Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Years ago, Bachmeier was convicted of state crimes. During one telephonic hearing, Bachmeier yelled a graphic, specific threat to gravely harm Judge Moran’s family. Bachmeier remains in state custody. Years later, Bachmeier filed a name change petition in Kenai, Alaska, which was randomly assigned to Judge Moran. The reassignment deadline passed before Bachmeier learned of the assignment. Bachmeier mailed a message to the Kenai Courthouse: Am requesting to cancel ... I would of struck Moran from this case as I have told her in the past Im going to kill her family which I still entend to do.” The clerk’s office forwarded it to Judge Moran’s chambers without reviewing its substance.Bachmeier was charged under 18 U.S.C. 876(c) for mailing a threatening communication. Bachmeier unsuccessfully argued that his request was addressed to the courthouse, not a natural person as 876(c) requires. The court rejected Bachmeier's request that the jury be instructed that it was required to find that “Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten” Judge Moran, instructing the jury to find either that Bachmeier “intended to communicate a threat... or acted with knowledge that the document would be viewed as a threat.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction. A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge, a natural person, was the addressee. The jury instruction was erroneous but the evidence overwhelmingly supported a finding that Bachmeier subjectively intended to threaten, so the error was harmless. View "United States v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

Matias, a native of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2014. El Salvadoran authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent gang. In Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree after being involved in a shooting that authorities determined was retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and identified Matias as an MS-13 “affiliate.” ICE detained Matias in 2018. Matias requested to be housed with a gang aligned with MS-13. An IJ denied him bond and later denied Matias relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review in 2021.Matias moved the BIA to reopen his case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding his request for CAT relief: claimed political changes in El Salvador and an alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a “snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El Salvador. The BIA denied his request for an emergency stay. Matias filed a habeas petition, asking the court to enjoin the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on his motion to reopen. The district court denied his motion. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, which denied Matias’s motion for a temporary restraining order, determining that 8 U.S.C. 1252(g)’s jurisdictional limits barred his claims. View "Rauda v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Lim, formerly a TForce California delivery driver, alleged that TForce employs delivery drivers and misclassifies them as independent contractors in violation of California law. The drivers sign an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement, providing that the agreement is governed by the laws of Texas, that “any legal proceedings … shall be filed and/or maintained in Dallas, Texas,” that all disputes “arising under, out of, or relating to this Agreement … including any claims or disputes arising under any state or federal laws, statutes or regulations, … including the arbitrability of disputes … shall be fully resolved by arbitration," that any arbitration will be governed by the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, that class actions are prohibited, and that the parties shall share the costs except in the case of substantial financial hardship--the prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, referring to the Agreement as an adhesion contract. Based on the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions, the district court correctly concluded the delegation clause, which requires the arbitrator to determine the gateway issue of arbitrability, the agreement was substantively unconscionable as to Lim. View "Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jones was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his girlfriend’s mother. After the California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence and denied his state habeas petition, Jones filed a federal habeas petition, raising multiple challenges to both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. The district court granted relief on Jones’s claim that the state trial court violated his right to present a complete defense; Jones should have been permitted to testify during the guilt phase about events from his childhood and his mental health history, and the trial court erred by conditioning such testimony on the presentation of a psychiatric expert who would explain the testimony’s relevance to Jones’s mental state during the murder.The Ninth Circuit reversed. The condition the trial court imposed on Jones’s testimony was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the valid purposes served by its ruling. The court remanded for the district court to consider Jones’s remaining claims. View "Jones v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 1949, the government of Saudi Arabia transferred certain land in that country to an official named Khalid Abu Al-Waleed Al-Hood Al-Qarqani, who leased it to an affiliate of what later became Chevron. Five of Al-Qarqani's heirs now claim that Chevron owes them billions of dollars in rent. Plaintiffs contend that an arbitration clause contained in a separate 1933 agreement between Saudi Arabia and Chevron's predecessor, SOCAL, applies to their dispute. An Egyptian arbitral panel agreed and awarded plaintiffs $18 billion. Plaintiffs then petitioned for enforcement of the arbitral award, but the district court found that the parties had never agreed to arbitrate and therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit, disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, that the absence of an agreement to arbitrate was a reason to deny enforcement on the merits, rather than to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The panel held that so long as a party makes a non-frivolous claim that an arbitral award is covered by the New York Convention, the district court must assume subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the panel affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as to Chevron USA because it was not named in the arbitral award and plaintiffs advanced no non-frivolous theory of enforcement. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the enforcement petition on the merits as to Chevron Corporation where there was no binding agreement to arbitrate between the parties. View "Al-Qarqani v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, domestic entities, entered into an insurance contract providing coverage for a Texas townhome complex that they own and operate. The Policy was underwritten by Lloyd’s, members of a foreign organization, and contains a mandatory arbitration provision, providing that the seat of the Arbitration shall be in New York and the Arbitration Tribunal shall apply the law of New York. In 2017, Hurricane Harvey caused an estimated $5,660,000 in damages to the townhome complex. A third-party claims administrator for Lloyd’s concluded that the Policy’s deductible was $3,600,000.Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Western District of Washington asserting breach of contract, failure to communicate policy changes, and unfair claims handling practices in violation of Washington law, asserting that the deductible should be $600,000. Lloyd’s moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings, arguing that the Policy’s arbitration provision falls within the scope of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Plaintiffs did not contest that the arbitration provision falls within the Convention’s scope but argued the provision is unenforceable because Washington law specifically prohibits the enforcement of arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. Plaintiffs cited the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011–15, which provides that state insurance law preempts conflicting federal law. On interlocutory review, the Ninth Circuit upheld an order granting Lloyd’s motion. Article II, Section 3 of the Convention is self-executing, and therefore is not an “Act of Congress” subject to reverse-preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. View "CLMS Management Services Limited Partnership v, Amwins Brokerage of Georgia" on Justia Law

Sanchez-Ruano, a citizen of Mexico, was admitted into the U.S. in 1995 as a visitor. He overstayed and has amassed criminal convictions including for possessing marijuana, receiving stolen property, DUI, and being the driver in two hit-and-runs. In 2013, he was charged with removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the country longer than permitted. He requested a continuance pending the status of his U Nonimmigrant Status application. After numerous continuances, his U-visa application was denied. The IJ found Sanchez-Ruano statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his conviction for marijuana possession, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2). Sanchez-Ruano argued that, given his previous admittance, section 1182(a)(2) did not apply to him for the purposes of cancellation of removal and that the personal use exception for violations involving 30 grams or less of marijuana under section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) rendered him eligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA dismissed his appeal without analyzing his argument.The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review. Aliens who have been admitted and commit certain crimes are deportable under section 1227(a); section 1229b(b)(1)(C) bars cancellation of removal if an alien has been convicted of “an offense under” sections 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3). Given Sanchez-Ruano’s conviction of an offense described under 1182(a)(2), the BIA correctly determined that he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation. View "Sanchez-Ruano v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2006, Wilson was sentenced to 352 months’ imprisonment for 11 counts of importation and sale of a controlled substance, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In 2015, pursuant to a stipulation under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), the court reduced Wilson’s sentence to 347 months, citing Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, which retroactively reduced the offense levels assigned to specified quantities of drugs. Wilson unsuccessfully sought reconsideration, arguing that to accomplish Amendment 782’s “full 2-point deduction,” he should have received the low end of the new Guidelines range--295 months.Wilson again sought sentence modification under section 3582(c)(2), arguing that to effectuate the original sentencing judge’s intent to sentence Wilson to a low-end guideline sentence, the court should modify his current term of imprisonment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. It is unclear whether Wilson is currently serving a term of imprisonment that is based, even in part, on a sentencing range that was lowered by Amendment 782. Assuming that Wilson is eligible to seek relief under 3582(c)(2), the judge considered the applicable section 3553(a) factors. Any error concerning the effect of Amendment 782 on the firearm offense was harmless. The decision was not substantively unreasonable; the judge was not required to give more weight to Wilson’s rehabilitative efforts than to the nature of Wilson’s conduct. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 1982, a court-martial convicted Hubbard of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. He previously filed unsuccessful federal habeas petitions and, in 2019, sought DNA testing under the Innocence Protection Act (IPA), 18 U.S.C. 3600(a), to prove his innocence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court was not the court that entered the judgment of conviction; Hubbard’s conviction was entered by a general court-martial, which has since dissolved, not in federal court. The court rejected Hubbard’s contentions that the district court had the power to grant his petition for DNA testing under the IPA or that the IPA should nonetheless be construed to allow him to petition for DNA testing in the district court because he would otherwise have no forum in which to seek his relief. The IPA, unlike the federal habeas statutes, does not provide a procedural mechanism for prisoners convicted by courts-martial to seek collateral relief in federal court. View "Hubbard v. United States" on Justia Law

Loyhayem filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)–(B), which prohibits robocalls to cellphones except for emergency purposes or with the prior express consent of the called party. Loyhayem received a call to his cell phone that left a pre-recorded voicemail message: Hi, this is Don with Fraser Financial... I recently saw your industry experience and I wanted to let you know that we’re looking to partner with select advisors ... I thought you might be a fit.” Loyhayem characterized this call as a “job recruitment call,” and alleged that it was made using an automated telephone dialing system and an artificial or pre-recorded voice and that he did not expressly consent to calls from Fraser.The district court dismissed Loyhayem’s suit, holding that the TCPA and the implementing regulation do not prohibit job-recruitment robocalls. The court read the Act as prohibiting robocalls to cell phones only when the calls include an “advertisement” or constitute “telemarketing,” as those terms have been defined by the FCC. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The statute prohibits in plain terms “any call,” regardless of content, that is made to a cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded voice. Loyhayem adequately alleged that the call he received was not made for emergency purposes and that he did not expressly consent to it. View "Loyhayem v. Fraser Financial & Insurance Services, Inc." on Justia Law