failed to establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and any protected grounds, thus denying his claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The IJ also denied CAT relief, finding it unlikely that Aleman would be tortured again in the future. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Aleman did not demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the persecution and his religious beliefs, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the BIA erred in its conclusions. The court held that substantial evidence did not support the BIA’s finding of no nexus between the persecution Aleman suffered and his political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The court noted that Aleman’s refusal to support the FMLN was a political opinion and that the FMLN attacked him because of this opinion. Additionally, the court found that the BIA mischaracterized Aleman’s proposed social group and improperly rejected it as circularly defined. The court also concluded that the BIA failed to consider probative evidence regarding government involvement in Aleman’s past torture and the FMLN’s continued power in El Salvador.The Ninth Circuit granted Aleman’s petition for review, remanding the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court instructed the BIA to reconsider Aleman’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, taking into account the correct characterization of his social group and the evidence of government involvement in his persecution. View "ALEMAN-BELLOSO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Grand Canyon University (GCU), a private university in Arizona, applied to the U.S. Department of Education to be recognized as a nonprofit institution under the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). The Department denied GCU’s application, despite GCU having obtained 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) recognition from the IRS as a tax-exempt organization. The Department concluded that GCU did not meet the operational test’s requirement that both the primary activities of the organization and its stream of revenue benefit the nonprofit itself.The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, upholding the denial of GCU’s application. The court found that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. GCU appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the Department applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating GCU’s application. Specifically, the Department incorrectly relied on IRS regulations that impose requirements beyond those of the HEA. The correct HEA standards required the Department to determine whether GCU was owned and operated by a nonprofit corporation and whether GCU satisfied the no-inurement requirement. The Department’s failure to apply these correct legal standards necessitated that its decision be set aside.The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to set aside the Department’s denials and to remand to the Department for further proceedings consistent with the correct legal standards under the HEA. View "GRAND CANYON UNIVERSITY V. CARDONA" on Justia Law

A class of over 500,000 federal student loan borrowers sued the U.S. Department of Education for failing to process their borrower defense (BD) applications. The Department and the plaintiffs reached a settlement, which included automatic debt forgiveness for certain borrowers and streamlined adjudication for others. Three for-profit universities (the Schools) listed in the settlement as having substantial misconduct intervened, claiming reputational harm.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California approved the settlement and denied the Schools' motion to intervene as of right but allowed them to object to the settlement. The Schools appealed, arguing that the settlement caused them reputational and financial harm and interfered with their procedural rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Schools had Article III standing due to alleged reputational harm but lacked prudential standing to challenge the settlement because they did not demonstrate formal legal prejudice. The court found that the dispute between the plaintiffs and the Department was not moot, as the Department's voluntary cessation of issuing pro forma denials did not render the case moot. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the Schools' motion to intervene as of right, concluding that the Schools did not have a significantly protectable interest and failed to show prejudice from the denial of intervention as of right.The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention as of right. View "Sweet v. Everglades College, Inc." on Justia Law