Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Competitors BladeRoom and Emerson began negotiating a sale of BladeRoom to Emerson. They signed a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The negotiations fell through. Facebook selected Emerson’s proposal for a data center. BladeRoom sued. Emerson proposed a jury instruction that would have excluded information disclosed or used after August 17, 2013, from its liability for breach of contract, which Emerson argued was the date of the contract’s expiration. The district court agreed that the NDA’s confidentiality obligations did not expire under paragraph 12 of the NDA. The jury found that Emerson breached the NDA and willfully and maliciously misappropriated BladeRoom’s trade secrets and awarded $10 million in lost profits and $20 million in unjust enrichment. The district court later awarded BladeRoom $30 million in punitive damages.The Ninth Circuit reversed. Paragraph 12’s natural meaning unambiguously terminated the NDA and its confidentiality obligations two years after it was signed. The court treated the district court’s error as an error of jury instruction and addressed issues for consideration on the awards of damages and prejudgment interest should they be determined after a new trial. Under California law, a party cannot collect punitive damages for breach of contract awards. On remand, the district court must take several steps to allocate damages and should consider adopting a more detailed special verdict form. View "BladeRoom Group Ltd. v. Emerson Electric Co." on Justia Law

After two administrative hearings, Brown was awarded disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits by an ALJ, who concluded that, as of April 25, 2018, Brown was “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 416(i), 423(d), 1382c(a)(3)(A), but rejected Brown’s claim that he was disabled prior to that date. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision.The Ninth Circuit remanded with instructions to set aside the ALJ’s determination and to conduct a new disability hearing before a different, and properly appointed ALJ. The ALJ who conducted Brown’s hearings was not appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Because this proceeding did not arise from a direct appeal from a decision of one or more invalidly appointed officers, nor was it a direct petition for review that might similarly have brought the entirety of the administrative decision before the court, the Commissioner may not challenge the portions of that decision that are favorable to Brown. The court held that it had no authority under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). to set aside, or to disturb, the grant of benefits for the time period on or after April 25, 2018, View "Brown v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

In 2017, Pollard was indicted for possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Over the previous 20 years, he had been convicted of several felonies and served over five years in prison, including for a 2004 violation of California’s felon-in-possession statute. Pollard pled guilty. He was sentenced to 57 months and did not appeal.A year later, the Supreme Court decided “Rehaif,” holding that section 922(g)(1) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew he was a felon at the time of possession. Pollard moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(a), contending that his guilty plea was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary without having been informed of section 922(g)(1)’s knowledge-of-status element. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Pollard’s motion because he had not shown actual prejudice and failed to overcome the procedurally defaulted nature of his claim. View "United States v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Reyes, a native of Colombia, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1989. Reyes had numerous criminal arrests and convictions, including indecent exposure convictions in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, Reyes married a U.S. citizen and adjusted his status through an application that his wife filed on his behalf. In 2011, Reyes was again charged with indecent exposure and pleaded no contest to a felony. He was sentenced to eight months in jail and three years probation. In 2014, he pleaded no contest to an additional felony for violation of the same California indecent exposure statute and was sentenced to 16 months in prison and three years of parole. In 2015, the government initiated removal proceedings. Relying on the 2011 and 2014 convictions, the government charged Reyes with being subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) as an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He argued that his convictions were not categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and submitted applications for relief from removal.The BIA rejected his argument. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review. The BIA erred in retroactively applying its 2013 precedent to change the legal consequences of Reyes’s 2011 conviction. View "Reyes-Afanador v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ayla, a San Francisco-based brand, is the registered owner of trademarks for use of the “AYLA” word mark in connection with on-site beauty services, online retail beauty products, cosmetics services, and cosmetics. Alya Skin, an Australian company, sells and ships skincare products worldwide. Ayla sued in the Northern District of California, asserting trademark infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125(a).Alya Skin asserted that it has no retail stores, offices, officers, directors, employees, bank accounts, or real property in the U.S., does not sell products in U.S. retail stores, solicit business from Americans, nor direct advertising toward California; less than 10% of its sales have been to the U.S. and less than 2% of its sales have been to California. Alya Skin uses an Idaho company to fulfill shipments outside of Australia and New Zealand. Alya Skin filed a U.S. trademark registration application in 2018, and represented to potential customers that its products are FDA-approved; it ships from, and allows returns to, Idaho Alya Skin’s website listed U.S. dollars as the default currency and advertises four-day delivery to the U.S.The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) comports with due process. Alya Skin had minimum contacts with the U.S., and subjecting it to an action in that forum would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The company purposefully directed its activities toward the U.S. The Lanham Act and unfair competition claims arose out of or resulted from Alya Skin’s intentional forum-related activities. View "Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd." on Justia Law

San Francisco pretrial detainees filed a putative class action challenging conditions of confinement under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the denial of access to outdoor recreation and direct sunlight. The court enjoined some of the jail’s practices, finding the evidence inconclusive as to whether the lack of direct sunlight created a medical risk and that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success in seeking exercise time outdoors. The policy of permitting general population inmates to receive 4.5-8 hours of day room time and 30 minutes of gym time daily was constitutionally sufficient but forcing pretrial detainees to live without direct sunlight for years was simply punishment. The court ordered the jail to provide one hour per week of direct sunlight to inmates who had been incarcerated for more than four years. The court dismissed the Sheriff’s Department as a superfluous defendant and dismissed individual defendants based on qualified immunity.The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. The government’s appeal was moot because the preliminary injunction order expired after 90 days, The district court did not err in denying greater preliminary injunctive relief; there is no bright-line test to determine if and when inmates are entitled to outdoor exercise. Plaintiffs did not show a likelihood of success on their “direct sunlight” claim given the district court’s extensive factual findings. The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ cross-appeal of the dismissal of the Sheriff’s Department and the individual defendants. View "Norbert v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency approved California’s plan for meeting the air quality standard for ozone in the San Joaquin Valley (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7408(a), 7409(a)). The plan contains a single contingency measure that will be activated if the other provisions do not achieve reasonable further progress toward meeting the standard.The Ninth Circuit remanded, finding the approval arbitrary after holding that AIR, a California nonprofit corporation with members who reside in the Valley, had Article III standing. AIR’s challenge was ripe for review. When an agency changes its policy, it must display awareness that it is changing position and show that there are good reasons for the new policy. In approving a contingency measure that provided a far lower emissions reduction, the EPA did not acknowledge that it had changed its understanding of what reasonable further progress meant. The EPA may not avoid the need for robust contingency measures by assuming that they will not be needed and did not provide a reasoned explanation for approving the plan. The court rejected AIR’s challenge to the approval of the State’s Enhanced Enforcement Activities Program. The program did not create an emission limitation that was less stringent than one in effect in the state plan so nothing in the Clean Air Act prohibited the state from pursuing it. View "Association of Irritated Residents v. United States Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Addressing two petitions for review, the Ninth Circuit held that noncitizens at reasonable fear hearings before an immigration judge (IJ), including noncitizens whose removal orders have been reinstated, are statutorily entitled to counsel. The court noted that 8 U.S.C. 1362 provides that noncitizens shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the government), by counsel of their choosing in "any removal proceedings" before an IJ and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General.Absent exceptional circumstances, denying a continuance despite the noncitizen’s inability to retain counsel within 10 days (the mandatory time for an IJ review hearing under 8 C.F.R. 208.31(g)) is not a denial of this entitlement if the asylum officer notified the noncitizen of the negative fear determination and the noncitizen requested IJ review and informed the noncitizen of the opportunity to have counsel, such as by providing a list of legal service providers. The statutory entitlement to counsel does not mean that a noncitizen must have counsel before an IJ can proceed, but only that a noncitizen must at least be informed and have an opportunity to seek counsel within section 208.31(g)(1)’s constraints. A noncitizen may waive the right to counsel, but such waiver must be knowing and voluntary. The court rejected additional due process arguments concerning the noncitizen’s hearing difficulties and the IJ’s failure to call a witness by telephone. View "Orozco-Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The district court entered a $38,489,055 judgment against Jecklin, a Swiss citizen, and two businesses he controls, also awarding post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs propounded post-judgment interrogatories and requests for the production of documents pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 69(A)(2), which authorizes a judgment creditor to obtain discovery from a judgment debtor to aid in the execution of a judgment. When the Jecklin Defendants failed to produce the requested discovery, the court granted a motion to compel responses under Rule 37. The Defendants did not comply. At a status conference, they advised the court, through counsel, that “they are not going to comply with the Court order compelling discovery because they do not accept jurisdiction of this Court and they consider Your Honor’s decision not to be enforceable in Switzerland.” Plaintiffs moved for sanctions. Plaintiffs sought the issuance of an arrest warrant.The district court held the Defendants in civil contempt, imposed a daily fine, and found that their “pattern of disregarding the Court’s Order supports the coercive sanction of arrest.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed; 28 U.S.C. 1826(a), which provides that when a witness refuses to testify or provide other information, including documentary evidence, the court “may summarily order his confinement ... until ... the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information,” applies to an individual who refuses to comply with a court order compelling responses to post-judgment written discovery requests. View "Invesco High Yield Fund v. Jecklin" on Justia Law

Munyuh, a Protestant and anglophone, taught physical education in Cameroon before fleeing to the U.S. She was tortured by police, who suspected her of membership in the SCNC, an anglophone separatist group, and escaped with the help of her husband. Her 14-year-old son and husband still live in Cameroon. She was denied asylum and related relief on adverse credibility grounds.The Ninth Circuit vacated the order of removal and remanded. The immigration judge erred by failing to give specific, cogent reasons for rejecting Munyuh’s reasonable, plausible explanations for the discrepancies tied to her declaration concerning the distance she traveled in a police truck before escaping on foot after officers raped her and being rescued by her husband. The IJ further erred by discounting Munyuh’s supporting documentation without giving her adequate notice and the opportunity to provide corroborative evidence. The “IJ seemed determined to pick every nit she could find” and discounted probative evidence on flimsy grounds, displaying “a dubious understanding of how rape survivors ought to act.” View "Munyuh v. Garland" on Justia Law