Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when, as a condition of his supervised release and while his appeal of his conviction was pending, he was required to complete a sex offender treatment program, and then was discharged from the program and given a limited jail sanction for refusing to admit to the conduct underlying his conviction, a required part of his treatment.The panel held that it was bound by the rule adopted by six justices in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003) (plurality opinion), as enunciated in this court's precedent, and consistent with the rule adopted by sister circuits—that the Fifth Amendment is not violated unless and until allegedly coerced statements are used against a suspect in a criminal case. The panel concluded that because plaintiff did not make a statement that was used in a criminal proceeding, he may not bring a civil action against the government under section 1983 for a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of this claim. The panel also affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims alleging that the government officials involved in this incident violated plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his First Amendment right to bring a civil lawsuit against the government. View "Chavez v. Robinson" on Justia Law

On rehearing en banc, the court held that the single factor rule conflicts with the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), and overruled the court's prior precedent establishing and applying it. The single factor rule required the court to sustain an adverse credibility determination from the BIA, so long as one of the agency's identified grounds was supported by substantial evidence. The panel remanded to the three-judge panel to re-examine the petition for review in light of the court's clarification of the standard for reviewing the BIA’s adverse credibility determinations. View "Alam v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review challenging the BIA's order denying petitioner's application for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The panel also affirmed the BIA's refusal to allow petitioner to seek asylum in light of the reinstatement of his prior order of removal. The panel concluded that petitioner does not have the right to seek asylum under the INA, and he did not have a constitutional right to have DHS consider whether, as a discretionary matter, to overlook his prior removal order and thereby allow him to seek asylum.The panel concluded that there is no basis for upsetting the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for withholding of removal. The panel explained that because the BIA's finding of changed circumstances was sound and sufficient to rebut the presumption of future persecution on account of petitioner's perceived sexual orientation, there is no need to address the BIA's finding that he could safely relocate within El Salvador; where the IJ concluded that it was not more likely than not that petitioner would be persecuted if he returned to El Salvador on the basis of his anti-gang beliefs, the record does not compel a different conclusion; and the panel rejected petitioner's claims that he would be persecuted on account of his membership in several other social groups. In regard to CAT relief, the panel concluded that there was no error in the IJ's finding that petitioner was not likely to face torture in El Salvador for the same reasons he was not likely to face persecution for withholding purposes. View "Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the high school and school district in an action brought by plaintiff under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, a student with attention deficit disorder, sought damages after he was assaulted and seriously injured by another student at a high school football game. Petitioner argues that guidance issued by the DOE in various Dear Colleague Letters should be binding, and that the school's failure to adopt all of the Letters' suggestions for preventing harassment of disabled students amounts to disability discrimination.The panel concluded that guidance issued by the DOE in the Letters was not binding and that plaintiff may not use the Letters to leapfrog over the statutory requirements to assert a cognizable claim under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The panel explained that the Letters do not adjust the legal framework governing private party lawsuits brought under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, plaintiff's claims—which rely entirely on the enforceability of the Letters as distinct legal obligations—fail. In this case, the Letters did not make plaintiff's need for social accommodation "obvious," such that failure to enact their recommendations constituted a denial of a reasonable accommodation with deliberate indifference. Furthermore, no request for a social-related accommodation was ever made and no prior incidents of bullying or harassment involving plaintiff were observed or reported by the school prior to the assault during the football game. View "Csutoras v. Paradise High School" on Justia Law

Juliano pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. Juliano had a 262-327-month guideline imprisonment range. The government agreed to recommend 240 months of imprisonment, then the minimum for Count 2, for a defendant who had one prior felony drug offense conviction. He was sentenced to 240 months. About 10 weeks after Juliano’s sentencing, the First Step Act reduced the mandatory minimum penalty for certain drug crimes, including those for which Juliano was convicted, from 20 to 15 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A).Juliano moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that his attorneys failed to investigate or inform him about the pending First Step Act, or to seek a continuance of his sentencing. The district court reasoned that courts “have uniformly concluded that a defense attorney is not deficient in failing to anticipate a change in the law” and that “it is doubtful the Court would have been receptive to a request to delay sentencing.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Given the general uncertainty surrounding pending legislation, counsel’s alleged failure to advise Juliano about the First Step Act or to seek a continuance fails to meet the highly deferential Strickland test for deficient performance. View "United States v. Juliano" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BRB's decision affirming an IJ's award of benefits to claimant under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). In this case, claimant sought disability and medical benefits under the LHWCA after injuring both knees while working for Sundial.The panel held that the ALJ did not err in applying section 910(a) of the LHWCA to calculate claimant's average weekly wage at the time of injury. The panel explained that the section 910(a) formula presumptively applies to calculating a five-day workers' average weekly wage, and the statutory presumption is not rebutted as a matter of law simply because section 910(a) would slightly underestimate earning capacity because the claimant worked in excess of 260 days. Rather, the statute plainly contemplates some inaccuracy in calculating the average weekly wage, and it does not provide that section 910(a) is inapplicable if more than 260 days were worked. Nor does the fact that claimant worked 264 days by itself make use of the section 910(a) formula unreasonable or unfair. In this case, claimant is incorrect that the section 910(a) formula entirely fails to account for his increased earnings, as the starting point for the section 910(a) calculation is the total amount of compensation earned in the previous year. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress did not envision application of section 910(c) under these circumstances. View "Martin v. Sundial Marine Tug and Barge Works, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department of the Interior and Intervenor WWP in an action challenging the BLM's denial of plaintiffs' request to transfer a "preference" to receive a permit to graze on certain federal land allotments.The panel applied step one of the Chevron framework and concluded that the IBLA correctly applied the clear and unambiguous language of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (TGA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which established that a grazing preference could not be exercised after the corresponding grazing permit was not renewed for bad behavior. Because the IBLA correctly interpreted and applied the statutory authorities, and therefore did not act contrary to law, it follows that the decision is not arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment. View "Corrigan v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction prohibiting the City of Los Angeles from discarding homeless individuals' "Bulky Items" that are stored in public areas, as authorized by a provision of its municipal code.The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that this provision, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. The panel found Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012), which upheld a preliminary injunction that prohibited Los Angeles from summarily destroying homeless individuals' publicly stored personal property, persuasive. The panel also concluded that the clauses authorizing the discarding of those items are not severable from the remainder of the provision. The panel emphasized that its holding imposes no new constraints on the City: its prior caselaw states clearly that the government may not summarily destroy the unabandoned personal property of homeless individuals that is kept in public areas. Finally, the panel concluded that the district court appropriately concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors tipped in plaintiffs' favor. View "Garcia v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government on petitioner's United States citizenship claim. The panel concluded that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his parents obtained a legal separation, as required for him to derive U.S. citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Even assuming arguendo that they did divorce and that petitioner's parents thereafter had a legitimate de facto union that would be recognized under Peruvian law, petitioner nonetheless failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that his parents were legally separated under Peruvian law. Because petitioner's petition for review presents no other grounds for avoiding his removal to Peru, the panel denied the petition. View "Giha v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Nichols filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and later were indicted on federal charges for their alleged participation in a scheme to defraud Marana Stockyard. To avoid disclosure of information that might compromise their position in the criminal proceedings, the Nicholses declined to complete steps required by the Bankruptcy Code to advance their case. They refused to hold a meeting with creditors, to file outstanding tax returns, or to propose an appropriate repayment plan. Marana, which had filed a claim in the Nicholses’ bankruptcy case, moved (11 U.S.C. 1307(c)) for the case to be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation. The Nicholses unsuccessfully requested a stay of the bankruptcy case during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The bankruptcy court determined that conversion to a Chapter 7 liquidation was justified by the Nicholses’ “unwarranted” delays and would have been proper, in the alternative, under section 1307(e), because the Nicholses failed to file tax returns for several years.The Nicholses did not comply with the bankruptcy court’s requirements but moved to dismiss voluntarily their bankruptcy case under section 1307(b). The Ninth Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the denial of the dismissal motion and conversion of the case. The Ninth Circuit reversed. A bankruptcy court may not invoke equitable considerations to contravene section 1307(b)’s express language fiving Chapter 13 debtors an absolute right to dismiss their case. View "Nichols v. Marana Stockyard & Livestock Market, Inc." on Justia Law