Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Maner worked as a biomedical engineer in the laboratory of Dr. Garfield for several decades. Maner learned that Garfield and another employee, Shi, were engaged in a long-term romantic relationship. Garfield brought Shi with him to research conferences to which other employees were not invited and conferred upon Shi a greater share of workplace opportunities related to publications and intellectual property than Maner felt she should have received. In 2008, Maner was arrested at work for alleged aggravated sexual assault; he pleaded guilty to a lesser state law offense. Maner subsequently received positive performance reviews and merit pay increases. Garfield approved a remote work arrangement to enable Maner to serve his probation. Garfield’s lab began to suffer a decline in grant funding. In 2011, Garfield submitted a highly negative review of Maner’s performance under the remote work arrangement. Maner’s position was eliminated based on the poor performance review and lack of funding.Maner brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and a Title VII retaliation claim alleging that his termination was for protesting Garfield’s favoritism toward Shi. The Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment for the employer. Maner’s “paramour preference” reading of Title VII fails the Supreme Court’s test for assessing whether an adverse employment action violated Title VII—whether changing the employee’s sex would have yielded a different choice by the employer. Maner failed to establish any causal connection between the claimed protected activity and the termination decision. View "Maner v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

In 2016, California voters passed Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution by granting eligibility for early parole consideration to state prison inmates convicted of nonviolent felonies who had completed the full term for their primary offense. Section 32 authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to adopt implementing regulations. CDCR adopted regulations, which excluded from early parole consideration nonviolent felony offenders sentenced to indeterminate sentences under California’s Three Strikes Law. In 2018, the California Court of Appeal found that the Regulations’ exclusion of these offenders was inconsistent with Section 32. CDCR amended the Regulations to include, for early parole consideration, state prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for nonviolent third-strike offenses and set a deadline of December 31, 2021, by which to schedule parole consideration hearings for previously-excluded offenders.The previously-excluded offenders filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, The CDCR defendants acted within the legislative sphere when they participated in the adoption of the Regulations. That the Regulations were later found to violate the California Constitution did not diminish their authority to adopt the Regulations in the first place. They were performing a legislative function when they adopted the Regulations and are entitled to legislative immunity. View "Jones v. Allison" on Justia Law

Plancarte, a licensed nurse from Mexico, obtained the position after the Mayor of Arteaga recommended her to the director of the hospital “because I had treated cartel members before in silence and the Mayor wanted” her to continue to work on cartel members. Plancarte recounted incidents during which armed men forcibly took her to “treat” people. She saw violence and rape; her family was threatened with violence. During one incident, a man “snatched” Plancarte’s infant son from her arms; another man pointed his gun at her mother and her son. Another time, they beat her until she bled, kidnapped her son, and forced her into a vehicle; after complying with their orders, she got her son back and fled to the U.S.The BIA affirmed the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Ninth Circuit remanded for a determination of whether the likelihood of torture if Plancarte were returned to Mexico is sufficient to warrant CAT relief. The Board’s rejection of Plancarte’s proposed particular social group of “female nurses” on the ground that “nursing” is not an immutable characteristic was unreasonable. Even if Plancarte ceased employment as a nurse, she would still be a nurse; the cartel targeted Plancarte precisely because of her special skills. The Board’s decision ignored uncontradicted record evidence showing both acquiescence and direct involvement by government officials. View "Plancarte-Sauceda v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit previously granted a petition for review of the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding where Dai, a citizen of China, alleged that he was beaten, arrested, jailed, and denied food, water, sleep, and medical care because he tried to stop the police from forcing his wife to have an abortion. The court held that neither the IJ nor the BIA made a finding that Dai's testimony was not credible.The Supreme Court held that the “deemed-true-or-credible rule” was irreconcilable with the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that a reviewing court must accept administrative findings as conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. If the BIA’s reasons for rejecting an alien’s credibility are reasonably discernible, it must be understood as having rebutted the presumption of credibility.On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed its prior order, finding that the BIA implicitly considered Dai’s statutory rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal to have been conclusively rebutted. By statute, an alien must satisfy the trier of fact that his factual claim is credible and also persuasive. Even if the BIA treats an individual’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. The agency’s findings of fact and conclusions are demonstrably reasonable; no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary View "Dai v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2010, AMN Healthcare contracted with Aya Healthcare to provide travel nursing services to healthcare facilities. The contract prohibited Aya from soliciting AMN’s employees. In 2015, Aya began actively soliciting AMN’s travel nurse recruiters. AMN temporarily terminated Aya’s access to AMN’s platform. The parties ended their relationship. Aya filed suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2, including a “per se” claim and a quick-look/rule-of-reason claim and claims for attempted monopolization and monopolization, and state law tortious interference and other claims. Aya claimed that it suffered exclusionary damages as a result of AMN’s non-solicitation covenant and retaliatory damages as a result of AMN’s termination of the relationship.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of AMN. The non-solicitation agreement is an ancillary, rather than a naked restraint, because it is reasonably necessary to the parties’ procompetitive collaboration; it is not per se unlawful but is subject to the rule-of-reason standard. Aya failed to satisfy its initial burden under that standard because it did not establish a triable issue of fact with respect to whether AMN’s nonsolicitation agreement has a substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant market. Aya’s claim for retaliatory damages failed because it did not present any evidence of a cartel or a concerted action in the termination of the agreement. View "Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Romero, a truck driver employed by Watkins, an interstate trucking business, made deliveries only to retail stores in California. To complete paperwork and training, Romero periodically logged in to an online portal that required a unique employee identification number and password. Romero’s unique user account completed a set of “Associate Acknowledgements,” through which he clicked “I Agree,” signifying that he read and agreed to the Arbitration Policy, a stand-alone agreement that purports to waive any right to bring or participate in a class action; it states that the agreement is “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and purports to waive "any provision of the FAA which would otherwise exclude [the agreement] from its coverage.” However, if "this [agreement] and/or its Waiver Provisions are not subject to and governed by the FAA, then the laws of the State of Nevada . . . will be the applicable state law.” The Arbitration Policy was not a condition of employment. Romero did not opt-out. In August 2019, Watkins announced it would cease operations. Romero and other employees were laid off.Romero filed a putative class action under the California and federal WARN Acts, 29 U.S.C. 2101, which require advance notice to employees before being laid off. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration. The NInth Circuit affirmed, while noting that the Federal FAA exemption of employment contracts for transportation workers applies and cannot be waived by private contract. View "Romero v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies of plaintiffs' action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Plaintiffs claim that the district court is failing its responsibilities to students under the IDEA by not timely identifying and evaluating students with disabilities, and, after identifying them, by providing them with insufficiently individualized, "cookie-cutter" accommodations and services. Although plaintiffs argue that exhaustion was not required because they are challenging district-wide policies that only a court can remedy, plaintiffs are unable to identify such policies. The panel agreed with the district court that plaintiffs have not satisfied any of the limited exceptions recognized by caselaw to the exhaustion requirement contained in 20 U.S.C. 1415(l). In this case, plaintiffs challenged what amounted to failures in practice by the school district, rather than policies or practices of general applicability. View "Student A v. San Francisco Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. View "Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland" on Justia Law

Ferguson and two others robbed Commerce Bank, wearing masks, then fled in a stolen car. Police quickly located the car and attempted a traffic stop. The car crashed. The men fled on foot. They were found nearby. Officers also located bags of cash (approximately $132,000) along their escape path. DNA evidence taken from recovered masks matched the co-conspirators. Charged with bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), 18 U.S.C. 371, they all pleaded guilty.The magistrate advised the defendants of their right to a jury trial, right to confront witnesses, and right against self-incrimination. Ferguson noted that he understood and still wished to plead guilty. The magistrate did not ask Ferguson whether he was entering the plea because of force, threats, or promises, nor inquire if Ferguson was pleading guilty voluntarily. He did not question Ferguson about recent drug or alcohol use, his level of education, his understanding of the proceedings, or if he had any mental impairments but determined that Ferguson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises. The Rule 11 plea colloquy for Ferguson and his co-defendants lasted about 10 minutes.The Ninth Circuit affirmed Ferguson’s 84-month sentence, 13 months below the low end of the Guidelines range. A defendant must show the Rule 11 violation’s impact on substantial rights before a court will undo a guilty plea. Ferguson cannot make such a showing. View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sharma entered the U.S. in 1997, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. In 2011, he was charged as removable. Sharma sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that he had been threatened by the Senior Superintendent of the Ludhiana, Punjab Police, Saini, based on Sharma’s investigation of the disappearance of Sharma's client. In 1997, days after a protest against Saini, police came to Sharma’s office, took Sharma’s files, tied Sharma’s hands, blindfolded him, put him in a van, and made threats, By phone, Saini told Sharma to “worry about [his] family,” and if he continued to investigate the disappearance. Sharma’s captivity lasted 18-19 hours. He does not identify any resulting physical injuries.After he left India, the police “initially harassed” Sharma’s wife. As of Sharma’s hearing, Saini worked as Chairman of the Punjab Police Housing Corporation. Sharma’s daughters live in Australia, Sharma’s wife splits her time between India, Australia, and the U.S.. Sharma’s son lives in India. None of Sharma’s family members has ever been physically harmed. The IJ found Sharma’s application timely, given changed circumstances, and his testimony “generally” credible but concluded that Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ denied voluntary departure based on Sharma’s 2011 DUI conviction. The BIA affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Sharma failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, given the family’s “travel history.” View "Sharma v. Garland" on Justia Law