Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rodriguez-Ramirez, a citizen of El Salvador testified that he fled to the U.S. in 2016, days after gang members threatened him outside his daughter’s school; he reported this threat to the local prosecutor, who prepared a report based on the information Rodriguez-Ramirez provided. Rodriguez-Ramirez did not provide any other corroborating evidence. The IJ relied on two inconsistencies: despite Rodriguez-Ramirez’s testimony that this threat occurred in February 2016, the report he provided from the prosecutor twice stated, on different pages, that the threats occurred in January 2016 and Rodriguez-Ramirez testified that the gang members showed him a weapon but he did not provide this information to the prosecutor or in his written asylum application. The IJ found that Rodriguez-Ramirez did not have a convincing explanation for the discrepancy. An adverse credibility determination was also supported by the IJ’s demeanor findings. The BIA dismissed an appeal from the denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. The BIA and IJ were permitted to afford substantial weight to inconsistencies that “bear[] directly on [Rodriguez-Ramirez]’s claim of persecution.” The IJ was not required to give Rodriguez-Ramirez notice and an opportunity to provide additional corroborating evidence because substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. View "Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12182(a), the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated 1991Accessibility Guidelines requiring that in sports stadiums, “[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of the general public.” A 1996 DOJ guidance document (Accessible Stadiums) provides: Wheelchair seating locations must provide lines of sight comparable to those provided to other spectators. In stadiums where spectators can be expected to stand during the show or event (for example, football, baseball, basketball games, or rock concerts), all or substantially all of the wheelchair seating locations must provide a line of sight over standing spectators."Plaintiffs, baseball fans with ADA-qualifying disabilities, use wheelchairs for mobility. The Stadium, designed in 1996 and constructed in 1997-1999, has vertically stacked seating levels sloped toward the field. There is wheelchair-accessible seating on each level. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ sightline claim and, regarding the Accessible Stadiums standard, concluded: [W]hen the Court reviews the illustrations considering what can be seen over the line representing the standing spectator’s shoulders, i.e., “over the shoulders and between the heads,” more of the field is visible from the accessible seat, making the views comparable." The Ninth Circuit vacated. The district court failed to explain how the Stadium satisfies all the Accessible Stadiums requirements. View "Landis v. WashingtonvState Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District" on Justia Law

Father sought the return of his children under the Hague Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), which implements the Convention. The district court found the repatriation of the minor children to Germany posed a grave risk of psychological harm if in father's custody and therefore ordered that the children be transferred back to Germany in mother's custody until a German court made a custody determination.The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's alternative remedy order for the district court to reasonably ensure compliance with its alternative remedy in Germany. The court explained that, because mother wrongfully removed the children, as she conceded, the district court in no way exceeded its authority to mandate the children's return to Germany accompanied by mother. However, in the context of an Article 13(b) finding, the district court needed a fuller record to have sufficient guarantees that the alternative remedy will be enforced in Germany. View "Radu v. Johnson Shon" on Justia Law

Guam’s Department of Revenue concluded that Guerrero owes approximately $3.7 million in unpaid taxes because he did not pay his full tax liability for the tax years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 after belatedly filing his returns for these years. The parties dispute when the Department assessed Guerrero’s taxes because the official records are missing, likely due to water, mold, and termite damage at the storage facility. Guam filed tax liens on real property that Guerrero owns with his former spouse in joint tenancy, then filed suit to collect Guerrero’s tax deficiencies through foreclosure. Guerrero argued that the Department cannot prove that it timely assessed his taxes, timely levied the tax liens, nor timely commenced its action, 26 U.S.C. 6501(a), 6502(a)(1). Guam invoked the presumption of regularity based on the Department’s standard procedure and internal documents to establish that Guam acted within the statute of limitations.The district court partially ruled in favor of Guam, on the issues of the presumption of regularity and the timeliness of the Department’s actions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The presumption of regularity applied and Guerrero failed to rebut it. Guam established the timeliness of its assessment of Guerrero’s unpaid taxes, its filing of the tax lien, and its commencement of this action through the internal documents and testimony from the Department’s employees. View "Government of Guam v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Yu, a Chinese international student, enrolled in ISU's Doctoral Program in Clinical Psychology in 2008. He completed the requisite four years of instruction and successfully defended his dissertation but failed to complete a mandatory professional internship consisting of 2,000 clinical hours. Several of Yu’s supervisors commented on his limited English language fluency and that Yu had trouble “form[ing] alliances” with clients and patients, and possessed limited “ability to adjust treatment.” Dr. Landers, Yu's supervisor, dismissed Yu, later testifying that Yu was never able “to grasp the communication nuances that are required” and noting the vulnerability of the patients, who were particularly high risk. After Yu was dismissed from the internship, ISU dismissed Yu from the Program.Yu filed suit, alleging that ISU violated Title VI because it intentionally discriminated against him based on his race or national origin. Yu presented the expert testimony of Dr. Zorwick that Yu was a victim of “aversive racism,” comparable to “unconscious” or “implicit” bias. The district court ruled in favor of ISU. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Evidence of unconscious bias against a protected class in an appropriate case may be probative of whether an entity has intentionally discriminated in a Title VI case but the question is factual, and here the court permissibly found that ISU did not intentionally discriminate. View "Yu v. Idaho State University" on Justia Law

Zyszkiewicz, a prisoner and a medical cannabis patient, wrote a one-page letter to the DEA, seeking the rescheduling of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801, which places federally-regulated substances into one of five schedules depending on “potential for abuse,” “medical use,” “safety,” and the likelihood of “dependence.” The DEA responded that the letter was not in the proper format for a petition but that it welcomed the opportunity to respond to his concerns. The DEA’s letter gave reasons for having denied an earlier rescheduling petition filed by Governors Chafee of Rhode Island and Gregoire of Washington State. Zyszkiewicz treated the DEA’s answer as a denial of his petition and unsuccessfully sought judicial review.Dr. Sisley, her associated institutions, and veterans (Petitioners) sought judicial review of the DEA’s response but did not seek to intervene in Zyszkiewicz’s petition before the DEA, nor have they filed a DEA petition of their own. The arguments Petitioners sought to raise were not made in Zyszkiewicz’s petition.The Ninth Circuit held that the Petitioners satisfy Article III standing requirements, but that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the CSA and dismissed their petition for review. Petitioners alleged direct and particularized harms due to the misclassification of cannabis. Dr. Sisley and her associated institutions contend that the misclassification impedes their research efforts, and the veterans contend that it forecloses their access to medical treatment with cannabis through the VA. View "Sisley v. United States Drug Enforcement Agency" on Justia Law

Porretti, a 62-year-old prisoner, has suffered from serious mental illnesses—Tourette’s syndrome, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder, personality disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia— throughout his life. Porretti’s mental illnesses have caused him to attempt suicide and to suffer psychotic symptoms, including compulsive ingestion of metal objects like razor blades, paranoid delusions, hallucinations, and verbal tics. Porretti received Wellbutrin and Seroquel for his mental illnesses before he was incarcerated in Nevada and after he entered into the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). In 2017, without the recommendation of a healthcare provider, NDOC stopped providing his medication because of a new administrative policy.The Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide Porretti’s Wellbutrin and Seroquel. The district court carefully applied the preliminary-injunction factors and rendered highly detailed factual findings that rejected opinions from NDOC’s experts for reasons grounded in the record evidence; Porrettif’s Eighth Amendment claim was likely to succeed on the merits and he would suffer irreparable harm in the form of “very serious or extreme damage to his mental health” if injunctive relief were not granted. Porretti’s severe and persistent psychotic symptoms overwhelmingly outweighed NDOC’s financial or logistical burdens in providing Wellbutrin and Seroquel. An injunction was in the public’s interest because prisons must comply with the standard of care mandated by the Eighth Amendment. View "Porretti v. Dzurenda" on Justia Law

Competitors BladeRoom and Emerson began negotiating a sale of BladeRoom to Emerson. They signed a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The negotiations fell through. Facebook selected Emerson’s proposal for a data center. BladeRoom sued. Emerson proposed a jury instruction that would have excluded information disclosed or used after August 17, 2013, from its liability for breach of contract, which Emerson argued was the date of the contract’s expiration. The district court agreed that the NDA’s confidentiality obligations did not expire under paragraph 12 of the NDA. The jury found that Emerson breached the NDA and willfully and maliciously misappropriated BladeRoom’s trade secrets and awarded $10 million in lost profits and $20 million in unjust enrichment. The district court later awarded BladeRoom $30 million in punitive damages.The Ninth Circuit reversed. Paragraph 12’s natural meaning unambiguously terminated the NDA and its confidentiality obligations two years after it was signed. The court treated the district court’s error as an error of jury instruction and addressed issues for consideration on the awards of damages and prejudgment interest should they be determined after a new trial. Under California law, a party cannot collect punitive damages for breach of contract awards. On remand, the district court must take several steps to allocate damages and should consider adopting a more detailed special verdict form. View "BladeRoom Group Ltd. v. Emerson Electric Co." on Justia Law

After two administrative hearings, Brown was awarded disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits by an ALJ, who concluded that, as of April 25, 2018, Brown was “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 416(i), 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A), but rejected Brown’s claim that he was disabled prior to that date. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions to set aside the ALJ’s determination and to conduct a new disability hearing before a different, and properly appointed ALJ. The ALJ who conducted Brown’s hearings was not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Because this proceeding did not arise from a direct appeal from a decision of one or more invalidly appointed officers, nor was it a direct petition for review that might similarly have brought the entirety of the administrative decision before the court, the Commissioner may not challenge the portions of that decision that are favorable to Brown. The court held that it had no authority under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). to set aside, or to disturb, the grant of benefits for the time period on or after April 25, 2018, View "Brown v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

In 2017, Pollard was indicted for possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Over the previous 20 years, he had been convicted of several felonies and served over five years in prison, including for a 2004 violation of California’s felon-in-possession statute. Pollard pled guilty. He was sentenced to 57 months and did not appeal.A year later, the Supreme Court decided “Rehaif,” holding that section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time of possession. Pollard moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), contending that his guilty plea was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary without having been informed of section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status element. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Pollard’s motion because he had not shown actual prejudice and failed to overcome the procedurally defaulted nature of his claim. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law